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ABSTRACT
Suing for Spanish: Puerto Ricans, Bilingual Voting, and Legal Activism in the 1970s
by
Ariel Arnau

Advisor: Clarence Taylor

This dissertation examines how the legal activism of a Puerto Rican group of activist-lawyers
and community members contributed to the reshaping of voting law and language policy during
the 1970s. The Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF) coordinated a series
of lawsuits in Chicago, New York City, and Philadelphia during the early 1970s. The decisions
in these lawsuits provided the legal framework to rewrite federal voting rights law during the
Voting Rights Act (VRA) reauthorization hearings in 1975. These cases resulted in vastly
expanded opportunity to vote for all language minorities in the United States. These civil rights
victories were challenged by the English Only movement during the 1980s. Again Puerto Rican
lawyers, activists, and elected officials in the Northeast coordinated efforts to prevent English
Only laws from becoming law.
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Introduction
In November 1980, Nelson Diaz, a Puerto Rican lawyer in Philadelphia, sat at his desk
and opened a hand-written letter. The letter he received was in response to an article he wrote in
the Philadelphia Bulletin on November 7th. The author of the letter reacted with ire to Diaz’s
defense of bilingual access to important social and political resources such as Spanish-language
translations at the Social Security office, bilingual education in the public school system, and
most importantly, bilingual access to voting.
Why all the concern about the Hispanics? If they treasure their language, why did they
leave these beloved associations? … when they [early European immigrants] came they
learned the language of this new country. There was no bilingual education, no bilingual
programs. The early settlers adapted to their new environment, learned the language and
all helped to make America great. Now, recently, minorities have endeavored to control
the earth. Why should reporters tell the difficulties of Spanish speaking voters? It will be
to our regret and our own detriment if the United States becomes a two-language country.
While you are concerned about your own people, give a little thought to the multitude of
others who also long for the good things in life.1

Aside from reflecting the attitude of many conservatives in 1980s suburban America towards
immigrants, this letter is particularly interesting because of its final request imploring Diaz to
consider “the multitude of others”. What the author of this letter failed to realize was that the
civil rights activism of Puerto Rican lawyers like Nelson Diaz and many others had a profound
impact upon United States language and voting policy that would touch the lives of all of those
who longed for one particular good thing in life … the ability to vote in their native language.
The story of voting rights activism by Puerto Ricans across multiple cities in the United States
during the 1970s is important because it broadens the scope of our understanding of the
movement for Puerto Rican civil rights in American history. By claiming important court

1

Letter from Helen Body to Nelson Diaz, November 10, 1980. Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Nelson Diaz Papers, Box 47,
Folder 1. Underlined text comes from the original document.
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decisions at the local level, Puerto Ricans paved the way for the institutionalization of bilingual
ballots across the entire United States and helped reshape the nation’s language policy.
Language policy in the United States over the course of the twentieth century has
vacillated between two points of view: restricting the use of languages other than English in the
public sphere or acknowledging the necessity of policies that allowed non-English speakers to
participate in civil society. English literacy requirements for voting were enacted in the
nineteenth century as a reaction to the growing numbers of European immigrants coming to the
United States. By 1924, eighteen states had some form of English literacy requirement.2 The
rationale behind this policy was that immigrants needed to learn English in order to assimilate
and make informed decisions. Public schools that provided German-language instruction to
students in states such as Pennsylvania and Ohio were forced to shift their curriculum to offer
classes solely in English during WWI.3 In addition, schools in the American Southwest and
California that provided both English and Spanish language instruction to students in the
nineteenth century were all required to use English as their primary language by the dawn of the
twentieth century.4 During the Cold War, foreign language acquisition was encouraged under
Title III and VI of the National Defense Education Act, and schools in Miami, Florida (such as
the Coral Way School) received federal and Ford Foundation funds to establish bilingual
education programs for the city’s growing Cuban population.5 While the turn towards
isolationism in the early twentieth century resulted in policy that steered the nation away from
2

Connecticut passed its English requirement in 1855; Massachusetts in 1857; Wyoming 1889; Mississippi in 1890;
Maine in 1892; California in 1894; South Carolina in 1895; Washington in 1896; Louisiana in 1898; North Carolina in
1900; Alabama in 1901; New Hampshire in 1902; Arizona in 1913; Georgia in 1908; Oklahoma in 1910; Virginia in
1902; New York in 1921; Oregon in 1924.
3
Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 176–193
4
Victoria-Maria McDonald, Latino Education in the United States: A Narrated History from 1513-2000 (PalgraveMcMillan, 2004), 55-73
5
John Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), Kindle edition
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foreign language acquisition, the need to look outside of the United States encouraged learning
other languages. These shifts in United States language affected not only the fifty states but its
territorial holdings as well.
It was during the early twentieth century when the United States began to reshape
language policy on the island of Puerto Rico in an effort to Americanize the island’s population.
As early as 1902, territorial laws such as the Official Languages Act elevated the social and
political status of the English language on the island. United States citizenship, conferred by the
Jones-Shafroth Act in 1917, allowed Puerto Ricans to freely travel between the mainland and the
island but only granted a second-class citizenship to Puerto Ricans; while they were citizens in
name, Puerto Ricans could not vote in Presidential elections nor for the governor of their own
island. Education policy during this period was changed to make English-language instruction
compulsory to all children in Puerto Rico. Although a policy of forced language assimilation was
implemented on the island, Spanish remained the primary language of day-to-day life on the
island.6 A shift occurred in this policy after WWII. The formation of the United Nations and the
various movements of national liberation within the European colonies made it more difficult for
the United States to retain possession of the island as a colony. In the aftermath of the war,
Puerto Ricans on the island were granted a degree of self-rule and the right to vote in their own
language for their own elected representatives. School instruction quickly reverted to Spanish
after the disastrous implementation of the English-Only curriculum. The recognition of Spanish
as the main language of the island created a precedent that legally acknowledged a language

6

For a more complete history of language policy for the island of Puerto Rico during the twentieth century, see
Sandra Rodriguez-Arroyo, “The Never Ending Story of Language Policy in Puerto Rico” in Teacher Education Faculty
Publications, Paper 74 (2013)
http://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1077&context=tedfacpub accessed on May 21,
2015. Also see Luis Raul Camara Fuertes, The Phenomenon of Puerto Rican Voting (University of Florida Press,
2004) and Amilcar Antonio Barreto, The Politics of Language in Puerto Rico (University of Florida Press, 2001)
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other than English (in this case Spanish) in the political and social life of an unincorporated U.S.
territory, yet Puerto Ricans who migrated to the mainland were still required to demonstrate their
proficiency in English before being allowed to vote.
During the height of the Civil Rights Movement (1954-1968), individual Puerto Ricans
living in the U.S. challenged the discriminatory voting practices leveled against those whose first
language was not English. In 1959, Jose Camacho filed an unsuccessful lawsuit against the New
York State Board of Elections in order to have the English literacy test removed as a requirement
for voting; he lost an appeal in 1961.7 After the passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in
1965, the New York State Board of Elections denied a Puerto Rican woman, Maria Lopez, the
right to vote because her first language was Spanish. In December 1965, a panel of three judges
determined that it was illegal for New York to forbid Lopez from voting.8 In 1966, the Supreme
Court of the United States (SCOTUS) decided that, in a lawsuit filed by Martha Cardona, New
York’s literacy requirement was unconstitutional.9 Although individual Puerto Rican plaintiffs
experienced some success in using the judicial system to guarantee access to the ballot box none
of these cases, however, provided an affirmative right for Puerto Ricans to vote in Spanish.
It was not until the 1975 reauthorization of the VRA that Spanish was allowed to be used
in the voting booth and this policy change was the result of judicial activism of Puerto Ricans
during the early 1970s. It was during this period when the Puerto Rican communities in Chicago,
New York City, and Philadelphia initiated lawsuits to ensure that each local Board of Elections
carry out the key provisions of the Voting Rights Act. While New York City had the largest
concentration of Puerto Ricans of any large city in the United States, both Philadelphia and
7

See Camacho v Doe (1959) and Camacho v Rodgers (1961)
See United States v Monroe County (1965). Section 4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act determined that any
American citizen educated in an “American-flag school” could not be prohibited from voting. This clause was
intentionally added to protect Puerto Ricans living in New York City.
9
Cardona v Power (1966)
8
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Chicago also contained sizeable Puerto Rican neighborhoods by the 1970s and continue to do so
in the early part of the twenty-first century. As a result of these lawsuits, judges in each city
entered injunctions that required the Board of Elections to print and distribute all election
materials in English and Spanish as well as provide bilingual staff, on-site that could assist
Spanish-speaking voters during elections. I argue that these legal battles waged by the Puerto
Rican activists in New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia established an important legal
precedent which lead to the expansion of voting rights for their own community and for other
language minorities as well.
Puerto Ricans represent a unique case in American political history since they are citizens
who were not required to learn English as a precondition of their citizenship.10 Citizenship,
however, did not guarantee these Spanish-speaking Americans equal voting rights. Puerto Ricans
in the United States faced the obstacle of English literacy requirements in order to exercise the
franchise. While they Ricans mounted challenges to these restrictive voting policies before 1973,
it was the Court’s decision in Chicago, the extension of this struggle into New York City, and the
culmination of this campaign with the decision in Philadelphia, which laid the groundwork for
amending the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1975 to include protection for language minorities
across the nation thus expanding the democratic process.11 Puerto Ricans, having been denied the
fundamental rights as citizens, responded to this civil rights violation by launching what would

10

While the Department of Homeland Security prefers applicants for naturalization to have “an understanding of
the English language, including an ability to read, write, and speak ... simple words and phrases ... in ordinary usage
in the English language ...” applicants of advanced age can be exempt from this requirement based upon the
number of years they have already lived within the United States. United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services, “A Guide to Naturalization”, p 26. https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/chapter4.pdf
accessed on September 17, 2016.
11
In the run-up to the 2012 Presidential election, 248 counties in the United States in 25 states were required to
provide bilingual elections in languages other than English. In Los Angeles, for example, voters could access ballots
in Spanish, Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, Khmer, Thai, Hindi, and Tagalog. Jessica Wilde, “More ForeignBorn Americans Voting in Native Languages” Voice of America News, November 6, 2012
http://www.voanews.com/content/article/1540732.html accessed on February 17, 2015
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become one of the most important civil rights campaigns in American history. The actions of the
activists and lawyers involved in this endeavor would have a profound impact on millions of
Americans and the nation.
The major civil rights organization that carried out the struggle for voting rights for
Puerto Ricans was the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF). Formed by a
trio of Puerto Rican lawyers in New York City in 1972, PRLDEF drew inspiration from other
groups of civil rights attorneys such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the MexicanAmerican Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF). For the founders of PRLDEF,
litigation was the best method to challenge discrimination and pursue social change. 12 In
response to the English-only vote, PRLDEF orchestrated a bilingual voting rights campaign that
resulted in arguably the most significant and lasting contribution of Puerto Ricans to civil rights
activism in the decade of the 1970s. This campaign was shaped as much by gender, race, and
class as it was guided by legal principles and judicial precedents.
In the early 1970s, PRLDEF both led and supported litigation to allow Puerto Ricans
living in cities like New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia to vote in Spanish. While New York
City bears the distinction of having the largest number of Puerto Ricans in a U.S. city, Chicago
and Philadelphia respectively contained the second and third most populous stateside Puerto
Rican communities. Each case within this larger campaign for bilingual elections created and
reinforced the idea that equal language access was a civil right that required federal protection. A
group of Puerto Rican grassroots activists in Chicago initiated (with the support of PRLDEF) a
lawsuit against the local Board of Elections. This lawsuit, PROPA v. Kusper (1973), was the first
case to explicitly mandate elections be conducted in both English and Spanish. The PROPA case
also bears the distinction of the only lawsuit in this campaign to go to trial while the cases in
12
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https://latinojustice.org/about/history/ accessed on May 8, 2015

New York and Philadelphia consisted of a series of meetings between attorneys and judges. In
New York City, the decisions in Lopez v Dinkins and Torres v Sachs created a “trigger-formula”
that resulted in bilingual elections and extended this right to the Chinese community (specifically
in school board elections). In Philadelphia, unlike Chicago and New York (where PRLDEF and
lawyers were in the forefront of the battle for bilingual elections), the struggle was led and won
by activist-lawyers and subsumed the voices of working-class Puerto Rican women into
PRLDEF’s larger agenda during this course of this litigation.
The civil rights campaign for bilingual elections had both intended and unintended
effects. The creation of a new protected class, “language minority”, was the direct result of the
litigation that PRLDEF supported and spearheaded. The VRA was originally passed to ensure
that qualified African-American voters were not subjected to unfair requirements in order to
vote. It was amended in 1970 to protect American citizens who did not possess full mastery of
the English language. While this change forbade the kinds of voter discrimination that AfricanAmericans in the South were subjected to for many years, it did not grant an affirmative right to
vote in Spanish. It was not until the 1975 VRA reauthorization by President Gerald Ford that
provisions protecting American citizens whose first language was not English were first
institutionalized. Looking at the local level, the activists (many of whom were men with law
degrees) who fought this battle hoped that allowing Puerto Ricans to vote in Spanish would
heighten voter turnout in their communities and lead to an increase in Puerto Rican elected
officials.
Another effect of this litigation was the backlash by advocacy groups supporting EnglishOnly policies. Founded in the wake of the successful campaign for bilingual voting,
organizations such as US English and English First waged their own battles to repeal bilingual

7

protection provisions at both the federal and state levels. By examining the Puerto Rican
experience with voter discrimination and the national strategy that activists utilized to achieve
protected status for language minorities, this dissertation will show how Puerto Rican activists
and lawyers became significant contributors towards the acquisition and retention of equal voting
rights for their community during the 1970s.
In order to better understand how equal language-access became a civil rights issue, I will
explore the struggle carried out by Puerto Ricans in New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. In
addition, this work will turn to the backlash against bilingual ballots in the 1980s and the
subsequent effort by Puerto Rican activists to preserve these civil rights victories. This
dissertation provides a deeper understanding of Puerto Rican activism and its political
development during the 1970s and 1980s.
Historiography:
For historians of the civil rights movement, the meaning of “civil rights” has generally
signified the promise of equality in American society. William Chafe conceived of civil rights
broadly as the legal protection of equal opportunity for all people in the areas of jobs, education,
and politics.13 Following this idea, Lang and Cha-Jua argue that, “civil and political rights
historically have been interwoven; for African Americans, civil rights have connoted
incorporation into the U.S. polity, as well as American civil society.” 14 Lang and Cha-Jua have a
more expansive understanding of civil rights beyond the ability to cast a vote and touch upon the
social significance of civil rights. While equal opportunity at housing, employment, and

13

William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom (Oxford
University Press, 1980), vii.
14
Clarence Lang and Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua, “Long Movement as Vampire: Temporal and Spatial Fallacies in Recent Black
Freedom Studies”, Journal of African American History, vol. 92 no. 2 (Spring 2007), 274
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education have all been areas where the idea of civil rights has been contested, the ability to vote
and the legal protections around the franchise are the main concern of this dissertation.
The historiography of the Civil Rights Movement in the twentieth century has expanded
over the past thirty years that a variety of subfields and interpretive discussions have unfolded.
Early accounts centered on first-person narratives/primary documents written by the participants
themselves or by journalists.15 By the 1970s, more academic studies began to interpret the
tumultuous events of this period in American history.16 With the publication of Aldon Morris’
The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in 1984, the field of civil rights scholarship begins to
change. He challenged the idea popularized by an earlier scholarship that the movement was
spontaneous in nature. The field has continued to expand since then to include debates over the
role of women in the movement.17 In addition, understanding the role of class difference within
the African-American community has also become an important theme in the history of the Civil
Rights Movement.18 A more recent transnational discussion has emerged through the
examination of the movement and the Cold War.19 While the story of a Puerto Rican civil rights

15

See Virgil Blossom, It Has Happened Here (Harper, 1959); Daisy Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock (University of Arkansas
Press, 1962); Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade: the Second American Revolution (Random House, 1964); Michael Dornan, We
Shall Overcome: a Reporter’s Eyewitness Account of the Year of Racial Strife and Triumph (Dell, 1965).
16
See Alan Wolk’s The Presidency and Black Civil Rights (Farleigh Dickenson University press, 1971); Steven Lawson’s Black
Ballots: Voting Rights in the South (Colombia University Press, 1976); Darlene Clark Hine’s Black Victory: the Rise and Fall of the
White Primary in Texas (University of Missouri Press, 1979); Richard Kluger’s Simple Justice (Vintage, 1976)
17
Important works in the discussion of women in the Civil Rights Movement include Belinda Robnett, How Long? How Long?:
African-American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Vicki Crawford ed., Women
in the Civil Rights Movement: Trailblazer and Torchbearers; Evans, Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil
Rights Movement & the New Left (Indiana University Press, 1993); Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom
Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and Bettye Collier-Thomas and V.P.
Franklin, ed., Sisters in the Struggle: African American Women in the Civil Rights-Black Power Movement (New York: New York
University Press, 2001).
18
See Clarence Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway: Class Politics, and Black Freedom Struggle in St. Louis, 1936-1975 (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2009), Brian Kelly, Race, Class, and Power in the Alabama Coalfields, 1908-21 (Chicago: University
of Illinois Press, 2001); Jack Bloom, Class, Race, and the Civil Rights Movement: the Changing Political Economy of Southern
Racism (Indiana University Press, 1987); and Michael Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis
Workers (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993).
19
Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2011); Justin Hart, “Making Democracy Safe for the World: Race, Propaganda and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy
during World War II” in Pacific Historical Review 73:1 (Fall, 2004); Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line:
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movement is largely absent from these texts, the struggle for equality among Puerto Ricans (and
other Latinos) has developed into its own subfield and this dissertation speaks to this growing
body of literature.
Much of the literature on Latino civil rights focuses upon the various campaigns waged
by Puerto Rican and Mexican-Americans (in the areas of employment, housing, and education)
and how these struggles and civil rights activism intersected with other racially marginalized
groups (either other Latino nationalities or African-Americans). Within this discussion, three
patterns have emerged. Some of the scholarship emphasizes the degree of collaboration between
racialized groups.20 Other scholars focus upon competition between racialized groups over
social, political, and economic access.21 A third current within this scholarship seeks a more
nuanced approach by emphasizing the changing nature of relations between racial groups over
time.22 What connects all of these interpretive frameworks is the focus upon moments when
activism causes different racial minorities to intersect with one another and how these moments
reshape identity. My dissertation will take up this conversation but will focus instead upon the

American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); and Penny Von Eschen, Race Against
Empire: Black Americans and Anti-colonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
20
Lauren Araiza, To March for Others: The Black Freedom Struggle and the United Farm Workers (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Max Krochmal Blue Texas: The Making of a Multiracial Democratic Coalition in the Civil Rights Era
(Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Jakobi Williams, From Bullet to Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of the Black
Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Laura Pulido, Black,
Brown Yellow, and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Shana Bernstein, Bridges
of Reform: Interracial Civil Rights Activism in Twentieth Century Los Angeles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)
21
Brian Benkhen, Fighting Their Own Battles: Mexican-Americans, African-Americans, and the Struggle for Civil Rights in Texas
(University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Nicolas C. Vaca, Presumed Alliance: The Unspoken Conflict between Latinos and
Blacks and What it Means for America (New York: Harper Collins, 2004); William Clayson, Freedom is Not Enough: The Civil
Rights Movement and the War on Poverty in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010)
22
See Lilia Fernandez, Brown in the Windy City: Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Postwar Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2012); Sonia Lee, Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement: Puerto Ricans, African Americans, and the Pursuit of Racial
Justice in New York City (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Frederick Douglass Opie, Upsetting the Apple
Cart: Black-Latino Coalitions in New York City from Protest to Public Office (New York: Colombia University Press, 2015); Gordon
Mantler, Power to the Poor: Black-Brown Coalition and Fight for Economic Justice, 1960-1974 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2013); Brian Behnken, Civil Rights and Beyond: African-American and Latino/a Activism in the Twentieth Century
United States (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2016)
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ways in which the activism of one group (in this case Puerto Ricans) impacted the civil rights of
other racialized groups.
The scholarship on Latino civil rights highlights the importance of intersectionality – an
idea developed by Patricia Collins and Kimberle Crenshaw.23 While Crenshaw and Collins focus
on the ways that multiple forms of oppressions – in this case gender and race – overlap in the
construction of identity, the subfield of Latino civil rights places emphasis on the points of
contact between different social movement for racial equality. These points of contact tended to
result in either conflict or in collaboration. Brian Behnken, in his most recent book Civil Rights
and Beyond: African-American and Latino/a Activism in the Twentieth Century United States,
reminds us of the importance of placing the convergence of activism in both communities at the
front of any discussion of interracial politics.24 This convergence, however, does not always take
the form of active movements clashing or working alongside one another. Mark Brilliant
observed in his book The Color of America Has Changed that California’s separate streams of
civil rights activism among the various ethnic and racial groups “never came together long
enough to form a river.”25 Although different racial groups did not always collaborate with one
another, the contributions of one oppressed minority affected the fortunes of others regardless of
the degree to which different racialized communities collaborated or competed with one another.

23

Patricia Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New York: Routledge,
1999). Collins conceptualized intersectionality as the place where African-American thought, particularly centered on race and
class, converged with Feminist ideas about power relations and oppression. She is particularly interested in the ways in which
the Black Feminism as an intellectual project affects the activism of Black women. Kimberly Crenshaw argues that

intersectionality is critical to understanding of Black women’s lives since neither race nor gender taken individually
can fully capture the nuances of their experience with discrimination. See Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color” Stanford Law Review, volume
43, number 6 (July 1991), 1241.
24
Brian Behnken, Civil Rights and Beyond, 5
25
Mark Brilliant, The Color of America Has Changed: How Racial Diversity Shaped Civil Rights Reform in California,
1941-1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 264; Brian Behnken, “Comparative Civil Rights: Notes on the
Field of Black-Brown Relations and Multiethnic Freedom Struggles, Journal of Civil and Human Rights, vol. 1, No. 2
(Fall/Winter 2015), 216
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It is undeniable that the gains made by African-Americans in the realm of voting rights in
the 1960s helped create a legal foundation which helped the cause of Puerto Rican voting rights
in the 1970s. Similarly, legal battles won by the Asian-American community helped pave the
way for federal investment in bilingual education programs for Latinos in the mid to late
twentieth century.26 In addition, gains made by Latinos in the cause of school desegregation
supported African-Americans for integrated education.27 It is this form of intersectionality of
civil rights struggles among racially marginalized groups that is important for understanding the
story of bilingual ballots. The legacy of African-American activism on the issue of voting rights
created a space in which Puerto Rican activists and their allies could expand the meaning of
these rights to address the concerns of their community. In turn, the victories won by these
Puerto Rican activists would affect the fortunes of all other language-minorities in the United
States.
Mark Brilliant’s scholarship is particularly important to this conceptualization of
intersectionality. He argues that the impact of Asian-Americans and Latino activism in
California pushes the historiography of the Civil Rights Movement beyond mere delineations of
space/region or time/chronology. Just as the movement for social justice in the 1960s and 1970s
incorporated a wide variety of fronts upon which to conduct battle, the activists involved in this
struggle also deployed a variety of different tactics to achieve their goals. “The country’s civil
rights past must not only be understood as ‘long’, as recent civil rights historians have argued,
but ‘wide’ – wide regionally, wide racially, and above all wide substantially with respect to the

26

Lau v. Nichols
Mendez, et al v. Westminster School District of Orange County, et al, 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, 161
F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947); Jared Wallace, “Mendez et. al v. Westminster et. al’s Impact on Social Policy and MexicanAmerican Community Organization in Mid-Century Orange County” Voces Novae vol. 5 No. 1 (2013); Philippa
Strum, Mendez v. Westminster: School Desegregation and Mexican-American Rights (University Press of Kansas,
2010)
27
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axes of discrimination that civil rights reformers tackled and the avenues of redress they
pursued.”28 Brilliant’s way of understanding the Civil Rights Movement, and the collected work
of scholars who explore Latino civil rights, challenges the Black/White biracial paradigm which
pervades much of the literature on the larger movement for equality during the 1960s and 1970s.
This dissertation will add to the discussion of Puerto Rican (and Latino) civil rights by
examining the points of convergence between grassroots activism, the work of lawyer-activists,
and the larger discussions around language policy and voting rights in the United States during
the 1970s and 1980s.
This dissertation also makes critical interventions in the literature on language policy.
The literature of language rights and voting rights is largely focused on the legal rationale behind
bilingual ballots or debated the value of bilingualism in American society.29 Noted conservative
scholar Abigail Thernstrom contends that the VRA outlived its usefulness in the wake of Barak
Obama’s 2008 Presidential Election victory. When discussing the 1975 reauthorization of the
VRA and bilingual ballots, she argues that Congress erred when it equated the kinds of voter
discrimination encountered in the South under Jim Crow with the problems that MexicanAmericans and Puerto Ricans encountered at the ballot box.30 While Carlos Soltero is more
sympathetic to bilingualism than Thernstrom, his only analysis of the Puerto Ricans struggle for
voting rights is confined to the Supreme Court decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan (and its
companion case Cardona v Power) in the 1960s which reaffirmed the ban on literacy tests being
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used to disenfranchise voters.31 His focus on Supreme Court cases limits his ability to examine
rulings in the lower courts and this causes him to assign more causative power to the Katzenbach
case than to PROPA v. Kusper and its associated cases in New York City and Philadelphia.
James Thomas Tucker also errs when he argues that “bilingual voting materials and Spanish
language assistance had to be provided under Section 4(e)” of the VRA. 32 He incorrectly cites
court decisions like Torres v Sachs which came almost ten years after the 1965 VRA. More
recent books that discuss the 1975 reauthorization of the VRA misplace their focus by
highlighting the role of individuals who were visible at the federal level without acknowledging
the important precedent established by the cases in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia.33
These texts all suffer from one central flaw; they all obfuscate the role Puerto Rican activists
played in the expansion of civil rights through a coordinated campaign that was national in
scope.

Chapter Outline

This dissertation opens with an examination of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
role that Puerto Ricans played in the construction of this important piece of civil rights
legislation. The voting dilemmas of Puerto Ricans in New York were an important issue for
elected officials and the New York City-based Puerto Rican activists who testified in Congress.
31
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The first chapter will also analyze the cases of Puerto Ricans seeking to vote in Spanish before
1970. While an isolated court case at the end of the nineteenth century points to a much longer
arc of Puerto Rican political activism, the bulk of these voting rights lawsuits transpired between
1958 and 1970. What connects these cases is the desire by Puerto Ricans to assert their own
claim to the same kinds of civil rights protections that African-Americans were granted during
the 1960s. They also demonstrate a commitment by Puerto Ricans to use the judicial system to
create election reform and voting rights. In order to justify this claim, attorneys representing
these Puerto Ricans began to conceptualize language as an element of race to achieve victory in
these cases. None of these cases, however, resulted in bilingual ballots. To that end, Puerto
Ricans lawyers formed PRLDEF to pursue this agenda.
Chapter two will explore the first lawsuit in this larger campaign for bilingual elections in
Chicago. Activists within Chicago’s Puerto Rican community sought to file litigation against the
City of Chicago and reached out to PRLDEF for support with this endeavor. This case, PROPA v
Kusper, was significant because it was the only case in this campaign that went to trial and the
witness testimony reveals the deeper organizing tradition amongst Chicago’s Puerto Rican
community. Multiple community based organizations came together to form the Puerto Rican
Organization for Political Action (PROPA). As attitudes among Chicago residents soured
against Puerto Ricans in the wake of well-publicized riots in the late 1960s, community activists
saw the need to gain control of political power in their community.
The lawsuit in New York City, being the largest population center for Puerto Ricans on
the mainland, was very different from the litigation in Chicago and is the subject of Chapter
Three. Unlike Chicago, where activists set the agenda for the lawsuit, it was the attorneys from
PRLDEF who orchestrated a pair of cases against the local Board of Elections. The first lawsuit
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concerned the ability to vote in school board elections while the second was concerned with
expanding their recent favorable court decision into the general elections. In both of these
lawsuits, PRLDEF allied with the Chinese-American community in order to strengthen its bid for
bilingual ballots. As a result of these two cases, an important trigger formula was created that
would eventually wind its way into federal civil rights law.
The fourth chapter examines how PRLDEF’s campaign for Spanish-language voting was
extended into Philadelphia. While Chicago’s case was driven by the desires of local community
activists and the New York lawsuits were tightly controlled by PRLDEF, the litigation in
Philadelphia was simultaneously driven by both local actors and PRLDEF. The way in which
gender and class distinctions within the Puerto Rican community were articulated in this case,
Arroyo v Tucker, sheds light on the tensions within this framework of political activism. This
chapter will also assess the political fortune of the Puerto Rican community in the wake of this
legislation.
Chapter five will shift away from the Puerto Rican communities of the East Coast and
Midwest and investigate how these cases provided and important legal logic that contributed to
bilingual voting for other language-minority groups in 1975. As the United States Commission
on Civil Rights studied the impact of the voting rights on African-Americans it also paid close
attention to the voting rights of other racial minorities such as Puerto Ricans and MexicanAmericans. Of special interest to this Commission were the decisions rendered in the bilingual
voting lawsuits initiated by Puerto Ricans. The Commission’s report was a key piece of evidence
offered during Congressional subcommittee hearings as the VRA was due for renewal in 1975.
During these hearings, elected officials and activists offered support for enshrining voting rights
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protections for language minorities into federal law. This would open the door for a wide variety
of languages being utilized in United States elections.
The final chapter will examine the fallout of the 1975 VRA. In the early 1980s, an
organized movement developed in California and its agenda was to dismantle bilingual education
and bilingual ballots. This movement, often referred to as English-Only, was lead by former
United States Senator Samuel Hayakawa and his organization US English. This organization,
with its fundraising operation and high-profile board members, helped to craft many state-level
laws which sought to outlaw the use of Spanish in elections as well as seeking to cripple the
implementation of bilingual education in public schools. While US English was very successful
in its west coast campaigns, it encountered stiff resistance when pushing eastwards into regions
with sizable Puerto Rican populations. Puerto Rican elected officials organized resistance within
local state legislatures while community activists mobilized utilizing direct-action protest to
successfully resist the efforts of US English.

I utilize a combination of archival materials along with oral histories to tell the story of
Puerto Rican voting rights activism in the 1970s and 1980s. One of the challenges in using the
oral histories of the activists and lawyers I interviewed for this dissertation is reconstructing the
past while recognizing that memory is highly subjective. I provide context to these recollections
through the use of print media (in both English and Spanish), court records, and documents of
civil rights organizations that were involved in this civil rights campaign. I began conducting
these interviews in 2013 as the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) struck down
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. Many of the individuals contextualized their activities in
previous decades in light of more recent events. The interviews conducted for this dissertation

17

consist of lawyers and activists that were directly involved in the campaign for bilingual
ballots.34 While many of these activists and lawyers had roots in the experience of the workingclass Puerto Rican community, this group of individuals was part of a small but growing cadre of
upwardly-mobile community leaders.
In addition to sources, this dissertation approaches the topic of this Puerto Rican rights
struggle for bilingual voting by combining both institutional and grassroots perspectives. The
tendency in the scholarship has been to focus on either one of these methodologies. For example,
Brilliant focuses his work on the civil rights legal cases in California, while Sonia Lee examines
Puerto Rican activists in the fight for jobs and education in New York. By examining both the
Puerto Rican civil rights struggles, in and outside of the courts, as well as including an analysis
of the key grassroots activists and attorneys involved in this struggle across multiple United
States cities, this dissertation will complicate our understanding of the Puerto Rican movement
for civil rights by demonstrating the points of contact between activists and the political
structures these activists sought to change.
This dissertation focuses upon the most significant contribution of Puerto Rican lawyers
and activists to voting rights and language policy in the 1970s and 1980s. As these community
leaders organized to create both judicial and legislative change for Puerto Rican voters, they
carved out a space in the history of Puerto Rican civil rights activism that has not been explored.
This project will expand Latino Studies and civil rights movement literature by putting Puerto
Ricans at the center of the language rights campaign in the late twentieth century. In the existing
literature, the story of Puerto Rican participation in the struggle for civil rights in the United
States has been largely dominated by stories of the Young Lords and other groups from the
34
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militant Left. This coverage is understandable because the generation of Puerto Rican youth that
participated in the Young Lords became part of the first major wave of mainland-born Puerto
Rican scholars. Many of these scholars focused on working-class radical movements and ignored
the contribution of more reformist, upwardly mobile activists. Moreover, the romantic appeal of
their anti-authoritarian rhetoric has maintained its appeal with succeeding generations of Puerto
Rican scholars and readers. While this trend is beginning to change with some of the more recent
work on the Puerto Rican civil rights movement, the problem with a focus on the radical push in
the late 1960s and early 1970s is that it negates the wide range of responses that the Puerto Rican
community articulated during these civil rights struggles and the internal class dynamics within
these Puerto Rican communities during the 1970s. The actions of civil rights organizations like
PRLDEF represented a different method of voicing a community’s opposition to the status quo.
While they were not necessarily collaborating with the various institutions of the state, they were
willing to press for change without using leftist militant rhetoric to create a national movement
with the goal of securing equal voting rights for all Puerto Ricans.
This dissertation will shed light on the varied responses of Puerto Ricans in these three
cities and it will open up new questions for scholars looking at the development of the movement
for Puerto Rican civil rights. Specifically, how did Puerto Rican involvement in movements of
social justice evolve during the 1970s and into the 1980s and 1990s? What was the changing role
of community-based organizations and electoral representation in that struggle? This dissertation
will challenge the assumption that the civil rights movement for Puerto Ricans was peripheral to
the main wave of civil rights activism. While the passing of the VRA was the result of a
combination of grassroots organizing within the African-American community and federal
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legislation, it was the work of the Puerto Rican community that sought to enforce these policies
not only for its own benefit but for the benefit of all language-minorities.
As voting rights in the United States come under attack from political forces that seek to
limit the power of traditionally marginalized groups such as people of color, women, naturalized
immigrants, and the poor, this dissertation provides a counter-narrative that illustrates the ability
of racial minorities to utilize mechanisms of power to create change. During the 1970s, Puerto
Rican activists sought to institutionalize equal language rights for their community in both the
federal courts and Congress. These legal reformers framed their grievance using a liberal
democratic framework which demanded that similar voting rights protections provided to
African-Americans be extended to Puerto Ricans. In the process of protecting the civil rights of
Puerto Ricans, the federal government would enshrine equal language protection for all
language-minorities. When these rights came under attack in the 1980s, Puerto Ricans again
turned to the legislature for relief but also raised awareness using public-protest. If we
understand the historical context of this particular civil rights movement, it can broaden our
understanding of the Puerto Rican movement for civil rights in the latter half of the twentieth
century, how these gains made by these activists were sustained in the face of fierce resistance,
and how the gains made by these activists were extended to include other Latinos, AsianAmericans, and other language minorities.
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Chapter 1: Puerto Rican Voting Rights and the Origins of PRLDEF
The decade of the 1960s saw a number of important advances in a larger, national civil
rights agenda. The Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964, 1968, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA) were all landmark pieces of federal legislation that sought to rectify institutionalized
racial discrimination against African-Americans. In addition to the more well-known voting
rights activism of African-Americans, Puerto Ricans waged their own struggle in the courts for
equal voting rights during the 1960s. Some of these cases were successful while others were not.
In the legislative arena, Puerto Ricans were also active in the construction of the VRA. Taken
together, these episodes of legislative and judicial activism demonstrate that equal and
meaningful access to the vote had long been a concern of Puerto Ricans living in the United
States. This desire for equal access to the ballot box helped spark the creation of a civil rights
organization dedicated to litigating voting rights cases on behalf of the Puerto Rican diaspora.
Having physical access to the ballot box, however, was not enough for Puerto Rican activists.
What they desired was equal access to a meaningful vote and this meant being able to vote in
Spanish. The work of individual activists and elected officials around the issue of voting rights
during the 1960s is important to understand because it provided the legal framework for bilingual
ballots in the 1970s.
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The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the voting rights activism of the Puerto Rican
community in New York State before the PROPA v Kusper trial in 1972. In addition, this chapter
will discuss the origins of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF) since
this civil rights organization played a pivotal role in the various cases in Chicago, New York, and
Philadelphia. I will discuss PRLDEF’s role as a reformist organization and the way that
foundation funding played a significant role in establishing the parameters of PRLDEF’s
mission.
Legal scholars have paid some attention to the pre-1970 voting rights cases where Puerto
Ricans were plaintiffs. This attention has usually been reserved for a brief mention of the case
with the majority of attention being placed on either Section 4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act
(VRA) or on the 1975 reauthorization of the VRA.35 What is missing from these accounts is a
connection with the existing civil rights organizing efforts in New York’s Puerto Rican
community. In these narratives, the plaintiffs are largely absent as the focus turns towards high
profile members of Congress or the Supreme Court. Court documents for these cases tell us very
little about the Puerto Rican plaintiffs themselves and any connection these individuals may have
had with existing civil rights organizations. We can infer, however, that individual Puerto Rican
plaintiffs had some connection to civil rights agencies since the plaintiffs in some of these cases
(the Camacho and Cardona cases discussed below) were willing and capable of filing these legal
applications on multiple occasions. What they also reveal was that Puerto Ricans envisioned
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their citizenship in ways that pushed policymakers to create reforms that broadened the civil
rights protections available to Puerto Ricans living in the United States.
An important element of the legislative reforms that expanded voting rights for Puerto
Ricans living in the United States was a shift in the notion of race and racism as it pertained to
this community. Legal scholar Derick Bell argued that racism is a permanent component of
American life.36 Karen and Barbara Fields argue that race does not, in and of itself, exist but is a
byproduct of racism. Racism, for Fields, refers to the theory and the practice of applying a
social, civic, or legal double standard.37 Race “does not depend on physical difference, can do
without visible markers, and owes nothing at all to nature. As the social alchemy of racecraft
transforms racism into race, disguising collective social practice as inborn individual traits, so it
entrenches racism in a category to itself …”38 This definition is useful in understanding how
Spanish became racialized; it became inextricably intertwined to the racial identity (as opposed
to the cultural identity) of Puerto Ricans in the United States through judicial decisions where the
power of the State and the will of a marginalized community met.
Language became a codified marker of race (as it pertained to Puerto Ricans) in United
States voting law during the mid-1960s and 1970s. By moving language from a cultural
characteristic into an element of racial identity, lawmakers, attorneys, and activists sought to
conceptualize Puerto Ricans away from whiteness and closer to African-Americans for the
purposes of civil rights protections. Prior to 1980, Puerto Ricans (along with Cubans and
Mexican-Americans) were classified as White by the United States Census. Before the use of the
term Hispanic in 1980, the U.S. Census accounted for demographic changes in communities like
Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans using supplementary reports on Spanish-language
36
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speakers. The civil rights activism by Puerto Ricans around the issue of voting rights was a key
factor in this shift.

The Voting Rights Act
Many scholars have written about the history of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The
passage of the act has been hailed by some as the crowning achievement of the civil rights
movement. David Garrow, in his book Protest at Selma, argues that the previous civil rights
legislation of 1957, 1960, and 1964 did not capture the public imagination the way that the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 did due to Martin Luther King’s masterful use on non-violent
coercion and the attention garnered by the events of “Bloody Sunday”.39

For Landsberg,

Alabama was indeed the site of the events that led to the passage of the VRA but he chooses to
focus voting rights litigation in the lower courts and how these cases influenced the final version
of the VRA.40 Gary May, author of Bending Towards Justice, focuses his narrative on the rankand-file activists and lesser known political figures who helped make enhanced voting rights a
reality for African-Americans.41 These scholars, however, overlook the presence of Puerto
Ricans in the discussion of federal voting rights protections.42 By ignoring the participation of
Puerto Rican activists in the passage of the VRA, the literature has effectively negated the
possibility that Puerto Ricans were participants in their own civil rights struggles.
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In order to better understand the impact that VRA had on Puerto Ricans and how they
played a role in shaping civil rights law, we must examine their activism. We can trace the
impact that Puerto Ricans had upon the VRA by examining Section 4(e) of the law. Section 4(e)
states: “Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the fourteenth amendment of
persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom language was
other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the States from conditioning the right to vote of
such persons on ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English
language.”43 The language of this clause, at first, might seem odd since it does not make any
specific mention of Puerto Ricans within its text. The clause “American-flag school” meant any
school where the American flag (and the United States federal government) exerted influence.
This included schools in the United States and its territories such as Puerto Rico and Guam.
Drafted by New York Senators Jacob Javits and Robert Kennedy, Section 4(e) was designed to
prevent voting discrimination against the Puerto Rican community of New York. This clause,
however, did not allow Puerto Ricans to vote in their native language.44 Not every member of the
Senate agreed with the language of this proposed clause. Senator Samuel Ervin Jr. of North
Carolina argued that it was the responsibility of the New York State Assembly to change New
York voting laws. Kennedy argued that in light of the inaction of the New York State legislature
to move on this issue, it was incumbent upon Congress to protect these Spanish-speaking
American citizens. Javits added that Section 4(e) would, “make a great difference in the feeling
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of … belonging of 300,000 potential voters.”45 While Javits and Kennedy deserve credit for
writing this part of the VRA, the issue of voting discrimination against Puerto Ricans was raised
by a number of other elected officials and community members.
The voting rights of Puerto Ricans in the United States were discussed within the House
as well as the Senate. In the wake of Bloody Sunday and Lyndon Johnson’s speech on voting
rights, hearings were held by the venerable New York Congressman Emmanuel Celler. Celler
was first elected to Congress in 1923. Celler, as head of the House Judiciary Committee, was
involved in the passage of previous civil rights legislation and spearheaded immigration
reform.46 The House Judiciary Committee began its hearings in March 1965 and interviewed a
number of elected officials from New York who spoke in support of the elimination of the
literacy test as a qualification for voting. Among these was Congressman Jacob H. Gilbert whose
district incorporated parts of the Bronx. Gilbert introduced a bill to eliminate the literacy test
from voting if the individual completed the sixth grade in the United States or any of its
territories. “By having a literacy test only in English for these American citizens we are
discriminating against them.”47
What is interesting about Gilbert’s proposal was that he never proposed to have the
option to vote in Spanish for Puerto Ricans even though he recognized that their primary
language was Spanish. His primary concern was finding a method to getting around the New
York State English literacy exam. Other elected officials also framed the discussion of Puerto
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Rican voting rights by focusing upon the English literacy exam rather than acknowledging the
racial motivation behind this form of discrimination. Congressman Leonard Farbstein’s district
encompassed the Lower East Side and Puerto Ricans were among his constituents. He favored
the complete abolition of the literacy test as a means to qualifying voters. For Farbstein, these
tests were implemented in a discriminatory manner against Puerto Ricans. “As my own State of
New York where countless Spanish-speaking citizens, who are perfectly literate in their own
tongue, and who often have high school or college degrees, are denied this basic right because
they are not literate in English.”48 Farbstein and Gilbert both envisioned the kinds of
discrimination that Puerto Ricans endured was similar to the kind encountered by Italian and
Jewish immigrants in the early twentieth century (ethnic discrimination) rather than the kind that
African-Americans faced (racial discrimination). By framing Puerto Ricans as an ethnic group
rather than a racial group, Farbstein and Gilbert implied that this group of Spanish speakers
would over time move towards “whiteness” and become more fully incorporated into American
society in a similar way in which Oscar Handlin’s book The Uprooted supported the notion
coming out of the Chicago-school that European immigration to the United States was
unidirectional, permanent, and invariably resulted in assimilation.49
Other New York City politicians were less reticent about connecting Puerto Ricans’
experience with voter discrimination to the issue of race. Congressman Abraham Multer, who
represented the citizens of Upper Manhattan and the Bronx, made the connection between race
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and Puerto Rican voter discrimination explicit. “Language … is considered an attribute of race.
The New York law does not test literacy … it tests rather proficiency in the English language
and thereby discriminates against U.S. citizens on an attributable racial basis.”50 Multer argued
that because the kind of voter discrimination Puerto Ricans encountered was based upon race,
Puerto Ricans could be protected under the 15th Amendment which prohibited the government
from denying a citizen the right to vote based upon that citizen’s race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. The association of language and race within the context of voting rights
by Multer was a small but significant leap of legal logic that would be used later by Puerto Rican
attorneys and activists to expand the voting rights of all language minorities.
Pressure to protect Puerto Ricans under the 1965 VRA came from within the Puerto
Rican community of New York in addition to the support lent by their elected officials. A
contingent of Puerto Rican activists came together and testified on behalf of their community in
New York City. This group consisted of Mrs. Irma Vidal Santaella, representing the Legion of
Voters, was the first Puerto Rican woman admitted to the New York State Bar Association. She
worked alongside Javitts and Kennedy to help craft the language for Section 4(e).51 Along with
Vidal Santaella and Badillo was Gilberto Gerena Valentin. Gerena Valentin became a labor
organizer after his migration to the United States in 1937 and created a number of different
Puerto Rican community organizations including the Puerto Rican Day Parade and the National
Association of Puerto Rican Civil Rights.52 Speaking on behalf of the group was Herman Badillo
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who supported a national ban on literacy tests as a voting requirement for all citizens. While he
acknowledged the arguments made by others who also sought this ban, Badillo highlighted the
value of Puerto Rican citizens to the overall security and growth of the United States. He cited
how Puerto Ricans were never asked for a literacy test as a prerequisite to military service and
argued that English literacy, likewise, should not be a prerequisite to voting. The presence of
literacy tests, however, was not the only obstacle in the path of prospective Puerto Rican voters:
Literacy test certificates suddenly disappear so that it takes 2 ½ hours or maybe all day by
the time a new supply is received from the central office of the board of education.
Pencils and other supplies are found to be lacking and I can say from personal experience
that I have had to buy pencils from a local candy store in order that people in line could
go in and take the literacy test. Polling places and registration places are closed before the
time scheduled by law … 14 Puerto Ricans, some of whom had waited as long as 5 or 6
hours to register, were turned away because a local school was closed a half hour before
the time to register had expired.53
Badillo, through his testimony, contextualized much of the discrimination encountered by Puerto
Rican voters in New York. In describing the purchasing of more pencils from a local candy store
and those aspiring voters who waited for hours to vote only to be turned away, he demonstrated
that the Puerto Rican community was not only subjected to a burdensome voting requirement in
the form of a literacy test, but that these voters were denied other resources that would allow
them to have equal access to the vote. The presence Badillo and his compatriots at this hearing
also demonstrates that Puerto Ricans were actively engaged in their own quest for political and
social equality and were not the beneficiaries of the largesse of well-intentioned politicians. In
fact, the advocacy work of Badillo, Santaella, and Gerena Valentin represented only a fraction of
the larger network of Puerto Rican civil rights activists in the United States. Prior to these
hearings, a series of lawsuits initiated by Puerto Rican plaintiffs transpired which demonstrated a
continuous push, not only for the dismantling of discriminatory barriers to voting like a literacy
53
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test, but the ability to vote in Spanish. Like their African-American counterparts, Puerto Rican
activists utilized both legislative and litigative means to achieve their ends.

Early Puerto Rican Voting Rights Cases
The earliest examples of Puerto Ricans using the courts to attain equal voting rights in the
United States go back to the end of the nineteenth century. After the Spanish-American War
concluded with the Treaty of Paris in 1898, the United States gained direct control over Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Philippines while exerting a great deal of influence over Cuba. Under the
new regime, many policy changes came to the island of Puerto Rico including the
implementation of English as the official language of the island and its educational system.
Scholars have argued that these policy changes were made in an effort to minimize the
importance of Spanish and undermine the cultural heritage of Puerto Ricans in order to pave the
way for the Americanization of the island.54 During the first two years of United States control
over the island of Puerto Rico (1898-1900), it was the military and not civilian authorities that
managed the day-to-day-affairs of the island. It was in this context that the earliest evidence of
Puerto Rican voting rights struggles can be found.
In 1899, litigation was filed by a Puerto Rican national struggling to attain the right to
vote in New York City. This case, People ex rel. Juarbe v. Board of Inspectors of the 24th
Election District, demonstrated the limitations of Puerto Ricans’ ambiguous citizenship status at
the end of the nineteenth century and the role of the Courts in reinforcing these limitations.
Juarbe joined the U.S. Army of Occupation during the 1898 invasion of the island and argued
that he never declared his allegiance to Spain. According to Juarbe, he willingly adopted the
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nationality of the United States upon moving to New York in 1899 although he was never
naturalized under the laws governing citizenship at the time. According to Article 9 of the Treaty
of Peace with Spain, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
ceded by Spain to the United States would be determined by Congress. Since Congress had not
firmly established the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans in 1899, Juarbe could not make the
argument that “the Constitution follows the flag” and thus the Court ruled against his claim.55 At
a time when the United States was expanding its reach beyond its shores, the judicial system
created a legal precedent that set the tone for limiting the abilities of Puerto Ricans to participate
as equals in the American political system.
The acquisition of Puerto Rican voting rights in the United States would not become a
question for the Courts until the late 1950s. In 1921, New York State made English literacy a
requirement for voting. While this law was not intended to attack New York City’s small Puerto
Rican enclave, it was intended to prevent Italian and Jewish immigrants from participating in the
political process.56 This law was still in effect when massive numbers of Puerto Ricans migrated
to New York City in the post-WWII period. Jose Camacho, a Puerto Rican migrant and resident
of the Bronx began his legal challenge to New York State’s English literacy requirement in 1958.
The case was in appeal when the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights published its 1959 report.
The Commission found that, “some 618,000 American citizens who have migrated from the
island Commonwealth of Puerto Rico live in New York City. About 190,000 of these people
have lived there long enough to satisfy the State's residence requirements for voting … Puerto
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Rican-American citizens are being denied the right to vote, and that these denials exist in
substantial numbers in the State of New York.”57 In both the Camacho 1961 case and Juarbe
1899 case, the plaintiffs both relied on their interpretation of the Treaty of Paris to seek relief
from the Courts. Both Juarbe and Camacho envisioned their U.S. citizenship to be sacrosanct and
validated by international treaty. Camacho’s invocation of the Treaty of Paris as well as Article
55 of the United Nations Charter demonstrated his belief that citizenship and the civil rights
protections attached to citizenship was not solely defined by one nation-state but existed at the
point where two different nation-states intersect.58
Camacho’s attorney in this litigation was Paul O’Dwyer. Paul, brother of New York City
Mayor William O’Dwyer, was a progressive lawyer who developed a reputation for defending
striking workers, African-Americans as well as targets of Communist witch-hunts during the
1950s.59 O’Dwyer drew upon the Civil War amendments to support his argument that Camacho
was being discriminated against due to his language and ethnicity. He argued that the 14th and
15th Amendments to the United States Constitution included Puerto Ricans as well as the
African-Americans as protected classes since "race and color were not intended to have a narrow
or technical connotation, but refer to any minority in the community.”60

In reading these

amendments in this way, O’Dwyer sought to link the racial oppression that African-Americans
faced in the American South for generations with the plight of Puerto Ricans in New York City.
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The racialization of Puerto Rican’s language marked an important step in the legal logic that
would later result in bilingual ballots.
The Court, as in the Juarbe lawsuit, rejected the arguments in the Camacho case. While
the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was an overture of support to marginalized African-Americans, its
power was limited and it made no provisions that specifically targeted Puerto Ricans as an
oppressed racial minority. In the Civil Rights Act of 1960, mention of Puerto Ricans was raised
only in Title III which noted that the island of Puerto Rico was exempt from the Act. According
to District Judge Charles M. Metzner:
We think it is clear that this provision applies only to the rights of persons born in and
resident of Puerto Rico, and that they are not given rights which they are entitled to
exercise in contravention of the valid laws of a state to which they may move from Puerto
Rico. They do not acquire a special status which would give them preferential treatment
over a resident of a sister state who moves to New York and seeks to vote from his new
residence … This brings us then to the nub of this case, which is whether a state may
adopt a requirement that in order for a citizen to be eligible to vote he must read and write
the English language… Because the plaintiff is unable to vote as a result of his inability
to pass the test, it does not follow that the plaintiff is being discriminated against.61
Although the Juarbe and Camacho cases were rejected by the Courts, they both demonstrate that
Puerto Ricans in New York had the will and means to challenge the law in an effort to secure
their civil rights. The colorblind interpretation of New York State’s literacy requirement for
voting in 1961 would not be successfully challenged until after the passage of the VRA in 1965.
It was Section 4(e) of the VRA, the additional voting rights litigation by Puerto Ricans in the late
1960s, and federal approval of these cases in 1970 that would result in literacy exams, of any
kind, as a prerequisite for voting being outlawed.
New York State election law was again challenged by Puerto Ricans shortly after the
VRA was signed by Lyndon Johnson. On September 30, 1965, Maria Lopez, born and raised on
the island of Puerto Rico and resident of the State of New York, attempted to register to vote for
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the general election in November. Lopez had recently celebrated her twenty-first birthday, and
when questioned by election inspectors in a polling site near her home in Rochester about her
English proficiency pointed out that she completed her education in Puerto Rico before
migrating to the United States. “Despite the clear mandate of Section 4 (e), which expressly
provides that a person having an education equivalent to that which Miss Lopez obtained in
Puerto Rico may not be ‘denied the right to vote’ in any election, she was refused registration.”62
After Lopez filed an official complaint, agents for the Federal Bureau of Investigations
interviewed each member of the Elections Commission in Monroe County (the county where the
city of Rochester is located). In these interviews it was learned that despite Section 4(e) of the
Voting Rights Act, it was the policy of the Board of Elections of Monroe County to refuse to
register any Puerto Rican to vote unless that individual could pass an English language literacy
test.63
This case, United States v Monroe County, unlike the previous efforts by Puerto Ricans to
utilize the courts to secure their voting rights, had the weight of the VRA to support its claims. In
addition, the full resources of the United States Attorney’s Office were mobilized in order to
defend Puerto Rican voting rights. The lead attorney on this case was John Doar, head of the
Civil Rights Division in the Attorney General’s Office. Doar was a veteran civil rights attorney
and worked in Montgomery, Alabama to provide legal representation to the Freedom Riders as
well as James Meredith in his effort to desegregate the University of Mississippi in the early
1960s. Doar also helped to draft the Civil Rights Act of 1964.64 Joining him were lawyers from
U.S Attorney’s Office and the Department of Justice. The federal support of Puerto Rican voting
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rights lent strength to the community’s claim on equal access to the ballot and reaffirmed the
constitutionality of Section 4(e).
Puerto Ricans living in New York State were still subjected to the literacy test even after
the favorable decision in the Monroe case. While the legality of Section 4(e) was protected, the
state government of New York still maintained the ability to regulate voting laws in such a way
where Puerto Ricans could still be subjected to an English literacy test. Martha Cardona, born
and raised in Puerto Rico, moved to New York in 1948. Although literate in Spanish, she never
fully mastered the English language and could not pass New York's English literacy requirement.
Arguing that this voting requirement was unconstitutional Cardona, like Lopez before her, filed
suit against the Board of Elections of New York in order to secure her voting rights. Although
her litigation was denied by the lower courts as well as the New York Court of Appeals, she
continued to press her case after Johnson signed the VRA.65 in addition to Cardona’s, a separate
lawsuit was filed by New York voters John P. Morgan and Christine Morgan alleging that
Section 4(e) of the VRA violated New York State voting law.66 These two cases became
intertwined as each moved through the courts until both were argued simultaneously in front of
the Supreme Court. In addition to affirming the earlier decision in Monroe, the decision in
Katzenbach v Morgan and Cardona v Power supported the idea that language was characteristic
of race rather than ethnicity.
Representing Cardona during oral arguments was Paul O’Dwyer. O’Dwyer’s legal
argument rested upon the discriminatory nature and application of New York State’s English
literacy requirement. He argued that this law was created during a period of hysteria over
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Southern and Eastern European immigration and its application against Puerto Rican voters was
therefore, a reflection of the anxieties many Americans harbored against this Spanish-speaking
population. Furthermore, O’Dwyer pointed out the hypocrisy of this policy. “the State of New
York went out of its way to give all this information in Spanish to the perspective taxpayer … if
they can go to the trouble of providing the taxpayer with instructions in Spanish as to how to fill
out a complicated form, it’s not too much to ask that perhaps they give some of the instructions
beforehand.”67 He stated rather boldly that since the passage of the Jones Act granted U.S.
citizenship to all Puerto Ricans, and Spanish was sanctioned as the language of education and
politics on the island, the United States was “for all intents and purposes … a country of two
languages. We have fostered one throughout this island. We have developed it here.”68
O’Dwyer, was questioned by Justice Stewart about the possibility of the extension of
protections that Puerto Ricans were granted in Section 4(e) to other groups like French-speaking
Americans or various Asian immigrants. Although the Cardona case was not considering the
expansion of voting rights to other minorities, O'Dwyer argued that the legal logic applied to
Puerto Ricans in this case should be applied to other language minorities.69 He based his position
upon his reading of the Fifteenth Amendment. “There was a suggestion that this was violative of
the Fifteenth Amendment and we claim that it is, not under the colored provisions, but under the
race provision. It is our suggestion here that Puerto Ricans in the sense are a race and a race that
are here in the sense that they have a language.”70 O’Dwyer was pushing the accepted meaning
of race to include cultural characteristics such as language for the purposes of extending voting
rights protections to Puerto Ricans in New York. The connection between race and language,
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while not of critical importance to the final determination of this case, was an argument that was
used in later years by lawyers seeking bilingual ballots.
Samuel A. Hirshowitz, the lawyer representing the State of New York, attacked the very
idea that Puerto Ricans could be classified as a separate race or nationality. “We are not talking
here about Puerto Rican citizens. We are talking about New Yorkers. The Fourteenth
Amendment defines state and national citizenship ... [Cardona] is entitled to be treated like any
other citizen of New York.” Hirshowitz, by arguing that the citizenship of Puerto Ricans was
equal to that of any other citizen of the United States, obfuscated some of the contradictions of
this community’s status within United States policy. While Puerto Ricans were American
citizens, their citizenship was far from equal. Puerto Ricans living on the island could be drafted
into the United States military, and indeed many were and served with distinction as pointed out
by O’Dwyer in his oral argument, and yet these same citizens could not vote to choose their
Commander-in-Chief. Within the context of the continental United States, full integration into
American society remained as elusive for Puerto Ricans as it was for African-Americans. Many
Puerto Rican migrants living in U.S. cities like New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago (similar to
their African-American neighbors) experienced residential segregation and found themselves
limited only to the lower end of the labor market. While these aspects of Puerto Rican life in the
United States were ignored by Hirshowitz, it was clear to Congress that Puerto Ricans required
some measure of federal protection from voting discrimination.
Elements of Hirshowitz’s arguments foreshadowed the kinds of arguments utilized in
later years by the English-Only movement. Despite an acknowledgement of the linguistic
diversity of New York, Hirshowitz argued that the special protections Cardona demanded went
beyond the scope of “normal” citizenship and if her application was granted, it would in effect
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sanction discrimination in the area of voting rights. “New York’s requirement … does not
classify its citizens in any way. It applies equally to all. She [Cardona] insists that she is in a
separate category and that Spanish learned in Puerto Rican schools must be treated equally with
English in New York. The Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee equality of language. It
guarantees equality of citizenship.”71 According to Hirshowitz, Section 4(e) was a discriminatory
voting policy against the English-speaking voters of New York. The argument that providing
Spanish language translations on voting materials was, in effect, an effort to limit the voting
rights of English-speaking New Yorkers would be utilized again during the 1980s by those
seeking to undermine the civil rights of Puerto Ricans and other language minorities in the
United States.
Although Hirshowitz and O’Dwyer focused their arguments on the question of the
discriminatory nature of New York’s English literacy requirement, the Justices of the Supreme
Court were more interested in assessing the constitutionality of Section 4(e) before deliberating
on the issue of discrimination. Delivering the opinion for the Supreme Court was Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan, serving as judge in New Jersey before being selected by Eisenhower for
the Supreme Court, had a degree of familiarity with the plight of Puerto Ricans in the Northeast
and was a longtime liberal.72 He and the other Justices who joined him, including Chief Justice
Earl Warren, William Douglas, and Thurgood Marshall, determined that not only was this aspect
of the VRA constitutional, but that English literacy requirement could not be enforced against
Puerto Ricans.73 According to Brennan, “There can be no doubt that § 4(e) may be regarded as
an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause … More specifically, § 4(e) may be viewed
as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory
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treatment by government -- both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or
administration of governmental services, such as public schools, public housing and law
enforcement.”74 Brennan, having a more expansive sense of civil rights, saw the connection
between discrimination in voting and other areas of American social and political life. Douglas
concurring with Brennan wrote “I doubt that literacy is a wise prerequisite for exercise of the
franchise. Literacy and intelligence are not synonymous … we are a multi-racial and multilinguistic nation … and so our equal protection question is whether intelligent use of the ballot
should not be as much presumed where one is versatile in the Spanish language as it is where
English is the medium …”75 Douglas, like O’Dwyer, articulated a legal foundation for bilingual
ballots but he did not go so far as to endorse its adoption as policy. That was a task, according to
Brennan, better suited for Congress.
Not every Justice on the Supreme Court agreed with Brennan and Douglas. John
Marshall Harlan II, joined by Potter Stewart, wrote the dissenting opinion. Harlan was the
grandson of John Marshall Harlan I, the Supreme Court Justice who wrote the dissenting
opinions in both Plessy v Ferguson and the Insular Cases. Unlike his grandfather, Harlan II was
often viewed as a voice of conservatism in the Warren Court.76 He pointed out that the roles of
the judiciary and the legislature should not be confused and worried that this case was an
instance where the Supreme Court was getting too involved in questions better left for individual
state legislatures. In addition, Harlan argued that Puerto Ricans were not the victims of voter
discrimination due to the presence of an English literacy exam. Despite evidence that
demonstrated the kinds of discrimination that Puerto Ricans were subjected to, Harlan made a
distinction between the forms of discrimination encountered by African-Americans in the South
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and that of Puerto Ricans in New York. “There is simply no legislative record supporting such
hypothesized discrimination of the sort we have hitherto insisted upon when congressional power
is brought to bear on constitutionally reserved state concerns.”77 Harlan’s narrow construction of
racial discrimination obfuscated the day-to-day experience with institutionalized discrimination
of Puerto Ricans in New York. Despite Harlan’s dissent, the justices of the Supreme Court
would ultimately rule in favor of Cardona.
The decision in the Katzenbach and Cardona cases served as judicial precedent that
Congress seized upon in 1970 when it eliminated all forms of literacy tests as a voting
requirement across the nation. During the deliberations on whether or not the VRA should be
extended in duration and expanded in scope, Congress drew upon the experiences of Puerto
Ricans in New York to make the case that English literacy might not be the most important
determinant of one’s capacity to participate in the political process. The blanket elimination of
all forms of literacy exams in 1970 was a result of the judicial activism of Puerto Ricans such as
Martha Cardona, Maria Lopez, and Jose Camacho. Even though none of these cases ended with
Puerto Ricans being able to vote in their native language, each case demonstrated that Puerto
Ricans were not content to be the mere beneficiaries of African-American civil rights activism.
Puerto Ricans, inspired by the civil rights struggles of African-Americans, replicated the tactics
of activists during the height of the Civil Rights Movement to seek the kind of legal reform that
would honor their language and citizenship. That kind of legal reform, however, would not be
possible without the ability to coordinate a nationwide campaign in a similar way that the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund coordinated the Brown v. Board of Education case. The creation of
such an institution was the focus of a number of Puerto Rican lawyers, activists, and elected
officials in the early 1970s in New York City.
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PRLDEF
The idea to form a Puerto Rican civil rights organization that focused on litigation as a
means to create social change began with Victor Risso of the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) and Lorenzo Casanova with Community Legal Services (CLS) in the Bronx. These
two attorneys wanted to create a Puerto Rican counterpart to the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund
and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF). After an initial
attempt to secure funding for this endeavor failed, Risso and Casanova brought their idea to their
colleagues, Victor Marrero and Jorge Batista who both worked for the Model Cities program, an
anti-poverty initiative started under Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty. Batista and Marrero
revised the initial proposal with the aide of Dennis Allee who worked for Senator Jacob Javits.
Working on the grant as a team, Allee, Marrero, and Batista recognized that in order to better
position themselves to secure funding from major foundations like the Ford Foundation and the
Rockefeller Foundation, they would need to invite prominent non-Puerto Ricans to serve on the
Board of Directors of this newly formed civil rights organization.78 After securing support from a
number of lawyers and elected officials, the first Board of Directors of PRLDEF met at the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York on November 15, 1971 to define the mission of
this new organization and discuss their next steps.
Joining the authors of the original grant proposal at this meeting were Cesar Perales,
Bronx Borough President Robert Abrams, Geraldo Rivera from ABC’s Eyewitness News, and
Pete Tijerina of MALDEF.79 Tijerina, participating in the meeting in an advisory capacity,
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explained to the group the origins of MALDEF and its relationship with major donors like the
Ford Foundation. Tijerina expressed optimism that PRLDEF could avoid the kinds of problems
that MALDEF encountered during its early years. During the first few years of its operation,
MALDEF engaged in the kind of work that reflected its commitment to grassroots activism such
as getting involved in police brutality cases against members of the Chicano movement. This
changed as MALDEF received the largest portion of its funding from sources like the
Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Foundation, and the Ford Foundation. These funding sources
altered the focus of MALDEF and moved this group away from more grassroots and directaction forms of advocacy into a more reform-oriented group.80 By the time PRLDEF was
created, MALDEF was going through its own process of purging its organization of activists and
relocating its central office out of San Antonio.
The Ford Foundation wielded a great deal of influence over civil rights groups like
MALDEF and PRLDEF. Founded in 1936, the Ford Foundation supported organizations that
endeavored to “promote democratic values” both internationally and domestically. 81 The
Foundation’s objectives were so broadly constructed, however, that the leadership of the group
exercised had a great deal of latitude indetermining which organizations would receive finiancial
support. In addition, there were instances when Foundation staff members drove the
prioritization of the funding process. “The Foundation’s initiative in the legal defense field, for
example, was led by a man who began his work here with grants in the field of public
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administration.”82 The Ford Foundation, however, was slow to support desegregation in the
1950s even though this was one of the Foundation’s explicit goals. When it did support civil
rights organizations, the Foundation steered these groups away from the Ford Foundation, as
well as others such as the Rockefeller Foundation, steered civil rights groups away from mass
mobilization during the mid to late 1960s and supported Latino public interest lawyers in order
to demonstrate that racial tensions could be addressed better from within the judicial system
rather than using mass mobilization to achieve its goals. The rising presence of militant Leftist
groups such as the Young Lords, the Black Panthers, the Brown Berets, and other similar groups
was perceived as a shift away from the kind of civil rights politics which favored assimilation in
favor of an ethnic Nationalism inspired by the contemporaneous Black Power movement.83
PRLDEF, heeding the advice of Tijerina, decided to focus its efforts on the regions where
significant Puerto Rican communities resided included New York, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Florida. The group also decided that the primary
mission of PRLDEF should be to “initiate or join in judicial and administrative proceedings
whenever the legal rights and interests of significant numbers of Puerto Ricans are affected.”84
Keeping in mind the kind of activities major foundations supported, PRLDEF steered clear of the
kind of work that other legal agencies such as the Legal Aid Society or CLS engaged in, such as
criminal defense or police brutality cases against individual Puerto Ricans and channeled its
energy into legal reform.85
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The Board selected Cesar Perales as its first Executive Director. Perales, the son of
Dominican and Puerto Rican parents, was raised in Manhattan and earned his law degree at
Fordham University in 1965. Graduating at a critical point of the civil rights struggles of
African-Americans and Latinos, he quickly got involved with a plethora of local struggles within
New York’s Puerto Rican community. “Within a few years of graduation, I had already served as
attorney for many grass roots organizations and for groups of students who had taken control of
buildings at City College and Brooklyn College demanding changes in curriculum and
admissions policies. I had also represented the Young Lords in their occupation of the ‘people's
church’.”86 While Perales’ work with student protestors and militant Left activists like the Young
Lords demonstrated his sympathies for these activists, he never envisioned himself as a
grassroots lawyer.
Drawing upon the very same funding sources as MALDEF, Perales never used PRLDEF
to engage in grassroots lawyering. According to Hilbink, grassroots lawyering goes beyond a
litigation-centered approach to civil rights activism. This style of legal activism, often used by
groups like the National Lawyers Guild, sought to be responsive and unaloof from the activists it
represented in court. “Lawyers acted as collaborators rather than directors, even in the realm of
litigation.”87 This kind of legal activism was deeply influenced by the organizing philosophy of
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civil rights groups such as SNCC, CORE, and the Highlander Folk School which rejected topdown, elite leadership.88
Contrast this approach to cause lawyering against what Hilbink calls the “elite/vanguard”
style. This style more closely resembles what the NAACP LDF engaged in. “From the
organization’s perspective, the goal was to establish legal principles first and foremost – putting
them at odds with activists who saw protest as not merely a way of establishing principle, but
involving people in their own liberation and thus challenging a culture of oppression.”89 For
lawyers like Thurgood Marshall, civil rights work was more effective when it was lead, planned,
and executed by lawyers alone without the input of grassroots activists. Derrick Bell recalled
Marshall getting upset when “crazy colored students” violated the property rights of Whites with
lunch counter sit-ins.90 Even though he worked with militant Leftist groups like the Young
Lords, Perales modeled the new civil rights group after more reform-oriented organizations like
the NAACP LDF (the Inc. Fund) “Several of us who had witnessed the pivotal role that the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund had played in the civil rights movement believed we could
establish our own organization that would challenge the barriers to our community's social and
economic progress …”.91
After working on the organizational structure of PRLDEF, rewriting the grant proposal
for the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, and securing the assistance of high-profile elected
officials, PRLDEF was able to officially begin its work in 1972. PRLDEF started as a rather
modest organization with a total budget of approximately $500,000. It received sizable grants
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from the Carnegie Corporation for its educational programs, the Ford, Field, and Rockefeller
Foundations, and corporate donations from a variety of businesses including Chemical Bank,
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Avon, General Mills, AT&T, Chase Manhattan Bank, F. W.
Woolworth, Exxon, and Coca Cola. By 1984, PRLDEF’s budget grew to over one million
dollars.92
Using this level of financial support, PRLDEF initiated a series of lawsuits during the
1970s designed to address the civil rights needs of the Puerto Rican community. Of these various
cases, PRLDEF’s work on the issue of bilingual access to voting and education are arguably the
most significant. Initiating litigation against the New York City Board of Education in 1973 on
behalf of Aspira, PRLDEF’s lawyers argued that compulsory education in the English language
was a violation of civil rights of limited English proficiency (LEP) Puerto Rican students. Aspira
and PRLDEF sought to create opportunities for Puerto Rican parents across New York City to
choose whether their children could participate in bilingual education programs in order to
master both English and Spanish. Similar programs were piloted in select schools in the Ocean
Hill-Brownsville section of Brooklyn, the South Bronx, and in the Lower East Side. The courts
did not agree with PRLDEF and this forced Aspira and PRLDEF to reduce the scope of their
litigation. This resulted in the Aspira Consent Decree in 1974, bilingual education programs
would be offered to only to Puerto Rican LEP students, but not to Puerto Ricans students who
fell outside of the LEP category. Historian Sonia Lee argues that the Aspira Consent Decree,
“did not represent the ideal victory they had hoped for, a victory was important for lawyers, who
needed to establish their positions as capable legal advocates of a minority group.” 93 Lee’s
assessment of PRLDEF’s bilingual education advocacy is accurate in the sense that neither
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PRLDEF nor Aspira were able to get the Board of Education to agree to all of their demands as
are her views on the different agendas emerging within New York City’s Puerto Rican
population and how these competing agendas were class-driven. Lee argues that the bilingual
programs that came out of this agreement resulted in very little change for Puerto Rican students
attending public schools in New York City. By making this argument in this manner, Lee
minimizes the other areas of civil rights litigation, like bilingual access to the vote, where
PRLDEF was more successful during the 1970s.94

Conclusion
Voting rights activism in the Puerto Rican community stretches back to the end of the
nineteenth century when the island was made a colonial possession of the United States. As
African-Americans continued to press for judicial and legislative reform to guarantee their civil
rights in the 1950s and 1960s, Puerto Ricans fought their own battles in the courts to secure the
right to vote. The cases of Puerto Rican voting rights during this period demonstrate a consistent
desire to bring structural change to United States election law that ultimately resulted in a
campaign for Spanish-language ballots.
The signing of the VRA in 1965 provided an important mechanism for Puerto Ricans to
revisit their earlier defeats in the Courts. While early lawsuits initiated by Puerto Rican plaintiffs
were heard in the Courts, the legal mechanism to protect minority voters would bolster later
94
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efforts to change voting laws in cities like New York. Section 4(e) of the VRA created a
mechanism that explicitly prohibited voting discrimination against Puerto Ricans in New York
and set a precedent that resulted in the English literacy requirement from New York’s voting
laws being overturned. Puerto Ricans were active participants in this process. The Puerto Rican
advocates that participated in the 1965 VRA hearings sought to include merge language into the
conversation of race in order to receive some measure of protection from language
discrimination.
The creation of PRLDEF was another important step in the Puerto Rican struggle for
equal voting rights. This was a well-funded organization with the professional training to plan
and execute civil rights litigation. Rather than challenge the validity of American citizenship, as
more militant groups had, attorneys for PRLDEF used American citizenship as a tool to advocate
for the civil rights of the Puerto Rican community. This agenda was supported by groups such as
the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation. By modeling themselves along the lines of
other activist-lawyer organizations such as the NAACP LDF and MALDEF, PRLDEF
committed itself to a Reformist agenda in an effort to create long-term structural change to the
United States.
PRLDEF’s bilingual voting rights campaign during the 1970s spanned multiple cities and
eventually became a part of a newly reauthorized VRA in 1975. Through the course of this
litigation campaign, PRLDEF and its attorneys utilized the decisions and arguments in cases like
Carmona v Power and made frequent reference to Section 4(e) of the VRA to substantiate their
legal claims. While PRLDEF lawyers directly litigated cases along the east coast of the United
States in cities like New York and Philadelphia, its role in Chicago was very different where it
served in an advisory capacity only. The Chicago case is particularly significant since it was the
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first case in this larger endeavor, the initiative for this lawsuit was generated from within the
community of Puerto Ricans in Chicago rather than being directed out of New York, and it was
the only case to actually go to trial. This case, PROPA v Kusper, revealed many of the class,
gender, and racial tensions within PRLDEF’s campaign for bilingual ballots and is the focus of
the next chapter.
Chapter 2: Broad Shoulders
On the afternoon of October 24, 1972 Ms. Hilda Frontany was called into the courtroom
to testify about her knowledge of language discrimination being leveled against members of the
Puerto Rican community in Chicago who were trying to vote. Frontany, a community organizer
with the Lakeview Latin American Coalition, (LLAC) understood the importance of this issue,
having been the victim of language discrimination since she came to Chicago as a young girl in
1953. Cross examining her was William Robert Ming Jr. Ming, often called Bob by his friends,
who had the distinction of being the first African-American to serve as a professor of law at the
University of Chicago in the late 1940s through the early 1950s. He was considered one of the
great legal minds of the NAACP and worked with luminaries such as Thurgood Marshall on the
Brown v. Board of Education case and even got Martin Luther King Jr. acquitted of perjury
charges in Alabama back in 1960. Now, Ming squared off against a diminutive Puerto Rican
woman.95
“Do you speak Spanish?” Ming asked. Frontany answered in the affirmative. Ming
continued, “Do you speak English?” To this rather inflammatory question Frontany quickly
retorted, “That is what I’m using now. I don’t know if you understand it.” She recalled this
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interaction with Ming many years later. “I thought I was speaking English all this time. It wasn’t
that I was trying to be funny, it was just that I thought it was out of order to ask that type of
question. We were there to make a point.”96
The point that Frontany, LLAC, and the other allied activist organizations were trying to
make was that Puerto Ricans should be able to vote in local elections in Spanish. This case,
Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action (PROPA) v Kusper, was the first instance where
the courts ruled that voters could exercise the franchise in a language other than English. It was
the first salvo fired in a larger battle waged across multiple fronts to gain legal protection for
language-minorities in the electoral process. While other cases in this national strategy were
spearheaded by the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF), a civil rights
advocacy organization based out of New York City, the PROPA case was initiated by “local
people” and helped to set the legal precedent that all other similar cases would draw upon.97
This struggle conforms to what Charles Payne calls the community-organizing tradition
which placed greater emphasis on the long-term development of leadership in ordinary people.98
The organizing tradition was passed from one generation of Puerto Ricans onto the next in
Chicago and a plethora of organizations developed in response to the local needs of the
community. The leadership of the Puerto Rican community based organizations that came out of
this organizing tradition in the late 1960s and early 1970s tackled many civil rights issues from
discrimination in employment, housing, and education. Of these groups, PROPA emphasized the
acquisition of electoral power and reform as a key part of its platform. The Puerto Rican
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community in Chicago, therefore, had put in place the organizational infrastructure to plan and
execute a civil rights campaign to achieve bilingual ballots. Although many kinds of
organizations existed among Puerto Ricans in Chicago, some more militant than others, it would
fall to reformist Puerto Rican organizations that had the technical skills to successfully push for
lasting policy measures and achieve protected status for all language minorities.

Migration, Settlement, and Conflict
Before the massive out-migration from the island of Puerto Rico to the mainland United
States after WWII, the Puerto Rican population of Chicago was very small. In 1910, only a
handful were living in the city. This enclave grew very slowly over the next few decades. By
1940, only 240 Puerto Ricans resided in Chicago.99 This would change in 1947 when the island’s
government implemented Operation Bootstrap, a New Deal-style program designed to increase
industrial employment in Puerto Rico.100 While manufacturing in Puerto Rico did increase, this
could not compensate for the overall job loss in other sectors of the island’s economy. Migration
from the island, therefore, became an important method to help alleviate unemployment on the
island. The migration of Puerto Rican women (of child-bearing age) was especially important for
the Migration Division since this was viewed as a favorable means of population control on the
island.101 To that end, the island’s government created a regional office of the Migration Division
in Chicago in 1949 to help facilitate the movement and assimilation of Puerto Ricans into the
city. A Chicago-based employment agency named Castle, Barton, and Associates established a
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satellite office in Puerto Rico to facilitate recruitment of workers directly from the island. Direct
recruitment of domestic workers was a key component of this firm’s business plan since Chicago
had a labor shortage in this area after WWII.102 The needs of private enterprise in tandem with
the government initiatives created pathways for the creation of the Puerto Rican community in
Chicago.
Even though pathways for migration were established by joint public-private initiatives,
the choice to take up contract labor migration ultimately rested with the migrants themselves.
The jobs offered to Puerto Rican workers were divided along gender lines; Puerto Rican women
were offered work as domestics while men were placed in foundries. While men found
employment in places like the Chicago Hardware Foundry Company, women were brought in
specifically to work as live-in domestic servants. Merida Rua noted that many Puerto Ricans
who came to Chicago via contract labor sought stable incomes in order to provide for themselves
and their families. Despite reports of poor treatment of Puerto Rican workers and questionable
working conditions, many still ventured to Chicago since the prospect of a bad job outweighed
the distinct possibility of not having one at all.103 Many of these migrants who were dissatisfied
with their jobs in Chicago abandoned them for other employment opportunities as they presented
themselves. Although employment opportunities in Chicago began to dwindle by the mid-1950s,
Puerto Ricans additionally were still convinced that their chances for securing stable
employment in Chicago were better than that of settling in New York City. 104 By 1960, over
32,000 had migrated to Chicago, making it the second largest concentration of Puerto Ricans in
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the United States after New York City.105 The growth of the Puerto Rican population and the
subsequent creation of a community, therefore, can be traced directly the migrants themselves.
In the post-WWII period many of these Puerto Rican migrants settled in neighborhoods
near Chicago’s downtown area like the southern portion of the Near North Side, Lakeview,
Uptown, and Lincoln Park.106 By 1960, Puerto Ricans had begun to reside in other sections of
the city such as East and West Garfield Park, the Near West Side, and Logan Square. 107 West
Town by 1960 contained 25 percent of the Puerto Rican population of Chicago within its
borders. While housing discrimination limited where Puerto Rican migrants of this period could
settle, they prioritized securing affordable housing near their place of employment. Puerto Ricans
living within these dilapidated sections of the city established stores, attended church, and
established “hometown clubs” that represented the various towns throughout the island.108 This
rapid population growth coupled with these efforts helped Puerto Rican migrants establish a
foothold within the city and became the bedrock upon which subsequent community organizing
was built.
As the numbers of Puerto Ricans in Chicago increased after 1945, this growing
community found itself in a complicated relationship with its various neighbors. The residents of
the Puerto Rican enclaves in East and West Garfield came into increasing contact with the
African American community who often found their Spanish-speaking neighbors to be culturally
and linguistically unintelligible.”109 While the desire to maintain Puerto Rican cultural practices
seemed odd to some Blacks in Chicago, there were efforts to find common cause in other arenas.
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Fred Hampton of the Black Panthers, for example, partnered up with the Young Lords and the
Young Patriots (an organization of poor White southerners) and formed the short-lived Rainbow
Coalition in 1969 in order to “fight racism with solidarity.”110 This coalition represented the
working-class and militant factions of the Black, White, and Puerto Rican communities. This
collaboration can be contrasted against other multiracial coalitions born from middle class
interests. Rev. Jesse Jackson often viewed Latino organizing efforts in a paternalistic manner
referring to them as, “our little brown brothers.”111 Frontany recalled that while supportive of
bilingual education, Jackson “would talk about minorities as if it was inclusive of us … but when
you went to his meetings there were no Latinos, there were no Latino staff, and no programs
directed at us (including voter registration).”112 The working relationship between the African
American and Puerto Rican communities in Chicago leading into the 1970s featured distinct
formations along class lines.
Perhaps the greatest source of tension for Puerto Rican residents was their relationship
with older White ethnics and those interested in urban renewal projects. Marixsa Alicea,
recalling her experience with White Anglo-Americans and European ethnics in Humboldt Park,
wrote “They saw us through a racist lens, which presented images of us as wild, dirty, and dumb
children who had to be controlled.”113 Hilda Frontany recalled moments from her time as a
student at William B. Ogden elementary school when her lack of English proficiency caused her
to be the object of derision. “That was my first encounter with the English language. The
children would make fun of me and I would, quite often, go home crying not wanting to return to
that school because I didn’t understand what they were saying to me.” As she grew up, Frontany
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noticed that Spanish-speakers were forced to attend church services at Holy Name Cathedral in
the basement and were not allowed access to the main sanctuary.114 These types of indignities
that Frontany and other Puerto Ricans endured, while demeaning, represented only one form of
bigotry. Other, more subtle, forms of discrimination had a more pervasive effect on Chicago’s
Puerto Rican community.
More pernicious than direct episodes of interpersonal discrimination was the strategy of
displacement established by groups such as the Chicago Central Area Committee. This group
was comprised of various local corporate interests and sought to transform Chicago’s downtown
area (“the Loop”) into a global financial center by removing the growing number of poor and
non-White residents from the center of the city.115 Urban renewal programs in the 1960s, such as
the construction of Congress Expressway and University of Illinois downtown campus, forced
many in this community to move to other sections of the city. 116 Other groups like the Lincoln
Park Conservation Association (LLCA) represented the interests of middle to upper-class
community residents who sought to save their community by gentrifying it and encouraging
Puerto Ricans to move out.117 There were efforts by the Puerto Rican community to counter
these redevelopment initiatives. The Young Lords initially formed as a street gang in the late
1950s and developed a militant, Leftist political ideology and embraced Puerto Rican
nationalism by 1968. Coming of age in the era of Black Power, the Young Lords provided health
services to members of the Puerto Rican community, free breakfast programs for neighborhood
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children, and shared its political message with others through its own publication Palante. The
Young Lords also submitted plans to the city’s Deptartment of Urban Renewal for a low-income
housing development in order to set aside low income housing in an effort to stem the tide of
gentrification threatening to reshape their neighborhood. These efforts were defeated by the
Department of Urban Renewal and the LLCA. By 1972, the Young Lords’ ability to be an active
force in community politics was waning due to police repression and internal fragmentation.118
Conflict with the Chicago police department, like the problems in housing faced by Puerto
Ricans, were motivated by racial hostility.
City leaders and local residents in Chicago understood Puerto Ricans as different from
Whites. Residential displacement, housing discrimination, racial hostility, high rates of
unemployment, poverty, and police brutality marked them as closer to African-Americans in the
racial hierarchy than to Whites.119 Historian Lilia Fernandez notes the rampant corruption of the
Chicago Police Department, how the police were tied in to the Cook County Democratic
machine, and how the police-community conflicts of the 1960s were an extension of racial
antagonisms between the predominantly White police force and the racialized Puerto Ricans.
“Relations with police often revealed the gendered dynamics of race relations: white police-men
made assumptions about Puerto Rican men’s criminality and regularly persecuted them for even
the smallest offenses.”120 Small offenses like cooling off under the spray of an open fire hydrant
is what got Silvano Burgos and Celestino Gonzalez, two young Puerto Rican men from Division
Street, arrested and beaten multiple times by the Chicago Police Department in July 1965. 121
While the Puerto Rican community organized around this incident, sending a letter of protest to
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Mayor Daley and to the local Spanish-language newspaper, the problems of police violence
continued unabated. Tensions between the growing number of Puerto Rican residents in
Humboldt Park and the Chicago police department grew and helped spark the Division Street
Riots of 1966.
On the evening of June 12, 1966, after a weeklong cultural celebration organized by
Puerto Rican community leaders, Chicago police officer Thomas Munyon shot 20 year old
Aracelis Cruz, claiming that the young man drew a gun on him. The growing number of police
brought in to control the crowd was covered live on local Spanish-language radio. This radio
broadcast attracted hundreds more people to the scene, many of whom were women and
children, and some rioters pelted police officers with rocks and bottles. Some rioters looted
stores and destroyed property. By the end of the night, 35-40 people were arrested. The very next
night, the riots continued, and seven more Puerto Rican men were shot by the police while 37
individuals were apprehended. The third night of the riot saw 500 police officers mobilized and
resulted in 40 more community residents getting arrested.122 In looking at the Division Streets
Riots of 1966, anthropologist Gina Perez notes how these three days of conflict shifted the
opinions of Chicagoans about the growing Puerto Rican community in Humboldt Park. Up until
this point, Puerto Ricans, while residentially segregated and discriminated against due to their
language, “were popularly cast as the city’s ‘model minority’ …”123 While the YLO had
disintegrated by the early 1970s, other Puerto Rican organizations that either pre-dated or were
contemporaries of the Young Lords continued to represent the interests of Chicago’s Puerto
Rican community and formed the bedrock of local support for bilingual elections.
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Community Roots of Litigation
As urban renewal continued to displace Puerto Rican families living near “the Loop”,
Puerto Ricans living amongst one another in neighborhoods like Humboldt Park, West Town,
and Lakeview became highly integrated regardless of class. While these ethnic enclaves had a
small number of white collar workers and professionals during the 1950s, the growth of a
middle-class within Chicago’s Puerto Rican community over the decade of the 1960s was fueled
by the growth of a number of new organizations and the rise of activists with increased access to
higher education and training in community organizing.124 External funding also played a role in
the development of a Puerto Rican middle class. While federal funding was distributed by the
political machine of Mayor Daley, other sources of funding came from foundations, the private
sector, and faith-based groups.125 These funding sources allowed Puerto Rican organizations in
Chicago to forego volunteer efforts in favor of paid, full-time staff with the skills and credentials
to form the basis of a new leadership cadre within the community. Among these organizations
were three that would form the nucleus of grassroots support for bilingual elections.
Among the Chicago-based Puerto Rican organizations, the Knights of St. John (KSJ) was
among the oldest.126 Created by the Catholic Church in 1954, “it attempted to bring the Puerto
Rican migrants into the mainstream of the city’s life while at the same time respecting and
encouraging their cultural traditions.”127 The men who joined this fraternal organization were
politically ambitious and the KSJ provided its membership the opportunity to hone their
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organizational and leadership skills.128 The KSJ engaged in both social and political activity in
Chicago on behalf of the city’s Puerto Rican population. The most well-known event that the
KSJ organized was Dia de San Juan (or St. John’s Day) celebration. This event was held every
year from 1955 to 1966 and created the foundation for the Puerto Rican Day Parade in Chicago
in 1966.129 The Knights of St. John in the late 1950s publicly denounced the housing conditions
in housing projects like Cabrini-Green and warned other Puerto Ricans from moving into this
low-income housing development.130 The group also fostered increased political awareness
amongst its membership and rallied Puerto Ricans to support the Kennedy campaign in 1960. In
the wake of the Division Street riots, the KSJ held meetings with community residents and tried
to mend fences between the police department and their own people.131 The KSJ, even though it
promoted a philosophy of racial uplift and acculturation, “accepted a struggle on the political
front as the most promising means of attaining equality for Puerto Ricans.”132 The Knights of St.
John began to decline in importance by the end of the 1960s. Its method of advocacy were
considered outdated in the wake of the Division Street Riots.133 After 1966, new activists and
organizations emerged and challenged the dominance of the KSJ in community politics. Among
these activists was a daughter of the KSJ who went on to become a key player in the PROPA
lawsuit.
Hilda Frontany, born in the town of Arecibo in the northwestern region of Puerto Rico,
grew up in Chicago in the 1950s and became a prominent grassroots organizer and instructor in
the 1960s. She grew up in a household that prioritized community engagement – her father was a
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member of the KSJ and her mother was involved with Las Damas de Sagrado Corazon, a prayer
group that also engaged in community service.134 While she never completed high school, she
took courses at three different colleges en route to her high school equivalency diploma. She
continued her education by earning certificates from the Saul Alinsky Institute and from
Roosevelt University for completing a program in American politics. In a 1989 interview,
Frontany mused, “I’ve looked into the possibility of earning a college degree, but when you have
six children and the youngest are 8-year-old twins, other things take priority.”135
In 1969, she cofounded the Lakeview Latin American Coalition and served as Vice
President and then President until 1976. The Lakeview Latin American Coalition (LLAC)
formed out of a number of smaller groups based in local Lakeview schools and churches. In
addition to Frontany, other key figures in the LLAC included Charlie Kyle (a Catholic priest at
St. Sebastian’s Church), Rev. Finees Flores Jr. of the United Methodist Church, and Fernando
Prieto (a Colombian who lived in Lakeview).136 In 1972, LLAC created the Universidad Popular
program. This program, geared towards adult education, started with only one teacher and 14
students in a basement and was based upon the ideas of Brazilian Paulo Freire. 137 Within a year,
the program had expanded to serve more than 800 adults.138 Not only did LLAC provide direct
service, but they also engaged in more direct advocacy work. The organization utilized a
combination of negotiation and protest actions to open up employment opportunities for Puerto
Ricans in Chicago. One such campaign was their 1972 protest of Illinois Bell, the main provider
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of telephone services to the city’s residents. Working in conjunction with other Puerto Rican
organizations, the LLAC applied pressure and eventually reached an agreement with the
telephone company to hire over 1000 workers.139
A key feature of LLAC’s approach to dealing with different issues in the Puerto Rican
community consisted of forming alliances with other community groups. Frontany recalled
working alongside Mexican-American community leaders Zeferino Ochoa of the Cardinal’s
Committee on Spanish-speaking People as well as Hector Franco and his organization the Allies
for a Better Community (ABC). These community partners collaborated on employment protests
against government agencies like the local office of the Social Security Administration and
private businesses such as the Jewel Tea Company (Jewel). After several months of sustained
protest, Jewel signed an agreement with both Franco and Frontany’s respective organizations to
employ more Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans.140 Puerto Rican activists like Frontany
understood how these protests were connected to larger issues. Commenting on her work with
the Lakeview Latin American Coalition, Frontany stated, “Being there, I saw the importance of a
more universal approach, of learning how outside economic, cultural, religious and political
factors impact on a community.”141 Frontany’s connection with Puerto Rican activists like
Hector Franco and other Latino organizations in Chicago like the Knights of St. John, would
prove essential in creating the network of allies that would later advocate for bilingual elections.
Hector Franco, a second-generation Puerto Rican raised in Humboldt Park, graduated
from Wells High school and worked three years in a factory while working on his political
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science degree from Northeastern Illinois University. After the Division Street Riots, Franco was
hired to work at the Urban Progress Center (an organization affiliated with the city’s Department
of Human Resources) where he learned how to be a community organizer. He left in 1969 and
formed the Allies for a Better Community (ABC) which focused on fighting employment
discrimination in the construction industry. By this time, Franco preferred direct-action
campaigns over providing direct-service. When one of the organizations he helped create, the
Spanish Coalition for Jobs, moved away from direct-action protest and became a service
provider, Franco decided to move on to other efforts. At some point, Franco made the decision
that protest-politics are not enough to create enduring change. Franco moved ABC into providing
mental health services and job training programs by 1974.142
PROPA formed out of the working relationship between Franco, Frontany and others
Latino community leaders in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was established with the aim of
facilitating the development of Spanish-speaking political power in Chicago. To this end, it
engaged in activities like voter registration campaigns. The organization outlined its mission
statement in a program distributed at a fundraising event in 1972. PROPA’s first annual banquet
program reads, “We declare that we now invade the political process (which has in the past
excluded us). We take it as a civil right and a human right for the benefit of our community. This
Renaissance requires that we … register our people to vote, and finally that we unite behind
Latino candidates.” While PROPA’s rhetoric may be interpreted as fiery (it viewed the political
arena as hostile territory that needed to be invaded), the organization made clear that its goals
were reformist and not revolutionary by invoking the idea of civil rights and equal participation
in the existing political system. It is also significant that in the organization’s mission statement
142
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they use the word “Latino” when discussing its support for political candidates and not “Puerto
Rican”.143 Even though the “PR” in PROPA stood for “Puerto Rican” the organization had a
much more expansive view of whom its activism would affect beyond Puerto Ricans alone.
Despite the expanding scope of PROPA’s work or any other projects that it was engaged with
like voter registration, the organization would be remembered for its civil action against the
Chicago Board of Elections in 1972.

Setting the Stage
When asked about her work with PROPA, Frontany stated, “When we started doing voter
registration we noticed that many of the newcomers coming into our community were not able to
exercise the right to register and to vote because of the language situation (they could not speak
English).” The leadership of PROPA met to coordinate their efforts to get the Chicago Board of
Elections to print voter materials in Spanish. Frontany and Franco met with lawyers from civil
rights organizations to receive technical assistance and guidance on how to proceed. “Attorneys
would come from, when we were doing the PROPA case, lawyers from MALDEF to give us
assistance and PRLDEF came from New York to help us out.”144 In the end, it was decided that
litigation was the best method to achieve their goals.145
In order to file a lawsuit against the Chicago Board of Elections, PROPA would need to
identify and recruit prospective Puerto Ricans who would agree to serve as plaintiffs alongside
the organization. To this end, Frontany utilized the LLAC’s Universidad Popular program to
solicit individual participants in the lawsuit. Many of these students that Frontany worked with
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shared stories with her about being discriminated against at their work due to their poor English
skills. After speaking with numerous students, Frontany was able to get three students to agree to
place their names alongside PROPA as plaintiffs in this litigation: Abdona Vargas, Geraldo
Gomes, and Maria DeJuan.146
Abdona Vargas was born and raised in Puerto Rico but had been living in Chicago for
about 12 years. While she could read Spanish, Vargas’ ability with English was severely limited.
She could not read English at all and could speak only a few words. While unemployed in 1972,
Vargas had previously worked doing packing work at a local factory.147 Maria Teresa DeJuan,
like Vargas, was from Puerto Rico and had been living on the mainland for about 15 years.148
Geraldo Gomes was born and educated on the island until about the 9th grade. He moved to
Chicago in 1971 and was employed at the Conrad Hilton Hotel. Gomes recalled that the job
application at the Conrad Hilton was in English and another Spanish-speaking employee at the
hotel helped him fill out the forms. While working at the hotel, Gomes never used English during
the day at his job.149
Frontany made sure while preparing them for this case that they understood this legal
action would take a long time, that they needed to testify, and they needed to be prepared to
withstand questioning.150 Her role in this case seemed to conform to what sociologist Belinda
Robnett called “bridge leadership” as opposed to formal leadership.151
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conceptualization of gender roles in the Civil Rights Movement, women often functioned as
“bridge leadership” in civil rights groups like the NAACP; women operated in direct contact
with multiple sectors of the community and linked the movement organizations and its official
leaders with the organization’s constituents. “The exclusion of most women from formal
leadership positions created an exceptionally qualified leadership tier in the area of micromobilization.”152 Robnett’s concept of “bridge-leadership”, however, does not capture the array
of roles that Frontany played in this civil rights struggle. She served in an official leadership
capacity within the organizational hierarchy of the LLAC and was the only Puerto Rican
community activist to actually testify in this case. In addition, she was a an active and visible
participant in this civil rights campaign and made herself a target for disrespectful questions like
“Do you speak English?” during this lawsuit. Frontany’s role in this litigation, therefore, went
beyond mere micro-mobilization.
After identifying the individual plaintiffs and preparing each of them for the upcoming
legal battle, Frontany and her students needed to demonstrate that the Chicago Board of
Elections engaged in discriminatory practices against Spanish speakers. To that end, Frontany
knew that she had an opportunity to stage a confrontation during the March 1972 primary
election. Frontany accompanied Vargas to the local election site at 641 West Surf Street to
provide assistance to Vargas. Frontany recalled that, “Mrs. Vargas entered the booth to vote.
Mrs. Vargas did not understand … After closing the curtains, Mrs. Vargas started talking to me
in Spanish, asking me questions in regards to the names and instructions in the machine itself
…”153 Vargas later testified in court that she asked Frontany for help once the curtains on the
voting booth were closed and the election officials on site did not allow Frontany to assist. She
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also asked for help from the various election officials who were present but none could
communicate with her in Spanish.154 Frontany observed the kind of assistance that Vargas
received in the voting booth while the curtain was open. While Vargas voted in the election, she
testified that she didn’t really know who or what she was voting for. The official, “started talking
to Mrs. Vargas and explaining in English what Mrs. Vargas was supposed to do. Yet, Mrs.
Vargas could not understand.”155 Abdona Vargas left the election site that day without getting
the kind of aid she needed.
Unlike Vargas, Maria DeJuan traveled to her local polling place with her parents to vote
in the March 1972 primary. When asked about her experience trying to vote in Chicago, DeJuan
recalled “I needed help … I did not know how to operate the voting machine … I had seen where
they don’t have a person that could speak Spanish to explain it to me.” DeJuan never made an
attempt to get help from an English-speaking Judge of Elections because, “I had noticed where
the judges would advise persons to vote for a certain candidate …” DeJuan was accompanied to
the voting site by her parents (who also lacked proficiency in English) and, after a great deal of
effort was placed on learning to properly operate the switches in the voting booth, all three voted.
DeJuan noted that she was, at first, unable to operate the voting machine, she felt as if her vote
was “lost”. After voting, the three began to chat and DeJuan commented that, “My mother told
me that she didn’t have a desire to vote in any prior election for the reason that she didn’t know
how to operate the voting machine; and if she did have some instructions in Spanish, she would
be able to.”156 While able to physically operate the voting machinery, DeJuan and her parents
did not really understand who or what they were voting for. The DeJuan family, like other Puerto
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Ricans in Chicago attempting to participate in the electoral process, sought access to a
meaningful vote rather than just the physical access to a voting site.
Months later, Geraldo Gomes attempted to register to vote before the 1972 Presidential
elections. Learning from Frontany that the voter registration began on September 14th, Geraldo
traveled with his two brothers (Jesus and Victor) along with another friend to a voter registration
office at 610 West Buckingham. Awaiting this group of young Puerto Rican men was Hilda
Frontany. Gomes recalled, “The application to register or to vote was in English. We had to get
help to have the information written down because we didn’t understand. A woman that was at
the place found a young girl about 14 years old to help us. That is the way we were able to get
help to fill out the application.”157 The woman Gomes spoke of was one of the Judges of
Election, Margaret Hess. Hess asked Frontany to help Gomes finish filling out the voter
registration form and Frontany refused. Frontany stated, “I was there as an observant to see if
they [the Chicago Board of Elections] really had help for the Spanish-speaking people …” It was
at this point when Hess brought in a young girl to help the Gomes brothers translate the forms.158
With these incidents documented by Frontany, PROPA and its attorneys felt that they had
sufficient evidence to show that Puerto Ricans were not able to fully exercise their right to vote
as US citizens.

PROPA v Kusper
On September 18, 1972, the attorneys for the PROPA filed a preliminary injunction
against Stanley Kusper and the other members of the Chicago Board of Elections arguing that
Puerto Ricans in the city would suffer permanent and irreparable harm if they were deprived of
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their right to vote in the upcoming elections. The lawyers representing PROPA, Donald T.
Bertucci and George C. Pontikes, asked for all voting materials to be translated into Spanish and
appoint Spanish-speaking election judges in Chicago wards that had a substantial number of
Spanish-speaking voters.159 In addition, they argued that the Kusper and the Board of Elections
were violating the 14th and 15th Amendments as well as the VRA.160 According to Bertucci and
Pontikes, the United States Census conducted in 1970 revealed that there were over 78,000
Puerto Ricans living in Chicago. In nine of the city’s wards, there was a concentration of
anywhere between 10,000 and 27,000 predominantly Spanish-speakers with an additional ten
wards containing 1,000 - 10,000 additional Spanish-speakers. They argued that, “Unless
defendants are compelled by order of this Court to furnish the written materials and instructions
to voters in the Spanish language, the plaintiffs will be subject to a de facto English literacy test
…”161
Literacy tests were used for many years in different parts of the United States to limit
who was eligible to vote. In the Jim Crow South, literacy tests were among the many different
methods utilized by local election officials to prohibit African-Americans from exercising the
franchise.162 Literacy exams being used to weed out undesirables from the voting pool, however,
were not confined to the American South. New York State created its own literacy requirement
for voting in 1921.163 New York’s literacy requirement was utilized years after its inception
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against Puerto Ricans attempting to register to vote. This law was eventually overturned in court
and literacy tests of any kind were eventually prohibited under federal law in the 1970 version of
the VRA.
Bertucci and Pontikes explained that Geraldo Gomez never voted before in the United
States and that Abdona Vargas, while she voted in the March 1972 primary, did not know whom
she voted for when she used the voting machine.164 The two lawyers noted how lack of Spanishlanguage access exacerbated the problem of low voter registration and turnout. To demonstrate
this point, Bertucci pointed out that the two wards with the largest Spanish-speaking population
in Chicago had the lowest percentage of eligible voters who were registered to vote.165 They also
argued that the statutory provisions that govern the Board of Elections didn’t prohibit them from
printing materials in Spanish or require them to produce voting materials solely in English.166 In
the state of Illinois, illiterate voters had the right to ask for help from two appointed officials (one
from each of the major political parties). In order for Spanish-speaking registered voters unable
to speak or read English to receive aid from these officials, PROPA wanted these appointees to
be bilingual.167
When describing the status of Puerto Ricans, the attorneys cited the Jones Act of 1917
and Section 4(e) of the VRA. During Congressional hearings on the VRA, Senator Robert
Kennedy commented on Puerto Ricans, stated that: “That his schooling takes place in Spanish is
not up to him, but is due to the fact that the U.S. government has chosen to encourage the
cultural autonomy of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, to make Puerto Rico a showcase for all
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of Latin America.” Kennedy’s reference to the island being a showcase for all of Latin America
was a reference back to how the economic development plan for the island of Puerto Rico called
“Operation Bootstrap” or Manos a al Obra in Spanish.168 Unlike Kennedy, Congressmen Jacob
H. Gilbert of New York kept the focus of his comments on the domestic dimensions of this issue
rather than its international implications. He argued that it was, “an anomaly for Congress to
encourage the perpetuation of Puerto Rico’s Spanish language culture and at the same time do
nothing to protect the rights of citizenship of Puerto Ricans who moved to other sections of the
country”. Both Kennedy and Gilbert also referred to the Katzenbach v Morgan case, which
upheld the constitutionality of Section 4(e) of the VRA.169 The attorneys representing PROPA
entered these comments and Supreme Court decisions into the record to provide context for
PROPA’s complaint and to boil this case down to its essential point: the, “Court is presented
with a situation involving English-speaking voters as a class and Spanish-speaking voters as a
class, wherein the defendants grant to some (English speaking voters entitled to assistance) what
is denied to others (Spanish speaking voters denied assistance). In essence the defendant Board
thus treats voters in like circumstances differently, or discriminatorily, and such discrimination
centers on race and color”.170
What was strange about this lack of Spanish-language material in the area of voting was
that the State of Illinois already had a number of other measures in place that recognized the
importance of bilingualism. The Board of Education in Chicago, for example, had adopted
bilingual education programs by 1971 and had even made the GED exam available in Spanish.
Interpreters were available for Spanish-speakers in both criminal and civil trials. Even driver’s
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license exams were able to be taken in Spanish. According to Bertucci and Pontikes, “The
Illinois legislature has recognized that there is no compelling state interest to maintain the
English language as the role language in the areas mentioned above primarily because the lack of
materials in the Spanish language was effectively depriving them of certain rights other U.S.
citizens obtain from birth. It seems axiomatic that the most fundamental of all rights – the right
to vote – should not be similarly safeguarded …” They were arguing that the right to vote has a
more expansive meaning than simply the ability to pull a lever; it was the right to an informed
and effective vote that was more important for the plaintiffs and their attorneys.171
William R. Ming Jr., responded on behalf of the Chicago Board of Elections that the
creation of election materials and appointing Spanish-speaking election officials violated Illinois
state law. Ming cited a statute enacted by the General Assembly of Illinois on September 22,
1969 that the official language of the state was in fact English. He argued that, “From 1923 to
that date the same section [of the statute] provided that the official language of the state was the
‘American language’. The Illinois courts had interpreted that phrase to mean the English
language and the 1969 enactment codified those decisions”. Ming went on to cite the 1870
Constitution of Illinois that forbade any writings or proceedings from being conducted in any
other language except English. By this logic, supporting the injunction would prohibit the Board
of Elections from doing their job. Ming questioned why the federal courts would even consider
contravening the laws of Illinois since the job of establishing election protocols was in the hands
of the state and not the federal government. This is puzzling because Ming in essence made an
argument in favor of “States-Rights” which was the same argument made by many racist elected
officials in the South during the 1950s and 1960s to support Jim Crow.
171
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Ming also argued against appointing Spanish-speaking election judges since that was a
form of reverse discrimination. “The Election Code does not provide for, or require, quotas of
election judges with Spanish surnames, or surnames of any other ethnic or national group. Such a
requirement would probably violate the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States”.172 Ming interpreted this injunction as a violation of the very amendment that the lawyers
for PROPA were invoking to support the case on behalf of Chicago-based Puerto Ricans and
argued for a more “color-blind” reading of the law. This idea of “reverse discrimination” and the
subversion of the term “colorblind” were tactics often used by opponents of such policies like
affirmative action and bilingual education. While Ming was not a supporter of voter
discrimination as evidenced by his history with the NAACP, his firm was contracted by the
Daley administration to defend the city against this lawsuit. According to Sophia Hall, “Bob
Ming was a professional and as a professional he had an obligation to vigorously defend his
client.” Pontikes recalled that professional ethics was not the sole cause for Ming’s firm to take
this case. “They were political insiders … they had access to the Daley regime.”173 While these
arguments were not the sole basis of Ming’s legal strategy, it was odd that an experienced civil
rights attorney would take a case that argued against the expansion of voting rights. 174
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After a series of preliminary meetings, the hearings in the PROPA case began on October
24, 1972. During his opening statement, Bertucci acknowledged that Kusper and the Chicago
Board of Elections had begun the process of translating voting materials into Spanish, but also
commented that the Board could exercise its own discretion in how it conducted the translation
and how it distributed these materials across the city. Bertucci argued that, “we think that the
Court should enter an order requiring the Board to so print and to so distribute and to so order
judges of elections to render assistance. Without such an order, it is up to the whim and fancy of
judges to interpret what is to be done … Mr. Ming can give us his word; that is not enforceable.
Mr. Kusper can give us his word; that’s not enforceable; the judges of elections can come in here
and give us their word and that again is not enforceable. We need an order of Court compelling
them to print and distribute and to notify the judges of elections to render this assistance on
Election Day.”175 Pontikes added the court order in this case was necessary, “to establish the
principal, the legal principal that these class of persons are entitled to assistance.”176
Ming, in his opening statement, categorically denied all of the claims made by Pontikes
and Bertucci and focused his attention on the lack of active discrimination against Puerto Rican
voters. For Ming, not having Spanish-language materials in the voting booth was not the same
thing as the practices that disenfranchised African-Americans in the South under Jim Crow.
Ming also highlighted other cases that denied Spanish-speakers the right to vote in their native
language.177
Frontany was called in as the first witness to testify in this case. She testified that on
September 5th she was sitting in her office going through files and working on reports when four
language of Puerto Rico was not Spanish. Since many of the island’s affairs were managed by the United States at
the federal level and those proceedings were conducted in English.
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gentlemen came looking for a registration office. Frontany went on to explain how she escorted
the young men to register to vote and the problems they encountered once they got to the voter
registration site. She also described similar difficulties when trying to help Abdona Vargas
earlier that year.178 What is significant about Frontany’s testimony is that she never discussed the
recruitment and training of Vargas and Gomes at any point during her direct testimony or on
cross-examination. She also minimized her role in coordinating the various Chicago-based
organizations in preparation of the lawsuit. Ming asked her “Do you know when this lawsuit was
filed?” and Frontany responded, “That would be information that the Lake View Latin American
Coalition Board and members would provide. I am staff. They make the resolution.”179 Despite
being asked a provocative question (regarding her ability to understand English), Frontany
remained composed and never let on that this lawsuit was part of a grander strategy.
Alderman Richard “Dick” Simpson of the 44th Ward on the North side was called in to
testify the next morning. Elected to office 1971, Simpson knew the Puerto Rican residents in his
district from census data and through his contact with local churches with Spanish-speaking
congregations. One of these churches, St. Sebastian’s Parish, was the site for a chapter of the
KSJ. During his time canvassing his ward, Simpson encountered a number of residents who were
unable to effectively use English.180 During his 1971 campaign, Simpson visited a polling place
located around Clark and Sheffield with Father Lezak of St. Sebastian’s Church because he had
“gotten complaints from several people that were unable to register because they were Spanishspeaking and no judges in the polling place spoke Spanish, no precinct captain in the polling
place spoke Spanish ... Over the years, I have had, I cannot begin to guess how many, but a
considerable number of complaints from Spanish-speaking precincts, both in the registration and
178

Ibid, 63-67 and 73-74.
Ibid, 80.
180
Ibid, 114-117.
179

74

confusion during the voting period.”181 While Ming argued that English was the official language
of the Puerto Rico’s government, it was clear that Spanish was the dominant language among
Puerto Ricans and that the language barrier was making it difficult for this community to fully
participate in the electoral process.
Ming, on cross-examination, asked Simpson if any effort was made to get any Spanishspeaking election officials. Simpson responded, “I have pushed the question to Stanley Kusper in
hearings in the City Council as to what can be done by the Board of Election Commissioners. In
fact, I specifically requested at the last City Council hearing as to whether or not we could make
it a requirement that a Spanish-speaking person be present in the polling place, either as a judge
or a translator. His specific answer to my question about that in literature and a lot of other things
was ‘No’.”182 Ming then asked, “in your opinion both as a political scientist and as an alderman,
that there are available means of political communication with the Spanish community, even
though the election procedure is conducted in English?” Simpson retorted, “That is not my
opinion … I find that a difficulty that cannot be overcome by any of the means I have yet
utilized, even though we attack the problem and stay within it systematically, so I do not share
your conclusion …”183 Even though Simpson demonstrated the need for bilingual assistance in
voting, the people in charge of setting up voting procedures across the city had no interest in
accommodating the language needs of Puerto Rican voters. This, for Simpson, meant that it was
imperative to change the very system of bureaucracy that governed voting in Chicago in order to
allow his Puerto Rican constituents equal access to the franchise.
John Kearney was called in to share his experience working with the Spanish-speaking
People Study Commission of the State Legislature from 1970-1972. This group held numerous
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hearings in Puerto Rican neighborhoods across Chicago to learn about the problems this
community faced. Among the topics of discussion at these meetings was Puerto Rican
participation in the electoral process and the issue of political representation.184 Kearney
remarked that the Puerto Rican community in Chicago had numerous difficulties in registering to
vote and exercising that right. “In the year 1962 there was a great deal of difficulty in
communicating to the Spanish-speaking people of the district … in that election the question of
exactly how to vote in a rather complicated voting procedure cost us a great deal of votes.” 185
Pontikes followed up on this point. “Do you, have you – on occasion, have you worked precincts
that have large numbers of Spanish-speaking voters in them?” Kearny responded, “Yes I have …
I have noticed in canvasing precincts where there are substantial numbers of Puerto Ricans that
they are much more under-registered than … comparable precincts where there are not Spanishspeaking … this under-registration is a direct factor of whether or not regular party organizations
do in fact have precinct workers who speak the Spanish language.”186
Kearny also discussed incidents when Spanish-speaking voters were prevented from fully
participating in the electoral process due to the Board of Elections not having enough bilingual
staff. He witnessed this occur in the elections of 1958, 1960, and again in 1972. “The specific
contest in which I was interested in was one for the Representative in the General Assembly. I
was, in that period of time, working as a volunteer for the reelection of ‘Jack’ [John] Merlo, who
is the – who represents I believe it’s the 13th District in the General Assembly … I observed a
person coming into the polling place, asking for instructions in how they could vote for the office
of Representative in the General Assembly, asking for it in the Spanish language … there were
other people present who spoke the Spanish language and who could have given them that
184
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instruction, although there was no member of the Board, no judge of election who was
competent to do so in the Spanish language.”187 Kearny, like Simpson, noted the inadequacies of
the electoral process with regard to fully incorporating Puerto Rican voters. By not having
bilingual voter registration forms or Spanish-speaking staff on site during elections, the Chicago
Board of Elections engaged in a systematic effort since the late 1950s to dilute the political
strength of a growing Puerto Rican community.
Kearny was cross-examined over two days. Ming pushed Kearny on the point of bilingual
election officials and existence of voter discrimination based upon language. Ming commented,
“you know, of course, do you not, Mr. Kearny, that there is certainly no statutory or other
limitation which would bar designation by either party of Spanish-speaking judges …” Kearny
responded that he knew of no statutory limitation but he was, “privy to a number of reports
where … [election officials] who in fact spoke Spanish were not allowed to offer assistance to a
voter in Spanish, presumably because the judges of other political parties could not understand
…” Ming asked if any reports were made to the Board of Elections about this difficulty. Kearny
answered, “in the judgement of persons in the headquarters the question had become moot,
because the persons had already been in fact denied their franchise …”188 While poll workers in
Chicago could be bilingual, the procedures for voter assistance were carried out in a manner
which stifled aid to Puerto Rican voters when help was available and was indicative a larger
pattern of de facto discrimination.
Abdona Vargas, Geraldo Gomes, and Maria DeJuan were each called in to give
testimony about their attempts to vote or to register to vote. After telling their respective stories,
Ming and his associates had the opportunity to cross-examine them. Of particular interest to
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Ming and his team was the level of English proficiency of each of these witnesses. In addition,
he focused his line of questioning on their voting history. Vargas, for example, was registered to
vote since 1970 and participated in previous elections. When asked if she remembered
registering to vote, Vargas responded in English “No”.189 Likewise, Gomes was also called out
by Ming as having at least some ability in English. Ming asked him if he could identify a
document in court. “Can you read that? I simply asked if you could. Can you read the letters in
blue?” Gomes replied that he couldn’t. Ming then called Judge Tone’s attention to the fact that
Gomes responded to his question without the use of a translator in an effort to undermine the
credibility of this witness.190 Ming’s clever method of drawing out information from the
witnesses aside, he misinterpreted what it meant to be bilingual. Understanding complicated
ballot questions was much different than using a few key English phrases in the workplace.
Although these witnesses possessed some working knowledge of English, they still required
bilingual protections from the court in order to fully participate in the democratic process.
DeJuan, unlike Vargas and Gomes, did not get flustered under questioning. Ming asked
her if she registered to vote in March of 1962, to which she replied “I believe that after the time
that I registered to vote I had been voting regularly but there was a time when I moved and I
stopped from voting.” She went on to explain that she never requested assistance during these
elections because nobody at the voting site could speak Spanish. “The first time that I voted my
husband’s father explained it to me before I went into the booth to cast my vote, but it’s very
complicated, once you get inside the booth. I didn’t understand it.”191 Even though other
witnesses with more social status like Simpson and Kearney were called in to offer testimony,
and even though she was exposed to the scrutiny of the superbly talented legal mind of Robert
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Ming, DeJuan’s testimony proved to be powerful. Her frustration with the English-only voting
system discouraged her from voting for years. When she attempted to vote again, the obstacles
she encountered in previous attempts were still present, even though her ability in English
improved over ten years. DeJuan’s words, “I didn’t understand” encapsulated the experience of
thousands of Puerto Ricans trying to exercise their voice in Chicago’s elections. While DeJuan’s
complaints were not heard by the Board of Elections, her voice was heard and understood quite
clearly that day in court.
After listening to all of the arguments and testimony in this case, United States District
Judge Philip W. Tone rendered his decision. While he acknowledged that the Chicago Board of
Elections was willing to take some steps to assist Spanish-speaking voters before the November
7th elections, Tone recognized that Kusper and the other commissioners held fast to their belief
that this litigation had no legal merit and that the federal court had any jurisdiction over this
affair. Tone also drew attention to the fact that PROPA and its lawyers recognized that the Board
of Elections’ proposed measures were, “all that they reasonably could be asked or ordered to do
in the time available between the date the case was commenced and the November 7 th election
…”192 One of the central problems that Tone identified was that the Board of Elections refused to
enter into a formal agreement to make any changes in their procedures and policies in relation to
Limited English Proficiency (LEP) voters. This refusal to guarantee the protection of Spanishspeaking voters’ rights would allow Kusper and his colleagues the ability to withhold any
changes and not be legally liable. According to Tone, “They [the Chicago Board of Elections]
state that the action they intend to take will be merely an experiment which they are conducting
voluntarily and not by reason of rights of members of the plaintiff class … It is also significant
192
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that defendants took no steps to provide election assistance in Spanish prior to the
commencement of this action.”193 Tone, realizing that the rights of Puerto Rican voters in
Chicago should not depend on the whims of the Board of Elections, agreed to grant the
injunction.

Conclusion
While the Daley machine ignored Puerto Rican voters during the 1950s and 1960s,
Puerto Rican community leaders in Chicago in the 1970s saw the potential to make in-roads into
the city’s political arena by mobilizing Puerto Rican voters. After the decision in the PROPA
case, three Puerto Rican men challenged incumbents supported by Daley’s political machine for
aldermanic seats.194 Frontany recalled that the LLAC also began promoting and supporting
progressive politicians like Dick Simpson and working on campaigns in the wake of the PROPA
lawsuit. “We began to focus on our own political campaigns and became campaign managers. In
March 1975, we ran a campaign with a young Puerto Rican male named Miguel Velazquez. We
challenged the 31st Ward organization which was in the heart of Humboldt Park; that community
and ward was run by Alderman Benjamin Keane …” The LLAC also linked up with other
organizations like League of Women Voters to help refine the political skills of people in the
community. They started teaching volunteers to be precinct workers, canvassers, and how to
understand the structure of the local political machine.195
Even with the legal victory in the PROPA case and these new alliances in place, it was
still very difficult for Puerto Rican residents of Chicago to elect one of their own to political
office. Velazquez and the other Puerto Ricans running for aldermanic seats in 1975 (among them
193
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Jose “Cha-Cha” Jimenez, former leader of the Young Lords) all lost their campaigns against
Daley machine-backed candidates. The aldermanic wards where Puerto Rican candidates ran all
had low levels of voter registration. In the 31st and 26th wards, areas of the city that formed the
center of Humboldt Park and West Town, less than one-third of eligible Puerto Ricans were
registered to vote. The lack of voter registration in Chicago’s Puerto Rican neighborhoods was
the result of years of willful neglect on the part of the Chicago Board of Elections. A 1971 article
in a local Spanish-language newspaper observed that, “Although the Commissioner of the Board
of Elections, Stanley Kusper, has directed a call to all the city’s residents to register to vote, little
or no official activity has been seen in the wards populated by Spanish-speaking residents …” In
addition to this purposeful neglect, the areas of Chicago where Puerto Ricans resided were
divided into separate political districts. This Puerto Rican community in the 31st ward only
represented 39% of the total number of registered voters in that district. In the adjoining 26th
ward, only 26.3 percent of the registered voters were Puerto Rican. What was clear to
community activists seeking political power in Chicago was that the judicial policy established
in the PROPA case wasn’t enough.196
In the early 1980s, a number of factors would converge to create a political climate where
Puerto Ricans in Chicago could achieve some measure of political representation. In 1983,
Harold Washington became the city’s first African-American mayor. He won his election with
the support of Puerto Rican activists like Luis Gutierrez. In 1985, the courts ruled that Chicago’s
wards needed to be reapportioned according to the demographic changes reflected in the last US
Census. This is how the political career of Luis Gutierrez got started. African-Americans and
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Latinos actively supported one another’s candidates, and this resulted in the electoral success that
eluded Puerto Rican activists during the 1970s.197
While PROPA did not yield the immediate electoral results that Franco and Frontany
sought, it did create an important legal precedent that would be used in other cities with
substantial Puerto Rican populations like Philadelphia and New York. PRLDEF, after providing
assistance to Frontany and her network of allies, paid close attention to the result of this case.
Herbert Teitelbaum, one of the lead attorneys for PRLDEF, was in communication with other
lawyers around the United States in an effort to coordinate their litigation strategy. In a letter to
Philadelphia-based attorney Nelson Diaz, Teitelbaum wrote, “Before we move on any of the
bilingual election cases outside of New York we are waiting for a decision from the Federal
Court here. Our theory is that a strong precedent … will be helpful in other jurisdictions.”
Teitelbaum also advised Diaz to examine the decision in the PROPA case to get a better sense of
the legal logic that could be used in other cities.198 This campaign would now shift back to New
York City where PRLDEF could continue the next phase of their campaign to secure bilingual
access to vote. Unlike in PROPA, where they only advised, Teitelbaum would argue this case
himself.
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Chapter 3: Big Apple
Introduction
In the aftermath of the PROPA case in Chicago, the litigation campaign for bilingual
ballots would shift to New York City. The lawsuits in New York City, Lopez v Dinkins and
Torres v Sachs, debated the same legal question of bilingual elections but had some unique
elements that distinguished these cases from the PROPA case in Chicago. Aside from taking
place in the most populous city in the nation, the energy behind these cases came directly from
PRLDEF rather than other Puerto Rican community organizations working with PRLDEF’s
guidance (as was the case in Chicago). In addition, PRLDEF filed this suit in conjunction with
another group that represented the Chinese-American community in lower Manhattan and this
highlights that language discrimination in voting did not affect Puerto Ricans alone. The lawsuits
initiated by PRLDEF in New York created the groundwork for the expansion of voting rights,
not only for Puerto Ricans but also for all language minorities. While New York City (unlike
Philadelphia and Chicago) was subject to the coverage formula of the VRA, the Lopez and
Torres cases helped to establish a new coverage formula that specifically targeted language
minorities for protection. These distinctions were important because these cases (and the Torres
case especially) set the standard that would be cited by Congress and applied to the entire nation
in a few short years.
An important figure in the struggle for bilingual ballots in this civil rights campaign was
Jewish-American attorney Herbert Teitelbaum. A professional civil rights lawyer, Teitelbaum
received his law degree from New York University in 1968. He went on to work for Bostonbased law firm Widett and Kruger where he worked on a case that resulted in the durational
residency requirements (the practice of mandating a minimum duration of a time in a given
83

jurisdiction before one can register to vote) for voting deemed unconstitutional. In 1972,
Teitelbaum was hired by PRLDEF and began his tenure there by advising local activists in
Chicago on how to approach the issue of bilingual elections. In addition, he served as the lead
attorney in both the Lopez and Torres cases as well as co-counsel on the Arroyo case in
Philadelphia.199 Teitelbaum, as Legal Director for PRLDEF, was the lynchpin that connected all
three cities in this national litigation campaign. Not only did he facilitate contact between
lawyers and activists in each city, but he helped generate the legal strategy that would be utilized
in court during this campaign.
The historiography of Puerto Rican activism in the United States has grown since its
inception in the 1980s. While the attention of scholars has largely focused upon the Young
Lords, more recent works have shifted away from this single organization and developed a larger
portrait of the Puerto Rican Left in the United States.200 In addition, the role of Puerto Rican
women and labor in this literature has also become more prominent.201 A renewed focus on
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Puerto Rican communities outside of New York City has broadened not only the geographic
scope of this writing, but allows scholars to compare and contrast the respective development of
each community.202 Relatively few focus upon electoral politics and citizenship as avenues for
social mobilization.203 This chapter, with its focus upon litigation as a form of activism, will add
to this by arguing that language (as a component of identity) was crucial for the political
mobilization of Puerto Ricans in New York. A significant portion of this activism was initiated
by a network of upwardly mobile activists, social reformers, and elected officials.

Pre-WWII Migration and Politics
Two factors helped facilitate Puerto Rican migration before WWII, the Jones Act (1917)
and the Johnson Act (1921) which curtailed immigration from Europe. While the Jones Act
granted Puerto Ricans citizenship, the Johnson Act contributed to the expansion of job
opportunities during the post-WWI period. A “family intelligence network” kept the lines of
communication open between Puerto Rican migrants in New York and their friends and loved
ones back on the island informed of developments in New York. There was a slight decrease in
New York’s Puerto Rican population due to return migration from 1931-1940 of almost 10,000
persons, although this represented only 20 percent of this community. Those who remained
tended to work in unskilled, semi-skilled sectors (farm work, light industry, restaurants, hotels,
Fernandez, Brown in the Windy City; Sonia Lee, Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement Puerto Ricans, African
Americans, and the Pursuit of Racial Justice in New York City (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2016)
202
See Carmen Whalen, From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia; Lilia Fernandez, Brown in the Windy City; Gina Perez, The
Near Northwest Side Story: Migration, Displacement, and Puerto Rican Families (University of California Press,
2004); Mirelsie Velazquez, ”Looking Forward, Working for Change: Puerto Rican Women and the Quest for
Educational Justice in Chicago” CENTRO: Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies Vol. XXVIII no. 2 (Spring
2016); Carmen Whalen and Victor Vazquez, The Puerto Rican Diaspora: Historical Perspectives (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2005); Padilla, Puerto Rican Chicago
203
See Lorrin Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen: History and Political Identity in Twentieth Century New York City
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010) and Jose E. Cruz, Identity and Power: Puerto Rican Politics and the
Challenge of Identity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998). For more on pre-WWII electoral and
community politics, see Virginia Sanchez-Korrol, From Colonia to Community: a History of Puerto Ricans in New
York City (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983)

85

and the garment industry) of the labor market.204 Migration to New York City came with some
risk but it offered the prospect of upward mobility to those at the lower end of the labor market
especially in the immediate aftermath of WWII.205
The average Puerto Rican who journeyed to New York City between 1925 and 1948 was
an adult (both men and women migrated although slightly more males moved than females),
travelled during their most productive adult years (15-44), were more educated than those who
remained on the island (typically 8 years of schooling vs 6.1/5.6 years for men/women who
remained on the island), and was more urban than rural. During the 1950s, these characteristics
largely remained the same except that later migrants were more rural than urban.206
Lawrence Chenault, who described the parameters of the Puerto Rican community in
New York during the Depression, located the geographic boundaries of the early settlements in
East Harlem, South Central Harlem, as well as a Puerto Rican enclave in Brooklyn. These
colonias (a term used by scholar Jose Hernandez-Alvarez to describe these early Puerto Rican
neighborhoods) were densely populated sections of the city. This pattern of settlement helped to
facilitate the creation of institutions which preserved the cultural identity of these Puerto Rican
migrants and allowed them to deal with problems stemming from the transition to a new cultural
and linguistic environment. The various colonias also functioned as magnets which attracted
continued migration from the island because they offered the new arrivals a familiar locale where
they could settle and acclimate to the mainland.207 These enclaves, although created by Puerto
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Ricans to make their life easier in New York City, were also critical for the maintenance of the
Spanish language among these migrants.
The Spanish language was a cultural element that Puerto Ricans rallied around to protect.
It was the principal language of Puerto Ricans in the home and in community life rather than
English (which was used only as the language of work). Even though Puerto Ricans took evening
courses to improve their proficiency with English, they continued to reshape their environment to
be more amenable to their culture. This included attending Spanish-language church services and
reading Spanish-language newspapers.208 One newspaper, Gráfico, published from 1926-1931
was explicit that its mission was to preserve the Spanish language and culture of Puerto Rican
community residents.209

During the 1920s this newspaper, “broached the subject of

discrimination against Puerto Ricans in New York, recommending the creation of a city agency
authorized to speak for these disadvantaged residents …”210 Another important Spanish-language
periodical was the Revista de Artes y Letras (Revista) and was published from 1933 until 1945.
Revista, like its predecessor Gráfico, was committed to the preservation of the Spanish language
and the Puerto Rican community in New York City. Revista, during the 1930s, joined with
parent-groups to rally against what it saw as the educational harassment of Puerto Rican youth.
Revista highlighted the issue of language discrimination citing how Puerto Rican students
transferring from schools on the island were often placed in classes for developmentallychallenged students or required to repeat the same grade year after year.211 This periodical served
as a community voice by articulating the concerns of parent groups who advocated for bilingual
education and the hiring of bilingual school staff. This kind of community engagement was not
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restricted to community newspapers alone. Revista and other Spanish-language newspapers were
joined by other Puerto Rican community organizations in the pre-WWII period to address a
variety of civil rights issues.
In the early 1920s, the Porto Rican Brotherhood of America (the Brotherhood) promoted
a sense of unity for Puerto Rican migrants and served as a mutual aid society. The Brotherhood,
in essence, acted as a watchdog group on issues involving the Puerto Rican community in New
York City while maintaining links with Puerto Rico. Among the many activities of this group
was the successful defense of four Puerto Ricans who, being unable to prove their American
citizenship, were detained on Ellis Island as aliens.212 Puerto Ricans migrating to New York City
in the 1920s thought they would be treated like earlier waves of immigrants, as temporary
outsiders. They attributed any social conflict they experienced on cultural and language
differences. Historian Lorrin Thomas argues that this perspective began to shift during the 1930s
towards a preoccupation on the part of Puerto Rican migrants and how they were viewed
racially. Congressman Thomas Jenkins (R-OH) proposed Joint Resolution 500 (H.J. Res. 500) in
1931 to further restrict immigration. Although this resolution did not pass, a report entitled
“Temporary Restriction of Immigration” observed that Canadians were desirable immigrants
since they held firm against race-mixing but Puerto Ricans were not as attractive since they were
too close racially to African-Americans, Jamaicans, and other immigrants from the West Indies
and their citizenship would one day guarantee them some measure of political power. “Who
knows how long it will be when these new elements shall choose to elect three or four members
to the House of Representatives from their group?”213 As Puerto Ricans began to develop their
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own community-based institutional infrastructure, Puerto Ricans had to contend with their
cultural and linguistic identity becoming racialized.
As Puerto Rican migrants were increasingly seen in racial rather than ethnic terms, they
sought to claim a portion of political power in New York City to insulate these enclaves from the
pernicious effects of racial discrimination. “The political steps taken by Puerto Ricans in New
York City during the late twenties and early thirties were intended to further the stability and
ensure the permanence of the pioneer settlements.”214 Puerto Ricans formed their own political
clubs that were often named after Puerto Rican historical figures and extensively utilized Spanish
to mobilize votes for a given candidate. Club leaders sought to exchange this political support for
patronage. By operating in this manner, these clubs were similar to other political groups
throughout the city often without a formal affiliation to either major political party. 215 These
Puerto Rican political clubs were able to rally support for one of their own in 1937 when Oscar
Garcia-Rivera was elected to the State Assembly representing the 17th District. His electoral
victory, “represented a momentary refocusing of the colonia’s political energies on the
traditional parties and their centrist policies in New York City.” Although Democrats in this
district outnumbered registered Republicans, Garcia-Rivera (running under the Republic ticket)
gained almost 60 percent of the vote.216 Despite an increasing sense among New Yorkers of
Puerto Ricans being foreign due to their anomalous racial identity and language, this small but
growing community was able to organize and mobilize sufficient numbers of voters to
successfully make an impact on the political structure of the city.
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The Puerto Rican voters of New York City during this period endured efforts by poll
workers to dissuade them from showing up at the polls. The story of militant political activist
Homero Rosado reveals the kind of language discrimination Puerto Ricans in New York City
faced. “it was not easy to vote at that time. The officials submitted the aspirant to an
interrogation with the purpose of frightening them by making them abandon their original
persuasions. This only served to keep Puerto Ricans away from the polls …”217 Despite this kind
of pressure not to vote, many Puerto Ricans still sought to participate in an English-only electoral
system in order to advance their community’s interests. Approximately 7,000 registered Puerto
Ricans participated in the 1918 governor’s race (these voters were aligned with Democratic clubs
from Brooklyn and Manhattan). A report from the Brotherhood noted that in the 1926 general
election, 2000 of the 5000 registered Puerto Rican voters were located within the 19th
Congressional District. The rate of Puerto Rican voter registration grew during the 1940s to over
30,000 in New York City which overwhelmingly supported Franklin Delano Roosevelt for
President and Vito Marcantonio for Congress.218 The increasing levels of participation of Puerto
Rican voters, despite intimidation and an English literacy test, demonstrated the growing
political participation of this community in the pre-WWII period.
The Puerto Rican community of New York City before WWII, while relatively small for
a city of that size, organized themselves in an effort to defend their cultural identity in a hostile
political and social environment. This community created political clubs, civil rights groups, and
print media with the explicit purpose of defending the Spanish language and the rights of Puerto
Ricans in New York City at a time when this community was being conceptualized as foreign
and non-white. While new Puerto Rican organizations rose to prominence in the post-WWII
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period, these groups continued to press for equal language access in all areas of American
political life.

Post-WWII Puerto Rican Politics
The postwar period ushered in many changes for Puerto Ricans in New York City but
arguably the most important was the expansion of Puerto Rican social service agencies,
community activist organizations, and elected officials who (through a variety of tactics) sought
to protect equal language access for others in their community. This was an era of expanded
migration to the mainland and is often referred to by scholars as the Great Migration. While this
term also applies to the period of African-American migration out of the American South after
1917, the Great Migration for scholars of Puerto Rican history refer to the period of 1945-1965
when more than one million Puerto Ricans left the island.219 This migration was facilitated by
both the government of Puerto Rico and by private entrepreneurs in the United States seeking
new sources of labor. By the end of this period, the Puerto Rican community in New York City
learned to fight its battles from both inside and outside of the power structure in the city.
As the Puerto Rican population in New York grew, so did the fear and misunderstanding
of these Spanish-speaking migrants. Print media and academics described the issues of
adjustment as “the Puerto Rican problem”. To ameliorate these concerns, the island’s
government formed the Migration Division in 1947 in order to assist the latest wave of migrants
to adjust to life in the United States and to help shape the image of these migrants in the media.
As the Migration Division began to exercise power within the Puerto Rican community in New
York, it encouraged the new migrants to learn English and adapt to their new environment. The
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Migration Division, having a strong connection to Puerto Rico’s ruling political party the Partido
Popular Democratico (the Popular Democratic Party or PPD), did not want the latest wave of
migrants to be seen as a threat.220 It wanted to distance Puerto Rican migrants from the efforts of
Puerto Rican Nationalists who sought political independence for the island. During the 1950s,
the Nationalists staged two attacks on U.S. soil; in 1950, two Puerto Rican Nationalists
attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman at Blair House, his temporary residence, and in
1954, a group of Nationalists led by Lolita Lebrón attacked the House of Representatives. Due to
the efforts of the Migration Division, the media was shifting its coverage of Puerto Ricans away
from this community as a problem and generating more sympathetic stories of migrants who
struggled with the language barrier during the 1950s. Also, as a result of the Migration
Division’s efforts, the media was shifting its gaze from the problems of recently arrived migrants
towards the growing potential of Puerto Rican political power in the city estimating the “Spanish
vote” at around 100,000 while party leaders considered supporting Puerto Rican candidates.221
This estimate was greatly exaggerated considering that others had estimated that the number of
Puerto Ricans registered to vote was at best around 40,000 but it did speak to the growing
awareness of how Puerto Ricans could potentially affect city politics through population
growth.222
While politicians courted the growing Puerto Rican electorate in the 1950s, few Puerto
Ricans won political appointments or elections. Oscar Garcia-Rivera was able to win a seat in the
State legislature in the late 1930s, but was unable to get reelected. In 1956, Felipe Torres became
a state legislator representing the Bronx 4th Assembly District, and in 1957 Manuel Gomez
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became a magistrate through mayoral appointment. In the face of these limited political gains
and their widely recognized voting potential, Puerto Ricans in New York City questioned
whether the challenges faced by their community were able to be addressed without complete
political equality and representation. “Many colonia leaders expressed deep pessimism about the
prospect of improvements for Puerto Rican housing, employment, schooling, and health without
political representation or ‘complete voting rights’ …”223 The disparity between the Puerto Rican
population’s voting potential and its actual numbers of registered voters (an estimated 35,000 out
of 250,000 potential voters in the 1952 Presidential election) had different explanations. Some
attributed this gap to voter apathy. Ralph Medina, a protégé of Vito Marcantonio, commented in
1957 that “most of the Puerto Ricans who were registered and brought into politics by
Marcantonio’s organization merely gave up when ‘Marc’ … died.”224 Others argued that this gap
had more to do with the obstacle of the English literacy requirement mandated by the state of
New York and the gerrymandering of the districts where many Puerto Ricans resided.225 The
desire for greater political access and representation would spur the development of new Puerto
Rican organizations and paved the way for groups to attempt to influence the destiny of their
community outside of the Migration Division. While success in electoral politics was still the
goal for some Puerto Ricans, it was not the only arena in which Puerto Ricans sought to make
their mark.
During the 1950s and 1960s as the movement for Puerto Rican civil rights gathered
strength, young Puerto Rican professionals and organizers in New York began to focus more
upon the difficulties of their community on the mainland as opposed to the politics of the island.
To this end, a number of different Puerto Rican groups were formed to advocate on behalf of the
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community which were in opposition to the Migration Division’s efforts at assimilation. The
Hispanic Young Adult Association (HYAA) at first advanced a similar agenda of acculturation
as the Migration Division. HYAA, however, broke away from the Migration Division in 1956
and renamed itself the Puerto Rican Association for Community Affairs (PRACA). Under this
new identity, PRACA worked on development of grassroots leadership among Puerto Ricans in
New York to work on local issues rather than island-based issues.226 HYAA was but one of the
many organizations to form in the 1960s to deal with the plight of the Puerto Rican community.
Among the many capable community based leaders that came out of HYAA, the best known is
arguable Antonia Pantojas. She came to New York in 1944 with experience as a union organizer
and educator on the island. Pantoja had a clear vision of how systemic poverty, lack of access to
equal education, and community politics intersected. For her, the strategy of leadership
development became of central importance during her career. Under the tutelage of her mentor
Dr. Frank Horne, Pantojas created the Puerto Rican Forum in 1957 and Aspira in 1961, which
had a similar mission but focused on Puerto Rican students.227 While organizations like Aspira
and the Puerto Rican Forum epitomized Pantojas’ world view and strategic sensibilities, other
Puerto Rican organizations of the 1960s took a more direct approach to improving their
community.
The internal dynamics of this circle of upwardly mobile group of Puerto Rican social
service agency leaders and grassroots activists in New York City reflected some aspects of the
concurrent divisions among African-American civil rights activists within the city and developed
as a response to tensions within their own community. There were activists like Pantoja who
were influenced by Frank Horne and focused their efforts on a reformist agenda while other
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Puerto Rican activists favored a more radical approach to their activism. Evelina Antonetty,
founder of United Bronx Parents, while seeking similar educational reforms as Pantojas was
closer to Milton Galamison in her style of activism. Among the key grievances that Antonetty
wanted to address was the classification of Spanish-language Puerto Rican students as mentally
deficient.228 Indeed, both Galamison and Antonetty were key figures in organizing the student
boycott of New York City public schools in 1964. Despite differences in tactical philosophy,
what united these activists was their desire to gain better access to education resources for Puerto
Rican students. This kind of tactical division not only manifested among activists but among
Puerto Rican elected officials in New York City and are best represented through Gilberto
Gerena-Valentin and Herman Badillo.
Other Puerto Rican civil rights organizations also took up the issue of language equality
during the 1960s. Among these groups was the National Association of Puerto Rican Civil
Rights (NAPRCR) which formed in 1965 and focused on a broad civil rights agenda. Gilberto
Gerena-Valentin was among the founders of the group. A union organizer with ties to the
Communist Party, Gerena-Valentin described the NAPRCR as “the militant arm of the Puerto
Rican community in New York City.”229 Its activities included working to abolish the English
literacy requirement for voting, police brutality, poor housing conditions, bilingual education,
and the support of Puerto Rican political candidates.230 On the issue of the English literacy
requirement, Gerena-Valentin along with Herman Badillo testified in Congress in 1965 in
support of the VRA. He noted that “following our example, organizations in other states ran
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campaigns to fight the literacy test. In this area … we Puerto Ricans were in the vanguard of the
civil rights struggle in the United States.”231 Gerena-Valentin used direct action protest and
advocacy to raise awareness of discrimination against Puerto Ricans. His methods, however
militant Gerena-Valentin may have described them, were always aimed at getting Puerto Ricans
included in the political fabric of the city. Even as Gerena-Valentin transitioned into a new role
as City Council representative for the South Bronx, he continued to advocate for direct-action
tactics in his agenda. Not all Puerto Rican politicians, however, followed the same trajectory
during their career.
Herman Badillo was born in the town of Caguas on the island of Puerto Rico. He came to
New York City as an 11 year old and was a product of the public school system. He earned his
law degree in 1954 from Brooklyn Law School and during the 1960s became a prominent
political force in New York City politics. Coming up, “through the ranks of traditional party
politics …”, Badillo worked on getting support from Puerto Ricans for the Presidential campaign
of John F. Kennedy in 1960 and worked for Mayor Wagner in 1962. 232 Badillo was elected
Bronx Borough President in 1965 and in 1968 was elected to Congress. Gerena-Valentin,
commented that Badillo was never interested in grassroots politics; while he was one of the
founders of the NAPRCR along with Gerena-Valentin, he was never very active in the
organization’s endeavors.233 Badillo’s energies were focused upon election reform in order to
ease the way for more Puerto Ricans to vote. He headed up a three-man task force established by
Mayor Lindsay in 1970 which criticized the Board of Elections for not having bilingual materials
for Spanish-speaking voters as well as noting the lack of bilingual staff to assist Puerto Rican
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voters.234 Even though he was appointed to this task by the mayor, Badillo did not hesitate to
oppose Mayor Lindsay when the mayor of New York expressed concern with the VRA covering
his city. Badillo cited abundant evidence of discrimination in voter registration that negatively
impacted both African-Americans and Puerto Ricans. He commented that this kind of
discrimination was, “not the obvious kind in the South, but the techniques used are the same …
Registrants are deliberately misinformed, lied to and discouraged.”235 While Badillo might not
have shared Gerena-Valentin’s methods, it was clear that they both desired Puerto Ricans to have
greater access to political power in New York City.
While the leadership of the Puerto Rican community in New York City was far from a
unified force, the spectrum of philosophies and tangled web of relationships reveal that the
political camps of this community defied easy categorization. “The reality on the ground was
that the relationships between people who subscribed to ‘two rival formulas for attacking
poverty’ were porous, not limited absolutely by the competing camps they occupied.”236
Individuals would support various Puerto Rican organizations even if these organizations had
completely distinct objectives. For example, Badillo at no point during his long political career,
could be characterized as a “leftist” or a “militant”. Badillo, along with Cesar Perales of
PRLDEF, although not members of the Young Lords supported these young militant Leftist
activists with legal aid when arrested. The lawsuits initiated by PRLDEF in New York were born
in this curious admixture of formal and protest-politics.
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Herbert Teitelbaum, recalling how the Lopez case began, stated that, “Prior to filing the
complaint in the Lopez v Dinkins case, our office was approached by persons who were residents
of the lower east side asking that we attempt to have the nominating petitions which were about
to be promulgated in the Community School Board elections of 1973 made bilingual.”237
Teitelbaum reached out to David Dinkins who was the Chief Officer of the Board of Elections at
the time, to ask him to get the election materials translated into Spanish as was done recently in
Chicago. Dinkins, who would later go on to become the first African-American to become mayor
of New York City, refused Teitelbaum’s request.238 While it was not entirely clear why Dinkins
refused this request, this simple refusal furnished the justification PRLDEF required to file a suit
against both the Board of Education and the Board of Elections. Along with Dinkins, Joseph
Monserrat in his capacity as a member of the Board of Education was named as co-defendant.
Monserrat was well known in New York’s Puerto Rican community for his work running the
Migration Division. Since both the Board of Education and the Board of Elections shared
responsibility in administering school board elections, PRLDEF sued them both. The individuals
and organizations involved in this phase of this litigation campaign highlighted some of the
racial ambiguities of this case. Teitelbaum, a Jewish lawyer working for a Puerto Rican civil
rights organization, sued an African American and a Puerto Rican for discrimination against
Puerto Ricans and Chinese-Americans. Clearly, the issue of electoral discrimination became so
entrenched that it transcended a binomial form of institutionalized racism. It was their shared
experience with this entrenched discrimination that allowed both Chinese-Americans and Puerto
Ricans to ally.
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The plaintiffs in this case wanted to get the right to vote in the May 1 st school board
elections in their native language and included Puerto Ricans and Chinese mothers whose
children attended public schools. Among these parents was Juana Lopez. Lopez, whose primary
language was Spanish, had a child that attended JHS 143 in Washington Heights. Joining Lopez
was Bo Lan Tom, a naturalized U.S. citizen from China. Tom’s daughter attended P.S 23 in
Chinatown and, like Lopez, she felt discouraged from voting in school board elections because
of her lack of proficiency in English. In addition to Tom and Lopez were nine other Puerto Rican
women in similar circumstances who hailed from the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan.
“Plaintiffs seek … injunction against the defendants’ systematic deprivation of plaintiffs’ right to
vote, the purpose and/or effect of which is to discriminate against plaintiffs and other similarly
situated persons under the color of law on the basis of race, color, or national origin.”239
Teitelbaum defined this group as a “class” in the sense that plaintiffs were all non-English
speaking citizens whose right to vote was curtailed because of shared language oppression.
While Chinese-Americans and Puerto Ricans in lower Manhattan may have spoken different
languages at home, their continued use of their mother tongues connected each group in ways
that neither could imagine.
Both Chinese and Puerto Rican students experienced a high degree of educational
segregation. New York City was home to over 800,000 Puerto Ricans according to the 1970
Census, 75 percent of which used Spanish as their primary language. Of the 1.1 million students
in the New York City public school system, 23 percent were Puerto Rican while 2 percent were
Chinese. These students were concentrated in several areas of the city. District 1 for example,
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located in the Lower East Side, approximately 70 percent of the student population was Puerto
Rican. Most of the Chinese students in the city were located in District 2 in Chinatown. While
only about 20 percent of the students in District 2 were Chinese, these students were
concentrated in two schools, P.S 23 (97 percent Chinese) and P.S. 130 (75 percent Chinese).240
In addition to language discrimination cited by Teitelbaum, Puerto Rican and Chinese-American
families were linked by residential segregation.
Table 3:1: Percentage of Puerto Rican and Chinese students in Select New York City
School Districts
District Number Puerto
Rican
student Chinese
student
population
population
1
68.2
4.9
2
26.6
21.5
4
63.9
0.3
7
64.1
0.1
8
42.9
0.4
9
42.9
0.6
12
55.7
0.2
14
62.2
0.5
15
48.5
1.1
Source: Educational Program Research and Statistics, Office of Business Administration, Board of Education of the
City of New York, Annual Census of School Population: October 30, 1970, 17-26.

Although Chinese and Puerto Rican plaintiffs experienced similar forms of
discrimination, each side had its own legal representation. Bo Lan Tom was represented by
Marttie L. Thompson. Thompson was an experienced legal aid attorney who placed high value
on providing service to the poor and the marginalized. When the Reagan Administration came
into power in the 1980s, it cut funding for programs like Legal Aid and civil rights enforcement
and as a result Thompson resigned in protest.241 The Chinese-American community of New York
also had grassroot activists advocating on its behalf. Judy Bauman of the Committee for
Democratic Election Law (CODEL) worked with PRLDEF in the Lopez case. Teitelbaum
240
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described CODEL as “an unincorporated association whose aim is to challenge discriminatory
local, state, or national election laws … by bringing these issues to public attention.” 242 While
PRLDEF had the organizational infrastructure to both litigate and educate its constituents, it
appeared that for the Lopez case the job of representing Chinese-Americans in court and outside
of it was divided between Bauman and Thompson.
Teitelbaum, in order to support the claim of his plaintiffs, cited the 1969
“Decentralization Law” to provide greater parent participation in the school system. According
to the Decentralization Law, each school district had to elect a community school board
consisting of anywhere from seven to fifteen members to administer junior and elementary
schools. Registered voters residing in the school district and parents (even if not normally
eligible to vote) with children going to school in the district could vote in these elections. In the
1971 election, petitions to nominate candidates for school board elections were only available in
English and, “the Board of Elections has indicated that they will be in English only again.”243
Ballot instructions were also only available in English. Improperly marked ballots, according to
the law, would be considered invalid. Puerto Ricans and Chinese parents were, “particularly
liable to prepare invalid ballots of the vote because of their inability to understand the English
instructions on the ballot.”244 In addition, translators were not available in the 1970 election and
the Board of Elections indicated that no translators would be available for the next school board
election in 1973. Therefore, the plaintiffs were “denied full, effective, and meaningful voter
participation.” By making election material available only in English, “defendants have
established a classification based on the racial and national origin characteristics of plaintiffs
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which discriminates against them.”245 In essence, Teitelbaum argued that language was being
used to racialize Chinese-American and Puerto Rican voters.
Nomination petitions for the school board elections were going to be made available to
candidates on February 15th while voter registration for the May school board election was
scheduled for four days in March. Teitelbaum, on behalf of the plaintiffs, asked for bilingual
materials and bilingual election officials to monitor polling sites but these entreaties were
rebuffed by the Board of Elections. In doing so, he argued, the Board of Elections and the Board
of Education were in violation of the 1st, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States as well as the VRA of 1965 and its 1970 version (which banned any form of
literacy test as a prerequisite for voting). Teitelbaum filed the lawsuit one day before the
nomination petitions were scheduled to be circulated in an effort to prevent this English-only
school board election from proceeding.
The judge who presided over this case was Charles E. Stewart. Stewart was appointed to
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by President Nixon in
1972. A Harvard-educated lawyer, Stewart had some familiarity with the Puerto Rican
community in New York and its struggles. In 1973, the same year he heard the Lopez case
Stewart reinstated Luis Fuentes, a superintendent who had been ousted by a local school board
on Manhattan's Lower East Side. Respected by both prosecutors and defense attorneys, he was
described “as a warm, careful, sensitive man who believes in justice."246 Even though a Nixonappointee, Stewart’s record on the bench reflected a deep commitment to civil rights issues.
Unlike the PROPA case in Chicago, the Lopez case did not have any witness testimony.
Rather, this was a case that was argued by legal briefs and negotiated in meetings between Judge
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Stewart, Teitelbaum, and the other attorneys involved in this case. It was through one of the
many briefs in this case that Teitelbaum focused in on the central problem of English-only
elections. “The results of this unconstitutional deprivation … is the discriminatory classification
between plaintiffs and persons who speak English, and that this classification is based on a prime
elements of plaintiffs’ racial and national origin characteristics – their language.”247 He went on
to directly cite PROPA v. Kusper noting that the case in Chicago increased the likelihood for
success in this case.
Foreshadowing the kind of resistance that bilingual elections would later engender,
Teitelbaum argued that producing bilingual election materials would not be overly expensive. He
argued the steps that the Board of Elections need to take to fix this situation would not be
onerous since many public documents were available in other languages (including court
summonses and welfare notices). Teitelbaum added that any cost incurred in preparing bilingual
election materials was far outweighed by the disenfranchisement of the plaintiffs. His most
forceful argument was also the most simply written, “nothing can compensate for the loss of
one’s right to vote.”248
While a temporary agreement was signed by both parties, Teitelbaum who represented
PRLDEF and Norman Redlich who represented the defendants, on Feb 16, 1973 the two sides
continued to negotiate over the next few weeks to come to an accord regarding various points of
contention. Neither side was completely satisfied with the preliminary order issued by Stewart
and sought to modify some of the stipulations. While the initial order only included seven
elementary schools, Teitelbaum wanted to include language that would expand bilingual
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protections to any school that had a Puerto Rican or Chinese population of at least 5 percent or
more. In their proposed counter-order, Redlich crossed this proposed stipulation by hand.
Redlich did not want his clients to be held responsible for preparing signs for each election site,
preferring instead that bilingual elections staff verbally assist Limited-English proficiency (LEP)
voters at the certain designated schools.249 Of critical importance in these negotiations was the
issue of the 5 percent threshold. The counter-proposal made by the defendants was where this
numerical standard was first mentioned and was in stark contrast to the 50 percent threshold
established in the Voting Rights Act (VRA); according to the VRA, if a given district’s voter
turnout was below 50 percent then that district would fall under the coverage of the Act. In
comparison, Teitelbaum’s 5 percent standard might have seemed ludicrously low. He suggested
this language in order to maximize the possible number of schools that would be covered by
Stewart’s order. This 5 percent standard, which would later be referred to as the Torres principle,
would later become enshrined in the 1975 version of the VRA.
After this period of negotiations, the Board of Elections and Board of Education agreed
to have voter registration applications translated and conducted the May 1st school board election
with bilingual voting materials for their Puerto Rican and Chinese-American constituents. The
execution of bilingual voter registration, however, left much to be desired. Teitelbaum began
receiving phone calls on March 13th updating him on the lack of bilingual voter registration
forms at various sites across the city. “I began receiving phone calls that schools were either not
provided with bilingual work sheets or had distributed all of the bilingual work sheets with
which they were supplied. I telephoned Mr. Bassett of the Board of Elections and informed him
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of the situation and inquired whether or not the defendants’ employees at the various places of
registration had telephoned the Board of Elections to request additional bilingual materials. Mr.
Bassett informed me that he knew of no such calls.”250 In order to track the manner in which the
Board of Elections implemented bilingual election registration, Teitelbaum tasked other
PRLDEF staff members to hit the streets and see what was going on for themselves.
Teitelbaum wrangled two fellow PRLDEF staffers to assist him in traveling to different
schools across the city. One of the PRLDEF staffers, Juan Rivera traveled to four schools in
Manhattan and Brooklyn where the Puerto Rican student population was in excess of 80 percent
(PS 15 and PS 115 in Manhattan and PS 19 and PS 1 in Brooklyn). “In each of the schools I
visited … I informed the officials in each of the schools that I had difficulty speaking English. In
none of the schools was I provided with bilingual registration forms, in fact, I was told that such
bilingual forms were not available in those schools.”251 Judy Medina, another staff member of
PRLDEF went to schools in Spanish Harlem and the South Bronx. She saw only one school
where bilingual voter information was posted and another where bilingual registration forms
were available upon request, but in the other schools she visited no bilingual forms were
available at all.252 Upon hearing of the Board of Elections’ non-compliance, Judge Stewart
issued a court order to extend the period for registration. This order mandated that the defendants
make bilingual election materials available for the school board elections and included
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Teitelbaum’s desired 5 percent standard.253 If not for the Board of Elections’ dismissive attitude
towards their initial agreement with PRLDEF, the 5 percent standard might never have been
included in Stewart’s final ruling.

Torres v Sachs
Following the success of the Lopez case, Teitelbaum sought to expand the application of
the decision in Lopez beyond the scope of school board elections. As in the PROPA case, he
wanted to get bilingual ballots implemented in the general election. Teitelbaum, contacted the
Board of Elections that summer in an effort to persuade the Board to adopt the Lopez and
PROPA decisions.254 Teitelbaum wrote Dinkins in July asking him what his plans were with
respect to implementing bilingual elections in the November general election.255. He received a
response a few weeks later from Betty Dolan, Senior Administrator for the Board of Elections
informing him that Dinkins was no longer with the Board. Dolan added that Teitelbaum’s
request was presented at a Board of Elections meeting on July 31st but, “The Board, after full
discussion, unanimously voted that all materials on the ballots was to be in English only, as in all
past elections.”256 In light of the Board’s refusal to extend bilingual school board elections to the
general election, Teitelbaum felt it necessary to move forward with an additional lawsuit.
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In order to file this second lawsuit, Teitelbaum needed plaintiffs. Unlike the Lopez case,
the plaintiffs in this case did not come from all over the city. While the available evidence does
not indicate how they were recruited, what is clear is that Rosa Torres, Vicente Lajes, and Teresa
Fernandez all resided in an apartment building at 941 Intervale Ave in the Bronx. Each of these
plaintiffs was born in Puerto Rico and were registered voters. The affidavits of Rosa Torres and
other plaintiffs all made the same claim: they were able to read, speak and write Spanish but not
English and wanted to participate in a meaningful and effective manner in the November
election. “I have been informed by my counsel that approximately ten constitutional amendments
and at least one proposition will appear …”257 These affidavits implied that Torres and other
plaintiffs did not initiate the litigation as the parents in the Lopez case did. According to
Teitelbaum, the plaintiffs in the Lopez case came to him. While Frontany made a similar claim
while testifying in the PROPA, it was later revealed that she identified and trained the plaintiffs
in the Chicago case in how to respond to questions while attempting to register to vote and when
going to the voting booth. In addition to the affidavits, an additional document seems to suggest
that Torres and the other residents of 941 Intervale Avenue merely lent their name to PRLDEF’s
campaign. A retainer affidavit from Teresa Fernandez dated July 19, 1973 stated that the
undersigned retained PRLDEF attorneys to represent “him” (even though Fernandez was clearly
female) in an action between himself and the Board of Elections. “I hereby direct and empower
the above named attorneys to take whatever legal action may be necessary in my name and on
my behalf …”258 This was of course in keeping with the tactics of the larger national litigation
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strategy to secure bilingual ballots; PRLDEF as an organization was invested in these kinds of
civil rights actions and, like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (or “Inc. Fund” as it was dubbed)
or the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) before them, PRLDEF
actively sought out individuals who would lend their name to a civil action.
According to Teitelbaum, there was no justification for the Board of Elections to not
provide bilingual ballots. While the initial implementation of translated ballots was hastily
implemented at first, he commented that the “Defendants cannot argue that the administrative
burdens are too onerous. With less time available, defendants altered the procedures for the 1973
community school board elections … Here, plaintiffs made their formal request to defendants
almost four months from the date of election … if there are any time pressures, they exist
because defendants have refused to alter their procedures outside the context of a lawsuit.”259 In
addition to the greater amount of time, the Board of Elections had to get election materials
translated into Spanish, it was vitally important that the November election have these materials
since a number of ballot measures were being presented to the electorate. The questions included
issues ranging from criminal trial proceedings to transit-bond proposals.260
James Siket, Executive Director of the Board of Elections, opposed the idea of courtmandated translations for the general election. He argued that the Board of Elections had already
made the decision in a September 20th meeting to voluntarily produce bilingual ballots and have
interpreters present at polling places. With regard to bilingual election staff, Siket added that,
“The Board of Elections is prepared and always has been prepared to appoint such inspectors if
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their names are submitted by the various Chairmen or Secretaries of the County Committees. It is
respectfully submitted that in accordance with existing law, the Board can do no more. It must
also be noted that all inspectors who are to be assigned on November 6, 1973, have … already
been appointed.”261 On the topic of printing the amendments and proposition questions, he
remarked that there was room on the current voting machines to add Spanish translations but he
hoped that PRLDEF and its staff would be willing to assist the Board of Elections in providing
Spanish translation of election materials.
In response to Siket’s written statement, Teitelbaum wrote that “Even though certain
factual matters are conceded, the central issue presented in this case will never be resolved until
this Court rules that plaintiffs have a legal right to the relief requested herein [bilingual
elections]. It is apparent that defendants’ ‘affirmative action’ regarding plaintiffs’ voting rights,
occurs only when lawsuits are filed. Unless an order is issued setting forth the rights of the
parties and mandating certain affirmative relief, plaintiffs will have to return to this Court for
each future election.”262 After considering the arguments by both parties and knowing the history
of this lawsuit, Judge Stewart (as he did in the Lopez case) issued a preliminary injunction in late
September with the hope that both parties would come to a mutually agreeable solution. This
temporary order mandated the Board of Elections conform to his earlier ruling in Lopez and have
bilingual ballots and translators available on-site during the November elections. Both sides
signed off on the injunction and began a period of protracted negotiations.
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When asked about the implementation of Spanish-language voting in the November 1973
general election, Teitelbaum remarked, “after I had been litigating the issue of bilingual ballots
since February 1973, and after this Court issued a preliminary injunction requiring translations,
inside the voting booth, I was appalled to discover that the booth in which I voted on November
6th had no translation of the amendments and propositions.”263 Teitelbaum was not the only voter
not to come across bilingual ballots on election day. As in the Lopez case, Teitelbaum asked
fellow staffers at PRLDEF to check on the implementation of bilingual elections at different
points across the city. Annette Oliveira, assistant to the Executive Director of PRLDEF, traveled
to the Little Red Schoolhouse down on Bleeker Street to cast her ballot and, “Notwithstanding
the order of this Court, no Spanish translation of the amendments and propositions appeared
inside the voting booth.”264 Another PRLDEF staff member went to a public school on Kelly
Street in the Bronx and also didn’t find any bilingual ballots or translations available. 265 As a
response of the Board of Elections dragging its feet on rolling out bilingual ballots, Teitelbaum
felt compelled to push Judge Stewart to make a ruling on the case.
In the wake of the November 1973 election, Teitelbaum explored different methods to
push this case towards a favorable resolution. He pushed for a summary judgment to get the
preliminary injunction made permanent.

263

266

The attorney for the Board of Elections, Irwin
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Herzog, opposed this idea. Herzog argued that since providing bilingual election materials was
already the policy of the NYC Board of Elections, making the injunction permanent was not
needed. He argued that after a four month investigation by the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) in 1972, they determined that, “there was no reason to believe that a literacy test
has been used in the past ten years in the counties of New York, Kings, and Bronx with the
purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color …” 267 A
memo from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division
of the DOJ, added that there was, “no allegation by black citizens that the previously enforced
literacy test was used to deny or abridge their right to register and vote by reason of race or
color” nor “any individual citizens whose inability to register is attributable to the absence of
Spanish language affidavits.”268 Using this report, the State of New York was exempted from the
filing requirements of the VRA. Despite these finding by the DOJ, Herzog argued, “the
unfortunate repercussions caused by the Board of Elections consenting to the preliminary
injunction [in the Torres case] …” caused New York to be subject to the VRA Section 5
preclearance clause after it successfully petitioned the federal government to release New York
from the VRA coverage.269
These “unfortunate repercussions” were, in part, engineered by Teitelbaum as he was in
communication with Barry H. Weinberg, a senior official with the DOJ, who reopened the case
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against New York State and got the federal government to reapply the VRA coverage formula to
New York.270 In reply to Herzog’s objections, Teitelbaum reaffirmed the argument he made
earlier in this case. “It is imperative that the Board be required by this Court to provide bilingual
ballots in the future elections as it did in the November 6th election. Otherwise, the members of
this Board or some future members may change their position, as they have done before, and
reverse their policy again.” Teitelbaum maintained that, “throughout this lawsuit the Board will
not adequately respond to the requirements of the 1965 Voting Rights Act … unless their duties
are specifically defined and made mandatory by this Court … the Board is far from
institutionalizing bilingual elections in New York City.”271 Teitelbaum’s strategic use of
communication, not only with federal civil rights officials but with other interested parties across
the country, helped generate and solidify support for bilingual ballots.
Other individuals around the country were following the bilingual elections lawsuits in
New York City as well as in Chicago and thought about ways to get these decisions applied to
their own jurisdictions. Stewart H. Jones, a United States Attorney, wrote to Gloria Schaffer, the
Connecticut Secretary of State, exactly one month after papers were filed in the PROPA case;
“we believe that the obligation is clear to provide at least one bilingual official from each party
in all election districts where there are non-English speaking voters in all but the most
insignificant amounts …”272 Schaffer communicated with her staff two days later to relay this
message. A year later, Schaffer reminded her personnel of the importance of bilingual elections
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in the wake of the Torres decision. “Although this decision is not directed against Connecticut
officials, it once again emphasizes the need to provide to our Spanish-speaking voters the
assistance necessary to enable them to effectively exercise their voting rights.” 273 Schaffer
contacted Cesar Perales, Executive Director of PRLDEF, to discuss these efforts. She wrote, “It
is my intention to sponsor such a legislative program, and I would therefore deeply appreciate
any specific recommendations or suggestions which you may have in this regard.”274
Considering that Connecticut had a growing Puerto Rican population of its own in Hartford,
officials in the Constitution State took a proactive stance towards the issue of bilingual ballots.
Beyond state-level officials, a number of civil rights advocates were aware of PRLDEF’s
progress with their litigation campaign. Teitelbaum was in contact with both the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and MALDEF to keep both organizations informed on his progress on
the Torres case.275 Stanley Levy of the Beverly Hills Bar Association Foundation was also
interested in filing a similar type of case for Chicanos and reached out to Judy Bauman of
CODEL. In a hand-written note, Bauman asked Teitelbaum to follow up directly with Levy and
he sent a copy of his legal notes to the California-based lawyer. Teitelbaum also suggested that
Levy examine the arguments made in Castro v California (1970), since this case sought a similar
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goal but was unsuccessful in its attempt to secure bilingual ballots.276 In the wake of Stewart’s
final decision in the Torres case, Teitelbaum contacted New York Secretary of State John Ghezzi
urging him to adopt bilingual elections across the entire state.277
Teitelbaum’s most important communication during this phase of the case was with
Judge Stewart and Irwin Herzog. Just before Christmas, he sent Stewart copies of the PROPA
decision in Chicago. That February, He also forwarded to Stewart’s office a recent decision
rendered in Philadelphia that supported bilingual elections.278 Teitelbaum and Herzog decided in
January that both parties would enter an agreement to conduct bilingual elections.279 With both
sides satisfied, Stewart rendered his final decision in the Torres case. “The fact that the
defendants have resolved to take some steps in the direction of giving Spanish-speaking citizens
an effective vote is an inadequate assurance for such a fundamental right in a free society.”280
With a court order secured, PRLDEF achieved the victory it had long sought. This victory was
the result of a broader interpretation of the law by Teitelbaum, sound organization by PRLDEF,
having the benefit of an accommodating judge, and the previous victories in the PROPA and
Lopez cases.
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Conclusion
Language, for Puerto Ricans in New York City, was (and still is) a central component of
ethnic identity. For the enclaves of Puerto Ricans living in New York City during the pre-WWII
period the importance of language was articulated by civil rights organizations, Spanishlanguage print media, and at the ballot box. Language rights, in the areas of education and
electoral politics, continued to be an area Puerto Ricans mobilized around during the 1960s using
both grassroots activism and through social service organizations. Formal electoral politics was
yet another area where Puerto Ricans mobilized to protect equal language access. Despite the
growing number of organizations and different tactical responses to the challenges they faced,
the Puerto Rican community in New York City by 1970 had a network of social service agencies
and grassroots community organizations who all supported language rights. PRLDEF filled an
important niche in this network during this period. Of all the Puerto Rican organizations in New
York, it was the only one focused on litigation as a method for social and political reform. The
work that Teitelbaum and the other members of PRLDEF on Lopez v Dinkins and Torres v Sachs
created an important legal precedent that resulted in the creation of an entirely new protected
class: that of language minority.
The historiography of the Puerto Rican civil rights activism has not fully explored the
range and depth of legal activism within this movement. While groups like MALDEF and
PRLDEF worked ceaselessly in their respective communities, much of the literature on the civil
rights contributions of Puerto Ricans and other Latino groups tends to focus upon the militant
Left who favored direct action protest rather than those individuals and organizations that sought
incremental and institutionalized change. The enduring policy contributions of more reformist
groups like PRLDEF are noticeably absent in this kind of narrative and it should not be so.
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PRLDEF was never after the media attention in the way that other, more visible civil rights
groups did and yet the changes in election law that Teitelbaum and many other worked so hard
for is (to date) still the law of the land. This chapter, and indeed this entire dissertation, can serve
as a corrective to this void in the literature.
PRLDEF’s campaign shifted to Philadelphia in the days following Lopez v Dinkins and
Torres v Sachs. Philadelphia, with its growing Puerto Rican population, was an ideal site to
continue this national litigation campaign for bilingual ballots. With low voter turnout among
Puerto Ricans (relative to the size of their community), getting a favorable decision in
Philadelphia would solidify the legality of this expansion of voting rights. As was the case in
New York City, PRLDEF would exert a greater degree of control over how this case was
managed but still required local lawyers and activists to ensure their success.
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Chapter 4: Brotherly Love
Introduction
As the push for bilingual ballots continued, PRLDEF turned its attention to Philadelphia
which contained the third highest concentration of Puerto Ricans in the continental United States
during this campaign. The Philadelphia case, Arroyo v Tucker, was very similar to the New York
cases in that it was comprised of a series of briefs, legal memos, and negotiations rather than the
kind of interaction with witnesses that transpired in Chicago. The Arroyo case, like New York,
also had a sympathetic judge presiding over these meetings and a local Board of Elections that
did not resist PRLDEF’s efforts with all the vigor it could have mustered. Why then should we
bother to even look at this case? Arroyo was something of a hybrid case in terms of
organizational mobilization. PRLDEF, wanting very much to get bilingual ballots
institutionalized, worked with local actors in Chicago by providing technical assistance but did
not have a hand in the actual courtroom proceedings. In New York, PRLDEF wielded a much
heavier hand; the organization identified plaintiffs, managed the actual case, and even provided
assistance to the New York Board of Elections with translations. Philadelphia, being relatively
geographically close to New York City, allowed PRLDEF to have a direct hand in this case as
well. It needed local people to provide knowledge of the community dynamics to help execute
this phase of the campaign. Into the fray stepped Nelson Diaz.
Nelson Diaz was born in East Harlem in 1948 and grew up as a rather sickly child in a
series of rat-infested tenements where drug abuse and gang violence were commonplace. His
health and his performance in school improved after having the opportunity to move into public
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housing and participating in organized sports. While working on his undergraduate degree at St.
John’s University, rioting engulfed Harlem in the wake of the assassination of Martin Luther
King Jr. In 1969, Diaz made the decision to relocate to Philadelphia and attend Temple
University Law School. He would get his first taste of civil rights advocacy while at Temple.
Diaz and the nine African-American law school students at Temple threatened to leave if the
University did not actively recruit more students of color. The protest was publicized in local
newspapers and, as a result, Temple began to recruit more Black and Latino law students. After
being the first Latino to graduate from Temple’s law school in 1972, Diaz contemplated
returning to New York City but was convinced to stay in Philadelphia by one of his
professors.281
Working as a Public Defender in his first few years out of law school, Diaz immersed
himself in the affairs of the local Puerto Rican community. He provided pro bono work to help
revitalize the Latino business district, often working with a local group called the Spanish
Merchants Association. Diaz also worked to pressure City Hall and the Philadelphia School
District to hire Latino teachers and administrators to work in local schools and represented
militant groups like the local chapter of the Young Lords Party. During his time in Philadelphia,
Diaz became increasingly resentful of the racial issues he encountered. “I believe in this whole,
‘justice’ and the American way. I had the colonial mentality… I have an awakening of the fact
that in this country, people of color are totally discriminated [against], including me … So I
revolted against the law; I get very radical. After my first year, I get very radical … I figured the
only way that I could do things to anybody was I had to sue ‘em all. I was suing people for
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everything …”282 Although Diaz became aware of to the harsh realities of race in urban America,
the details of the Arroyo case reveal how traditional notions of class and gender influenced this
phase of the litigation campaign.
The dearth of information about Peggy Arroyo and Petra Gonzales highlight some of the
internal tensions within this larger civil rights campaign. While Teitelbaum and Diaz represented
these plaintiffs, Gonzales and Arroyo had no input in how they were represented (as was the case
in the two New York City lawsuits). The various documents and briefs in Arroyo v Tucker
provide very little detail about either plaintiff. What we do have is Nelson Diaz’s recollection of
those initial meetings. He asked the plaintiffs, Arroyo and Gonzales, if they were willing to
participate in a lawsuit to gain Spanish translations of the ballots and other voting materials. “As
I remember them they were no different than maybe my mother … very cooperative, bien
sencilla, and didn’t question the basis of what I was doing … They saw me as this young kid
who was trying to do the right thing…”283 The description of Gonzales and Arroyo as compliant
and maternal reflects the class and gendered dimensions of the interactions between male lawyer
and female client. This silencing of Puerto Rican women plaintiffs was unfortunately nothing
new in the United States Courts system. In 1904, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in the
Gonzalez v Williams case where the voice of the plaintiff, Isabel Gonzalez, was conspicuously
absent. According to Sam Erman, “the official record came to portray her [Isabel Gonzalez] as
… dependent, silent, and an object of state policy”.284 In the case of the Arroyo lawsuit in
Philadelphia, the voice of these plaintiffs were muted by PRLDEF and its allies as much as by
the official record. The campaign in Philadelphia reflected a critique of the way in which the
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electoral system functioned but not a critique of the system itself where only those recognized by
the court will have their voice heard. Unlike other civil rights struggles in the Puerto Rican
community (such as those focusing upon bilingual education, housing, and employment), support
for bilingual ballots in Philadelphia was driven by the middle-class sensibilities of Diaz and
PRLDEF, rather than desires of the working-class Puerto Rican community of Philadelphia.

Migration, Settlement, and Conflict
Puerto Ricans established a presence in Philadelphia by the turn of the twentieth century,
but the number of Puerto Ricans living in the city steadily increased since the inception of
Operation Bootstrap in 1947.285 This program was designed to boost the economic prosperity of
the island of Puerto Rico by bringing large-scale industrial employment opportunities to the
island for the first time. While the numbers of industrial jobs on the island increased, they did not
increase proportionately with the loss of job opportunities in the agricultural arena. This
contributed to massive unemployment in Puerto Rico. Operation Bootstrap was successful in
industrializing the island but this program did not create a sufficient number of jobs to satisfy the
demand for employment in Puerto Rico. Consequently, many Puerto Ricans turned to migration
to the United States as an option to increase their chances at prosperity. Puerto Ricans, unlike
most foreign groups, found emigration easier to the United States because they were U.S.
citizens.
Puerto Ricans living in Philadelphia during the post-WWII years confronted a similar set
of challenges in their adopted city like other diaspora communities. A report released by the
Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations (PCHR) in 1954 indicated that Philadelphia’s
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Puerto Rican population was approximately 7,300. By 1970, this community’s population
increased to over 40,000.286 Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia were concentrated largely in Lower
North Philadelphia where 56.9 percent of the sections’ population was Puerto Rican and
generally had higher rates of poverty than both whites and African-Americans.287 The median
family income for Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia in 1960 was $3,435. This lagged behind the
median family income for both African-American ($4,248) and Whites ($6,269). The
unemployment rate for Puerto Ricans was also higher (16 percent) than African-Americans (11
percent) and Whites (5 percent).288 As historian Carmen Whalen noted, Puerto Rican women
were hard hit by the change in Philadelphia’s economy during the 1950s and 1960s. Many of
these women participated in the garment industry which began to relocate away from
Philadelphia and towards the South and West. At the same time 1960s, demand for seasonal
agriculture labor of Puerto Rican men decreased in Southern New Jersey. The entire economy of
the region was changing from the availability of unskilled labor opportunities towards the service
sector (a pattern replicated in many U.S. cities in the Northeast and Midwest).289
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Table 4:1: Median Family Income and Percent below Poverty in Philadelphia: 1970
Section of Philadelphia
Center City
South Philadelphia
Southwest Philadelphia
West Philadelphia
Lower North Philadelphia
Upper North Philadelphia
Kensington
Roxborough/Manayunk
Germantown/Chestnut Hill
Olney/Oak Lane
Near Northeast Philadelphia
Far Northeast Philadelphia

Median Family Income in % of Families below Poverty
1970
Line
13,343
7.2
8,180
15.3
9,138
9.5
8,665
13.5
5,987
29.4
7,868
14.7
9,113
8.5
11,027
4.1
10,483
9.1
10,381
5.7
10,645
4.6
11,807
2.8

Source: Philadelphia City Planning Commission, Socio-Economic Characteristics: 1960 and 1970 Philadelphia
Census Tracts (1975), 6

The PCHR found that this growing community “rarely used civic agencies for help.
When they need advice, they consult Spanish-speaking people.”290 Perhaps Puerto Ricans in
Philadelphia were hesitant to utilize civil agencies because of their experience with language
discrimination in the city. In the years leading up to 1970, Puerto Ricans encountered hostility
when interacting with different civic institutions often being greeted with comments like, “Why
don’t you go back if you don’t speak English” or at other times refused service altogether.291
Some of these Puerto Ricans worked for existing institutions like the Archdiocese of
Philadelphia while others created new agencies, businesses, and organizations to service the
needs of the Puerto Rican community in Philadelphia. The Puerto Ricans who worked for or
created these community groups most often bore higher levels of education, more technical
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skills, and higher levels of income than the vast majority of Puerto Ricans living within Lower
North Philadelphia. A study of the census tracts where Puerto Ricans resided in Philadelphia
reveals this class differentiation. The tracts where the concentration of Puerto Ricans was highest
had lower levels of income and educational attainment and higher levels of unemployment. This
data suggests that by 1960, those Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia who were more educated and
upwardly mobile (in comparison with the majority of their fellows), began to separate
themselves from the barrio. It was this group of upwardly mobile and more educated segment of
Philadelphia’s Puerto Rican population that would be identified as community leaders during the
decade of the 1960s. As this cadre of Puerto Rican community leaders grew, some among this
group began to foster connections in the political arena.
Table 4:2: Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia living in high concentration Census tracts
Puerto Ricans living in census tracts Puerto Ricans living outside of
with high concentrations of Puerto these census tracts
Ricans
School 4%
21%

High
completion
Unemployment Rate
Median annual income
Born in Puerto Rico

17%
$3,272
73.2%

11%
$4,007
67.5%

Source: Commission on Human Relations, City of Philadelphia, Philadelphia’s Puerto Rican Population: A
Descriptive Summary including 1960 Census Data (March 1964), 15

Puerto Ricans made limited in-roads into Philadelphia’s Democratic machine during the
1960s. In collaboration with the Democratic Party, Puerto Ricans began to organize get-out-thevote campaigns in their own neighborhoods to register more voters in an effort to increase their
political clout. Even representatives of the Island’s government encouraged Puerto Ricans in
Philadelphia to register to vote. Joseph Monserat, head of the Migration Division, stated, “If you
remember Puerto Rico, you remember the vote is destiny of the people. It doesn’t matter what
party – register and vote. The vote is the defending of happiness for you, so social justice will
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come to pass. Each of you look for five more people. Take them and register and vote. It will be
five more nails in the structure of happiness and righteousness.”292 Individual Puerto Ricans like
Frank Aday and his sister Hilda Arteaga were also able to secure positions in the local
Democratic political machine.293 In addition to Aday and Arteaga, Puerto Ricans gained
appointed positions in the Mayor’s office and another even won a seat in the State Legislature. 294
These efforts, however, did not translate into massive rates of voter registration or voter
participation among Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia. In 1968, community leaders like Pascual
Martinez, Director of the Mayor’s Office of Information and Complaints, argued that out of the
45,000 Puerto Ricans living in Philadelphia “fewer than 9,500 Puerto Ricans registered to vote
… only about half bother to come out on Election day.”295
Why would members of the growing Puerto Rican community cultivate ties with the
local Democratic Party if substantial numbers of Puerto Ricans did not vote in local elections.
The most likely explanation has to do with the political hegemony the Democratic Party had in
city politics since 1952. Local politicians of the Democratic Party in the post-War period
attempted to engage this growing community into the fabric of civic society through Englishlanguage assimilation initiatives like earlier waves of European immigrants. The dominance of
the Democratic Party in post-war Philadelphia must be tempered against the initiative of Puerto
Ricans themselves; many Puerto Ricans actively sought to build relationships with the
Democrats in order to gain access to key resources. During the 1960s, local Puerto Rican
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organizations like the Council of Spanish-Speaking Organizations (Concilio) needed the support
of City Hall in order to gain access to War on Poverty funds that were controlled by Mayor
Tate.296 Groups like Concilio sought these alliances even when its leaders were skeptical about
the local electoral politics. Moises Gonzalez, president of the Concilio, migrated to Philadelphia
in 1932. In addition to his position within Concilio, Gonzalez also was an operative within the
local Democratic political machine. Despite these connections to the Democratic Party, Gonzalez
commented that “The politicians are only after the vote, not to help the people, and until they
show more interest in the Puerto Rican community I don’t want to have anything to do with
them.”297 Although a certain degree of apathy was expressed by Puerto Rican community
leaders, there did not appear to be any discussion as to whether they should have the option of
voting in Spanish. In fact, the generation of Puerto Rican community leadership that rose to
prominence during the 1960s tended to look for ways to work from within Philadelphia’s
political structure to affect change rather than challenge it. The ties between Puerto Rican
community leaders and the Democratic Party became more complicated in the 1970s.
For much of the decade of the 1970s, the mayor of Philadelphia was Frank Rizzo. Mayor
Tate named Rizzo his successor in an effort to prevent White ethnics in Philadelphia from
defecting to the Republican Party. According to Nixon, Frank Rizzo (mayor of Philadelphia from
1972 to 1980) was as an exemplar of the “silent majority” which emerged in reaction to the gains
made by the Civil Rights movement.298 While previous mayors favored a policy of “restrained
integrationism”, Rizzo saw during his time as Police Commissioner in the 1960’s that American
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cities were being divided by racial politics, and he was determined to use his power to stifle the
efforts of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and other similar groups.299
He would utilize his power as mayor in much the same way. An investigation by the
Pennsylvania State Committee of the United States Commission on Civil Rights came to the
conclusion that Rizzo’s actions resulted in “the deterioration of police-community relations for
minorities and white dissidents.”300 Despite Rizzo’s aggressive tactics against minorities, many
of the established Puerto Rican community leaders continued to support him. This continued
support alienated a younger generation of Puerto Ricans who were influenced by both the Black
Power movement and Puerto Rican nationalism; this was the generation of young activists that
formed the Philadelphia branch of the Young Lords. It was into this political environment that
Nelson Diaz entered when he migrated from New York City to pursue his law degree.

Arroyo v Tucker
Diaz and Herbert Teitelbaum began to correspond in January of 1973. Diaz initially
contacted Teitelbaum about his clients Peggy Arroyo and Petra Gonzalez to see if Teitelbaum
was interested in bringing the resources and experience of PRLDEF to bear against the City of
Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Teitelbaum, at first, was hesitant. “Before
we move on any of the bilingual election cases outside of New York we are waiting for a
decision from the Federal Court here. Our theory is that a strong precedent in New York will be
helpful in other jurisdictions.” In addition, Teitelbaum advised Diaz to take a look at a similar
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case in Chicago, PROPA v. Kusper (1973) that PRLDEF was also assisting with.301 By October
1973, the courts in New York handed PRLDEF a favorable decision in Torres v. Sachs, and Diaz
and Teitelbaum began taking steps to begin their work in Philadelphia. After contacting both
Secretary of State (Dolores Tucker) and the local Elections Commission, Diaz came to the
conclusion that neither was particularly interested in voluntarily providing Spanish translations
in local elections. Thinking about these events forty years later, Diaz mused “Tucker just, you
know, bucked it to the local Commission in Philadelphia and the interesting thing about the local
Commission in Philadelphia, the guy who was the Chairman of the local Commission, didn’t
give a damn about it.”302 While Tucker (at the state level) was responsible for setting the terms of
elections, the various City Commissioners of Elections at the municipal level were responsible
for implementing elections and, therefore, both levels of government were culpable.
While city and state officials procrastinated, Diaz and Teitelbaum were prepared to move
forward and file an injunction to halt the upcoming November election. Although the injunction
was never meant to indefinitely postpone the November election, it served as a necessary legal
gambit to force action. In his October 5th affidavit, Herbert Teitelbaum stated that the, “central
issue raised in this lawsuit is whether an election conducted by defendants exclusively in the
English language violates the Voting Rights Act of 1965 …”303 He cited three recent cases to
support his claim: (1) Torres v Sachs in New York (1973) where the court ordered bilingual
election materials including the use of translators, (2) the Puerto Rican Organization for
Political Action (PROPA) v Kusper (1973) in Chicago, in which the court issued a preliminary
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injunction forbidding the exclusive use of English in elections, and (3) Lopez v Dinkins (1973)
when bilingual school board elections were ordered throughout New York City’s thirty-two
school districts. Teitelbaum added that since no affirmative response was received during earlier
inquiries, he and Diaz were forced to conclude that the defendants had no plans to provide
bilingual materials or translators for the November 6th election.304
In a press release prepared October 5th, Diaz and Teitelbaum informed the public that a
lawsuit was filed in Federal Court charging that the Secretary of State and the Philadelphia
County Commission of Elections denied qualified Puerto Rican voters their rights to full and
equal access to the November 6th ballot. The complaint alleged that an all-English ballot would
violate the voting rights of Puerto Rican citizens of Pennsylvania who have difficulty
understanding English. While the discrimination in this case might not have been as blatant as in
Smith v. Allwright (1944) where the Court ruled that not allowing African-Americans to
participate in Democratic primaries was a violation of the 15th Amendment, the two young
attorneys in Arroyo v. Tucker charged that the lack of bilingual assistance of Puerto Rican voters
in Pennsylvania was in violation of both the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the Constitution.305 The
November election was particularly important because it contained a proposed stateconstitutional amendment in addition to the names of the candidates.306 Cesar Perales stated that,
“We are optimistic that Pennsylvania’s November 6th election will be bilingual. Puerto Ricans in
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New York, New Jersey, Illinois and now Pennsylvania are demanding that their rights be
fulfilled under the Constitution of the United States and the Voting Rights Act. The lawsuit is
only the beginning of the Fund’s involvement in Pennsylvania”.307
PRLDEF was already engaging in voting rights cases outside the confines of the Puerto
Rican community in New York City. The Philadelphia Bulletin reported on October 6, 1973
indicated that a United States District Court in Newark, New Jersey asked that New Jersey
election officials provide Spanish translations on ballots. This request came as a result of a
lawsuit filed by PRLDEF. Perales stated, when asked about the lawsuit in New Jersey and the
recent successful lawsuit in New York, “We are gratified and encouraged by the great support
and excitement which our victory in New York has created with the Puerto Rican community.
Our people have been citizens of this country for decades, yet it is only now that we are gaining
the power to cast an informed and effective vote. We are hoping that bilingual elections will
become a reality in Puerto Rican communities throughout the country.”308 Arroyo v. Tucker was,
therefore, not a lawsuit confined only to Philadelphia but part of a larger push by Puerto Ricans
to assert their civil rights and PRLDEF (like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and MALDEF)
became the vehicle for this push.
The courts system moved incredibly fast on this lawsuit. “You get an injunction right
away when you request an injunction because they [the defendants] have so many days to
respond to the injunction.”309 Judge Lord issued an order on the evening of Friday, October 5th
restraining Pennsylvania Secretary of State Delores Tucker and other officials from publishing or
advertising any material concerning the November 6th election until after a hearing. Lord’s
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October 12th preliminary order directed the city’s Commission of Elections to place unofficial
Spanish translations of the November 6th ballot, including all propositions and amendments, at
polling places within Philadelphia. Furthermore, wherever the 1970 census tracks contained 5
percent or more persons who were Spanish-language dominant voters, bilingual (Spanish and
English) representatives had to be provided at polling places to help Spanish-dominant Puerto
Rican voters.310 In his column in the Philadelphia Bulletin, Diaz characterized this decision as a
giant step forward in gaining respect and recognition for Philadelphia’s Puerto Rican
community.311 “Voting has seemed irrelevant to Puerto Ricans here, but this step will increase
the participation of Puerto Rican voters in this city and throughout the country.”312 This
preliminary order like the previous injunction, while only a temporary solution, put pressure on
the defendants while the two sides negotiated a more permanent resolution.
During the first meeting of the respective attorneys, Mr. Marvin Halpern (a candidate for
judge) was brought in by the city commissioners for his knowledge of the Puerto Rican
community. He claimed that 90 percent of Philadelphia’s Puerto Ricans could speak, understand
and read English. Diaz disagreed with this citing a study conducted by the Commonwealth
Office of Puerto Rico demonstrating that 98% of Puerto Ricans living in the continental United
States claimed Spanish as their primary language. Eugene Maier asked “If we do this for you,
will we have to do the same for those who speak other languages?” Diaz pointed out that Puerto
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Ricans are not foreigners having been granted citizenship in 1917 by the Jones Act. “The
government has never required them [Puerto Ricans] to speak English, and Spanish remains their
mother tongue”.313
According to Diaz, as a result of bilingual voting materials not being available to Puerto
Rican voters, the ability of all Puerto Ricans to participate in elections held in Philadelphia
would be “seriously and substantially impaired”. It was clear that Puerto Ricans would be forced
to either vote for or against amendments that were unintelligible or refrain from voting
altogether. “Under either circumstance, [the] plaintiffs’ fundamental right to vote will be
impaired.”314 Diaz added that not having bilingual election materials for Puerto Rican voters
rendered their votes meaningless and was “tantamount to absolutely denying [the] plaintiffs their
right to vote.”315
If Diaz and Teitelbaum were to be successful in this lawsuit, they would have to
demonstrate that Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia represented a class whose rights were being
infringed upon by monolingual elections. “The class consists of all persons eligible to vote in
general elections over which [the] defendants have jurisdiction either jointly or severally who are
of Puerto Rican birth or descent residing in Pennsylvania who speak, read, write and understand
English with severe difficulty or not at all.”316 Diaz argued that Arroyo and Gonzales had claims
typical of other Puerto Ricans living in Philadelphia and that a class action lawsuit was the only
practical method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this complaint as the substance of the
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complaint not only pertained to the individual plaintiffs but to the class as a whole.317 The
formulation of class that Diaz and Teitelbaum were advocating for was one that characterized
Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia as a homogeneous group and did not account for class difference
within this demographic.
While Diaz argued that this lawsuit was an effort on behalf of the local Puerto Rican
community, this litigation was not prompted through grassroots organization and community
representatives who shared the educational and economic status of their fellows. Diaz, it could be
argued, by virtue of his education and status was slightly removed from the daily struggles of
working-class and poor Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia. Although Diaz had worked tirelessly on
behalf of a number of individuals and organizations within Philadelphia’s Puerto Rican
community, he admitted that he was looking for a way out of the Public Defender’s Office by
1973 due to conflicts with his supervisor over his work in local Puerto Rican protests. 318 He
wanted to utilize this lawsuit to increase the number of Puerto Rican voters, get Puerto Rican
candidates elected, and establish a PRLDEF office in Philadelphia. Arroyo v Tucker, therefore,
provided an opportunity to satisfy both his personal objectives as well as provide another path
for community political development. Diaz would not be alone in this regard.
A more recent case, Fisher v. University of Texas (2008), which challenged affirmative
action policy in higher education admissions was funded by Edward Blum’s organization Project
on Fair Representation. “In the Fisher case, while the young woman may have lent her name to
the lawsuit, the case before the Court has very little to do with her. Her name appears just five
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times in the thousands of words that make up the body of the complaint.”319 While the
motivation behind the filing of the Arroyo lawsuit might be viewed as somewhat self-serving,
success in this litigation would not only affect Diaz’s agenda but the larger fight to guarantee fair
access to all language-minorities to the ballot box.
Diaz sought to demonstrate that a substantial number of potential voters could be
negatively impacted by the lack of bilingual voting materials. He argued that according to the
1970 Census, “In the Philadelphia area, alone, there are in excess of 30,000 Puerto Ricans …”320
The Census Bureau stated approximately 26,948 Puerto Ricans lived in Philadelphia while local
Philadelphia newspapers estimated that the number of Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia in 1973 was
approximately 90,000 people. Some of the older, more conservative leaders of Philadelphia’s
Puerto Rican community disagreed with the U.S. Census count and that this undercount was
purposeful to reduce the community’s political power.321 While waves of earlier immigrants
came to the United States and, for the most part, remained here, Puerto Rican migration has been
characterized as cyclical between the island and the mainland, the typical undercounting of poor
neighborhoods, and the difficulty counting a group which had no category of its own may
account for the discrepancy over the actual population in Philadelphia.322
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While the debate over the actual number of Puerto Ricans in the city continued, some
questioned whether the essential claims of the lawsuit were applicable to Philadelphia. Joe
Davidson, a reporter with the Philadelphia Bulletin, felt that the VRA did not apply to Puerto
Ricans in Philadelphia since the trigger mechanism in the act only applied when less than 50
percent of the voting age population of a state or county failed to register or vote in recent
presidential elections. Philadelphia, after all, was not the American South where Jim Crow stifled
generations of African-Americans from exercising the franchise.323 While the 50 percent
threshold was not an issue for the overall voting population in Philadelphia, Lord’s preliminary
order held to the standard established in Torres v. Sachs which established the precedent that if 5
percent of a given district’s population was Puerto Rican then that district was obligated to
provide Spanish translations to all voting materials.324
Teitelbaum began to contact other attorneys between November 1973 and January 1974
to probe their interest in bringing their resources to bear on this case and possibly expand its
scope across Pennsylvania. He reached out to his colleagues at the United States Department of
Justice Civil Rights Division, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania Legal
Services Center (PLSC). David H. Wilderman, a lawyer with the PLSC, shared the news of the
preliminary order with his colleagues and began to marshal his resources for a possible statewide
push for bilingual elections. In order to assess whether the results of this case might be extended
to other regions of the state, Teitelbaum and Diaz would have to demonstrate that sufficient
numbers of Spanish-dominant Puerto Ricans lived in census tracts outside of Philadelphia. To

323

J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party
South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 224.
324
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Newspaper clipping collection, Joe Davidson, “Phila. Puerto Rican Leaders Clash
with Census Bureau” Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, August 10, 1975 (Philadelphia, TUUA); “Order” [Series 1B Box
13 Folder 9] Nelson Diaz Papers (Collection 3079), Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Arnau, “Evolution of
Leadership”, 77.

134

accomplish this, they enlisted the help of Melvin Shuster, the Deputy Attorney General of
Pennsylvania who was able to provide the information they needed.325 According to the data, a
successful outcome in Arroyo v. Tucker could impact eight additional counties across the state.
By February 1974, Teitelbaum was pressing for a summary judgment arguing that,
“There are no genuine issues of material in dispute … The only issue remaining is one of law:
the legality of conducting elections in English only.”326 The parties met again to discuss the
feasibility of adding Spanish text to the existing voting machines.327 The defendants argued that
Spanish signs posted on the walls of election sites were one issue but including Spanish
translations on voting booths was something else entirely. In order to present his case that
bilingual voting machines were feasible, Diaz enlisted the aid of Lloyd A Wallace, Director of
the Model Cities Community Organization Department for the City of Philadelphia. Wallace
went on record to state that not only was it possible to have bilingual voting machines, but that it
had already been done for Model Cities elections one month earlier where the machines were in
both English and Spanish.328
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As negotiations continued, both sides offered slightly different proposals that would
eventually become parts of the final version of Judge Lord’s order. The defendants, for example,
suggested in one draft of the order that bilingual elections be required only in certain sections of
the city and they provide at least one individual who was fluent in both languages at the various
polling places Spanish-dominant Puerto Ricans were likely to frequent, and to publicize elections
“in a way that reflects the language characteristics of the plaintiffs.”329 Diaz and Teitelbaum’s
draft preferred the term “sufficient numbers” rather than “at least one” with regard to the number
of translators available and felt the term “in all media proportionately in a way that reflects the
language characteristics of the plaintiffs” would better protect Spanish-dominant voters in
Philadelphia.330 Both sides agreed that voter registration forms and sample paper ballots would
be translated and that conspicuous bilingual signs at polling places and registration sites be
posted.
According to Diaz, Judge Lord demonstrated a keen understanding of the problems
Puerto Rican voters faced and was highly instrumental in negotiating the settlement. Lord
identified the central issue in this case - whether or not Philadelphia’s English-only election
system infringed upon the plaintiff’s voting rights. “We agree the right to vote means more than
the mechanics of marking a ballot or pulling a lever.” He concluded that, under Section 1 (the
equal protection clause) of the 14th Amendment and the VRA, conducting elections in English
for American citizens who do not speak English would be a violation of their rights. Lord stated
in an interview that, “This is a novel matter in this (Eastern Pennsylvania) jurisdiction but not

329

“Counter Proposed Order”. Records of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Archive of the
Puerto Rican Diaspora. Litigation Files, Box 1 Folder 1. Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, Hunter College, City
University of New York.
330
Ibid

136

elsewhere.”331 Diaz was unaware that Lord already had a history of ruling on cases involving
civil rights issues in Philadelphia. In 1966, Lord ruled that the Pennsylvania Public
Accommodation Act required Girard College to admit African-Americans. While this ruling was
reversed by the US Third Circuit Court of Appeals in February 1967, this did not stop Lord from
continuing to press Girard College to open its doors to racial minorities. In July 1967, Lord ruled
that Girard College’s exclusion of African-Americans was a violation of the 14th amendment
(which applied to the private school because of its tax exempt status).332
In his March 1974 opinion, Judge Lord based his judgment on the existing case law. It
was clear to Lord that section 4(e) of the VRA 1965 forbade any State from "conditioning the
right to vote" of a person educated in an American-flag school where English was not the
language of instruction. This clause, therefore, explicitly protected the Puerto Rican community
residing in the United States and on the island. Since the passing of the Jones Act in 1917,
residents of Puerto Rico were citizens of the United States. Thus, unlike naturalized citizens,
Puerto Ricans did not need to demonstrate fluency in English. Indeed since 1947, the United
States encouraged Puerto Rico to teach its school children in Spanish, reversing an earlier
decision mandating that all schools on the island teach only in English. While Puerto Ricans in
the United States remained subject to other modes of sanctioned discrimination such as police
brutality and residential segregation (much the same way African-Americans were during their
Great Migration), there was a slow shift in policy to recognize the importance of language for
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this group and incorporate them (under conditions which remain grossly unequal) into the body
politic.333
For Lord, the critical issue in this case was whether Philadelphia's English-only election
system constituted a limitation on the plaintiffs' franchise as prescribed in Section 4(e). Although
Lord felt this issue was new for Pennsylvania, he agreed with Diaz and Teitelbaum that identical
issues were presented to a district court in New York in Torres v. Sachs and to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals of Illinois in PROPA v. Kusper. In Torres, the court determined that
"The conduct of an election in English only violates plaintiffs' rights under the Voting Rights
Amendments of 1970 which enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and the Civil Rights Act of 1871." In PROPA, the court held that the Voting
Rights Act mandated that "a Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican is entitled to assistance in the
language he can read or understand" and that the "right to vote" included the right to an
"effective vote”; it was not merely the right to gain physical access to a voting booth.334
Lord also referred to other cases that did not specifically pertain to Puerto Ricans when
he made his decision. In Garza v. Smith (Texas 1970) the court held that the right to vote
included the "right to be informed" and found a Texas statute violated the equal protection clause
by permitting assistance to blind voters but not to illiterate voters. A narrow construction of the
"right to vote" was similarly rejected in United States v. Louisiana (1966), United States v.
Mississippi (1966), and United States v. Post (1969). Lord agreed that the franchise meant more
than the mechanics of marking a ballot or pulling a lever. He determined that the plaintiffs could
not cast an "informed" or "effective" vote without demonstrating an ability to comprehend the
333
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registration and election forms and the ballot itself. The English-only election materials,
therefore, constituted a device conditioning the rights of plaintiffs. In essence, the sole use of
English language materials at the voting booth became akin to literacy tests utilized against
African-Americans during Jim Crow. Such an election process, according to Lord, could not
withstand scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act.335
In the aftermath of Lord’s decision, Teitelbaum contacted his colleagues at the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund and MALDEF to keep them abreast of the final order issued by Lord.336
Meanwhile, Diaz worked on assisting the County Commissioners with the Spanish translation
for the May and November elections in 1974.337 Diaz had the opportunity to observe different
polling places and voter registration sites across the Puerto Rican sections of Philadelphia after
Lord issued the preliminary injunction and noted that while bilingual materials and machines
were in place at most sites, others did not have interpreters.338 Not satisfied with the manner in
which the City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were implementing
Lord’s order, Diaz and Teitelbaum filed a motion for Contempt and Sanction on February 21,
1975.339 They charged that the voter registration site in City Hall had no bilingual employees and
that the defendants had no intention of hiring more than three bilingual staffers for the forty voter
registration sites in Philadelphia’s Spanish-speaking communities. They added that while
advertisement of elections occurred in Philadelphia’s English-language media, no effort was
made to distribute similar advertisements in the city’s Spanish-language media and that the
335
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Federal District Courts have the authority to punish the refusal of any party to comply with the
Court’s orders.340
A week later, the defendants responded to this motion stating that as of March 12, 1975,
they intended to employ sufficient numbers of Spanish speaking personnel to fully service the
Spanish speaking sections of the city. While it is not clear what the defendants meant by
“sufficient numbers”, they stated that the “Commissioners’ long experience and expertise will
determine the number of persons required for full compliance with the Court’s Order.” While the
defendants agreed to print bilingual notices and instructions for election sites, they disagreed
with Diaz and Teitelbaum that they were obligated to post election notices via Spanish local
media and added that the Elections Commissioners did not have the funds to do so. 341 Deputy
City Commissioner Harvey Rice stated that his office was working to register the Spanishspeaking community. Rice argued that, “The effort is there … as far as I recall, we’ve covered
those [Puerto Rican] areas as much as we’ve covered others…” even though his office was
working with limited personnel and a reduced budget.342 During the decade of the 1970s,
cutbacks in federal aid forced the Philadelphia officials to rely on local tax revenue in order to
govern.343 These cutbacks would negatively impact the manner in which the Elections
Commissioners went about enacting Lord’s order. James Thomas Tucker argues, however, that
language assistance provisions of the VRA can be implemented in a cost effective manner
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through partnerships with local language minority groups.344 In this instance Lord, however,
made no distinction between the intent to hire more bilingual staff and the actual hiring of
bilingual staff.

Assessing the Impact
While Spanish-dominant Puerto Ricans were now legally guaranteed access to bilingual
ballots, it did not necessarily translate immediately into more electoral participation and
representation. Diaz hoped that the success of Arroyo v. Tucker would encourage more Puerto
Ricans to vote and move into electoral politics in Philadelphia in the same way that AfricanAmericans were doing in the 1970s.345 The actual number of Puerto Rican voters in Philadelphia,
however, is difficult to determine. The Philadelphia Bulletin, for example, stated that 15,000
Puerto Ricans were registered voters in the city. Another article in the Philadelphia Inquirer
speculated that there were fewer than 9,500 Puerto Ricans registered to vote. Journalist Juan
Gonzalez argued that the number of registered Puerto Ricans increased from 5,000 to 10,000 by
1979. Diaz’s view was more pessimistic; he guessed that less than 4,000 voted with any
regularity.346 The apparent weakness of the Puerto Rican electorate in Philadelphia is confusing
when one considers the dramatic increase in population during the decade. Eugene Ericksen and
other scholars studying this community argued that the Puerto Rican population increased during
344
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the 1970s by as much as 76 percent.347 Although the result of Arroyo v. Tucker created
opportunities for Spanish-dominant Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia to vote, other factors
continued to hamstring their electoral power until the late 1970s.
The failure to increase the number of Puerto Rican elected officials in Philadelphia in the
wake of Arroyo v. Tucker can be partially explained by the lack of an independent electoral
infrastructure within this community during the 1960s and 1970s. Matthew Countryman notes
that during the 1970s, “Black Power activists in Philadelphia and elsewhere developed electoral
strategies that sought not only to elect blacks to represent majority black communities, but then
to hold those elected officials accountable to the movement’s agenda of fundamental
socioeconomic and institutional reform.”348 Before the lawsuit, the Puerto Rican community in
Philadelphia had one elected official at the state level from 1968 to 1970, and much of the
established Puerto Rican community leadership supported Frank Rizzo.349 While some Puerto
Ricans worked closely with the city’s Democratic Party, this collaboration did not translate into
voting power or support for Puerto Rican candidates during the period.350
A study of Puerto Rican voting turnout revealed between 1972 and 2000, the island of
Puerto Rico had significantly higher rates of voter participation than Pennsylvania or any other
state in the country.351 What was it about living in Philadelphia that prevented Puerto Ricans
from selecting their own political representation even though they now had access to Spanishlanguage ballots? Political scientists looking at Latino electoral participation attribute a variety of
347
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factors that curtail the ability of Latino candidates from winning local elections. These include
the relative youth of the population, lack of education, higher rates of poverty, and lack of
participation in community organizations. In addition, factors that exist outside of the Latino
community also affect its political participation and electoral power such as gerrymandering,
voter intimidation, and outright violence.352 A study of Puerto Rican political representation
found that at the municipal level, this community’s electoral power was divided among three
different Philadelphia City Council districts. Thus, the mix of at-large and district seats and the
drawing of City Council district borders negatively influenced the ability of Puerto Ricans to flex
their electoral muscles.353
The electoral breakthroughs Diaz hoped for would not occur until the 1980s and were the
result of increased electoral access and participation as well as the creation of political
organizations independent of the local Democratic Party. The creation of this independent
organizational machine was the result of Mayor Rizzo’s attempt to change the city charter so that
he could run for a third term in 1978. A coalition of young, Leftist Puerto Ricans formed a group
called Puerto Ricans United Against Rizzo and collaborated with African-Americans and white
Liberals to defeat the charter change.354 The campaign doubled the number of registered Puerto
Rican voters in the city and led to the creation of The Puerto Rican Alliance (La Alianza) which,
while continuing to organize protests, ran Puerto Rican candidates in state legislature elections
for the first time since 1968. Although La Alianza began to dissolve in 1982, the experience
352
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gained by running independent political campaigns and guaranteed access to bilingual election
materials contributed to the electoral victories of Ralph Acosta for State Representative in 1984
and Angel Ortiz for City Council in 1985 despite the obstacles presented by Philadelphia’s
political structure.355
Conclusion
The merits of Arroyo v Tucker case can be evaluated from a variety of perspectives to
assess its success. As discussed earlier, it did not have the immediate desired impact upon the
political structure of Philadelphia that Diaz sought. The Arroyo case, when taken into
consideration alongside the PROPA case in Chicago and the two cases in New York City, did
strengthen the argument in favor of creating a federal policy in support of bilingual ballots by
solidifying the legal logic for this policy. Taken together, these three cases were cited on
multiple occasions by federal officials during the 1975 VRA reauthorization hearings which
ultimately led to a national policy on this issue. The Arroyo case also highlights the way in which
the voices of working class Puerto Ricans were silenced. While the PROPA case was initiated by
grassroots activists, Arroyo was conceived of and executed by the attorneys. Once the plaintiffs
were recruited by Diaz, they are never heard from again in any capacity. One could argue that
Diaz, having shared the struggles of working class and poor Puerto Ricans as a child, represented
the interests of this segment of the population. By virtue of his education and upward class
mobility, Diaz was also a part of a growing Puerto Rican middle class. Diaz acknowledged that
he wanted to both empower the Puerto Rican community in Philadelphia and help himself as
well.
355

Gonzalez, “The Turbulent Progress of Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia,” Centro Journal of the Center for Puerto
Rican Studies Vol. 2 No. 2 (Winter 1987-88), 38-41; Whalen, From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, 237; Victor VazquezHernandez, “From Pan-Latino Enclaves to a Community: Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia, 1910-2000” in The Puerto
Rican Diaspora: Historical Perspectives, ed. Carmen Teresa Whalen and Victor Vazquez-Hernandez. (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2005), 102.

144

The success of PRLDEF’s cases in Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York not only
reflected some of the internal tensions within the Puerto Rican community around gender and
class but more importantly they helped create a solid legal logic that would be used to extend
equal language access in voting for other language minorities. This part of the narrative, unlike
the lawsuits in Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York, was not organized by PRLDEF. It
stemmed, rather, from the initiative of elected officials and political operatives in the nation’s
capital and is the subject of the next chapter.
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Table 4:3: Percentage of Puerto Rican Population by Pennsylvania Census Tract - 1974
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Census Tract

Chapter 5: From Courtroom Activism to Federal Law
Introduction
Far from the Puerto Rican barrios of Humboldt Park, North Philadelphia and East
Harlem, the halls of power in Washington, DC were the scenes of a very different kind of
political drama. It was in the nation’s capital where the courtroom struggles of Puerto Rican
activists from across the diaspora would become institutionalized into federal legislation. These
cases - PROPA v. Kusper in Chicago, Lopez v. Dinkins and Torres v. Sachs in New York City,
and Arroyo v Tucker in Philadelphia - played an important role in the 1975 reauthorization of the
Voting Rights Act. Taken together this trio of successful lawsuits established a legal precedent
that legitimized the practice of bilingual ballots in United States law and were cited repeatedly
during the process of reauthorizing the VRA.
This process went through two important phases. The first phase was a study conducted
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights (the Commission). The product of this study
was a report entitled The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years Later. The second phase of this process
consisted of Congressional Hearings by the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
(the Subcommittee). The hearings that this group conducted in 1975 would shape the way the
VRA was rewritten to include legal protections for all language minorities (and not just those
who spoke Spanish). Unlike the lawsuits in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia, this process
was not dominated by Puerto Rican activists. Indeed, most of the individuals involved were
politicians and government bureaucrats. Some actively lobbied to create the language-minority
category, some gave guarded support for the idea of bilingual ballots, while others sought to
exploit the issue to create a wedge between African-Americans and the growing number of
Spanish-speaking voters. While representatives of PRLDEF did participate in this process, the
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relative dearth of Puerto Ricans involved helped to reshape the vision of this bilingual voting
litigation campaign into a larger movement for all non-native English speaking American
citizens.
The reauthorization hearings would not only result in bilingual voting protection for
Puerto Ricans, but the creation of a new protected category in civil rights law (language
minorities). The creation of this new category was important because it equated language with
race for the purposes of determining which marginalized communities required federal
legislation designed to secure their ability to vote. The discussion of race as it pertained to the
Puerto Rican population in the United States was one of the points of debate during this process.
Were Puerto Ricans and other Latinos an ethnicity or were they a race? Some individuals were
heavily invested in answering this question while others saw it as an opportunity to achieve their
own political aims. Witnesses called in to offer testimony recognized that even though Puerto
Ricans were incorporated into the United States political system as citizens, they were marked
socially and politically as second-class citizens due to their language and presumed inferiority.
While Puerto Ricans and other Latinos in the United States endured similar obstacles in the
realms of education, housing and employment like their African-American counterparts, it was
the issue of language and voting discrimination that these conversations in the nation’s capital
centered upon. The merging of voter discrimination and language discrimination together helped
to institutionalize the racialization of language and provided an opportunity for Puerto Ricans
and other Latinos to expand the scope of voting law.

The Commission Report

148

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was created in 1957 during the Eisenhower
administration and was designed to be an investigatory and advisory body looking at issues of
civil rights violations. The Commission consisted of six members from both major political
parties and were appointed by the President. By 1974, Arthur S. Flemming was tasked by
President Richard Nixon with heading up the Commission as Chairperson. The son of a federal
judge, Flemming began his career in government in 1939 under the Roosevelt administration in
the US Civil Service Commission. He later served as Ambassador to the Philippines under
Truman and was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by Eisenhower in 1957. Under
Flemming’s leadership, the Commission conducted an extensive investigation of the efficacy of
the VRA from July through November of 1974.356
The investigation resulted in a report published in January 1975 and was designed to
assess the effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act. Among the many questions posed by the report
was if African-Americans in the South were politically empowered because of the protections of
the VRA. In an effort to answer this question, the authors of the study examined voter
registration and participation rates in the South since 1965. In addition, the report looked at the
number of African-American elected officials as an indicator of whether the VRA was effective
in preventing voter discrimination; the logic here being that if African-Americans were
prevented from voting they would not be able to elect members of their community into office.
While issues surrounding African-American voting were of importance in this study, the voting
concerns of other minorities were not ignored. The writers of the report clearly stated that one of
their goals was “to determine whether the promise of full participation has been fulfilled for
356
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blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans …” in select regions of the
country.357 The way the Commission interpreted civil rights had clearly changed by the mid1970s. While the prior focus was on the worst abuses of voting rights in the African-American
community, the 1975 report clearly saw the struggles of all racial minorities as meriting
attention.
In a letter addressed to President Gerald Ford, the authors of the report acknowledged
that the VRA was very effective at increasing the level of minority political participation since
1965. The optimism of this observation, however, was tempered by the persistence of many
barriers that limited the opportunity of African Americans, Native Americans, MexicanAmericans and Puerto Ricans to participate on equal footing with their White counterparts. They
agreed that a “detailed examination of recent events reveals that discrimination persists in the
political process. The promise of the Fifteenth Amendment and the potential of the Voting
Rights Act have not been fully realized. We, therefore, conclude that the protections of the
Voting Rights Act should not be allowed to expire in August 1975.”358
Among the many parts of the VRA, one of the most important was the section on
enforcement. According to the report, "The Voting Rights Act strengthened the Attorney
General’s authority to bring suits to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment … The authority to sue is
particularly important for protecting voting rights in jurisdictions that are not covered …”359 The
language of jurisdictions that are not covered deserves some context. It is important to remember
that the VRA did not apply to every jurisdiction in every state of the country. For a jurisdiction
to fall under the VRA it had to have less than 50 percent of eligible voter turnout in a given
presidential election. This formula was designed to include most of the American South since
357
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this was the region where Jim Crow policies blatantly and often violently stymied the Black
voting power. The coverage formula, however, was not confined to the South alone. Parts of
New York State (specifically boroughs in New York City) fell under this formula since the voter
rates for African-Americans and Puerto Ricans in New York City fell under the 50 percent
threshold.360
Voting rates were not the only measure utilized to measure discrimination in the electoral
process. The 1965 version of the VRA suspended the use of tests and other devices in
jurisdictions with less than 50 percent turnout in the 1964 or 1968 Presidential election. In 1970,
this was amended and the VRA suspended all literacy tests, regardless of turnout, until 1975.361
This idea of a "test or device" is one that would become an important point of discussion during
the Congressional hearings in 1975 with regard to bilingual elections. It is important to reiterate
that this clause in the VRA only applied to jurisdictions already falling under the coverage
formula of this piece of legislation.
According to this report, the language of the VRA and its coverage formula excluded
areas where voting discrimination was transpiring. "The requirement of English-language
literacy disenfranchised many otherwise qualified voters in jurisdictions such as New York,
California, and Arizona."362 In addition to voting districts in New York State that did not fall
under the coverage formula of the VRA (we are talking about regions outside of New York City
itself), there were many voting districts in Texas (with its concentration of Mexican-Americans),
Illinois, and Pennsylvania which also fell outside of the VRA coverage formula even though (as
various court cases already demonstrated) voting discrimination was an obstacle that many
Spanish-speakers had to endure every time they went to the polls.
360
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As discussed earlier, the granting of American citizenship to Puerto Ricans living on the
island planted the seeds for bilingual elections. Prior to these cases in Chicago, New York, and
Philadelphia, several states created policies that required a demonstration of English literacy
before allowing someone to vote. In many cases, these requirements were instituted during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as measures to limit the political power of recently
arriving immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. The strange case of Puerto Rican
inclusion into the U.S. political body represented something very different from these earlier
waves of European immigrants. The recognition of the importance of the Spanish language in
Puerto Rico would be institutionalized using Spanish as the primary language of instruction in
the island's school system after earlier efforts to convert Puerto Rico’s education system towards
English yielded disastrous results. In addition, Section 4(e) of the 1965 VRA explicitly protected
the voting rights of Puerto Ricans educated on the island but who resided in the mainland. 363
There was, therefore, a desire to simultaneously protect the language among Puerto Ricans and
protect their right to vote. The litigation campaign by PRLDEF for bilingual ballots was the
logical next step to merge these two desires.
The report found that the judicial decisions in New York, Chicago, and Illinois created an
important legal precedent which expanded the protections of the VRA to include not merely the
ability of a Puerto Rican voter to physically access a voting booth, but affirmed a positive right
to have access to voting materials in Spanish. The report made special mention of PLDEF’s work
on the Torres case; it highlighted the importance of connecting fair language access with voting
rights in areas covered by the VRA. "Court decisions in New York have resulted in specific
363
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orders that the Board of Elections provide extensive bilingual assistance to voters in election
districts with substantial non-English speaking populations … In Torres v Sachs, a Federal court
found that the conduct of elections in English deprived Spanish speaking citizens of rights
protected by the VRA …"364 While citing this decision, the report acknowledged the many
problems that local Board of Elections had with implementing bilingual elections. These
difficulties included the quality of bilingual assistance, voter purges, and the way in which
political districts were drawn on the map all served to limit the political participation of Puerto
Ricans and other Spanish speakers across the country.365 Despite these continued challenges,
Flemming and the other Commissioners took care to note the importance of the other cases in
Philadelphia and Chicago to demonstrate that a national bilingual voting policy was possible.366
This report even established a series of guidelines for an extension of bilingual ballots
nationwide and established a framework for discussion of bilingual ballots when Congress began
formal hearings to investigate the continued need for the VRA.
The report made several recommendations considering its findings. First, the
Commission recommended that Congress extend the Voting Rights Act (and the national
suspension of literacy tests) for an additional ten years. “Research by the Commission in areas
with large numbers of blacks, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans whose
literacy in English is limited indicates that a return to literacy tests would serve no useful purpose
and would have a disproportionately adverse impact upon these groups.”367 In addition to the
364
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continued ban on literacy tests, the report emphasized that the Department of Justice should take
action to ensure that minority citizens whose usual language is not English receive adequate
election materials and necessary assistance in their usual language. 368 Finally, the Commission
recommended that in addition to expanding the protections of the VRA to other areas outside of
the jurisdictions already covered by the law, the VRA should be amended to protect the rights of
all citizens regardless of their mother tongue.369 The Commission clearly connected PRLDEF’s
work with its own in these recommendations since these were the very same demands that
lawyers such as Teitelbaum, Diaz, and Pontikes made in their respective cases but went one step
further to include Native Americans and, thereby, expanded the scope of bilingual ballots to
include not only Spanish speakers but all language minorities.

Language and Race
In the wake of the Commission’s report, the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights (the Subcommittee) held hearings to debate the need to extend and amend the VRA.
These hearings were crucial in recrafting the language of this civil rights law. Using much of the
evidence gathered by Flemming and the Commission, the members of the Congressional
Subcommittee who convened these hearings in February and March of 1975, heard testimony
from a variety of witnesses that called attention to the courtroom victories gained by Puerto
Rican activists. During these hearings, one of the most important discussions concerned the
question of language and race. Should Puerto Ricans and other language minorities be
categorized as a race (under the Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution) or as an
ethnic group (under the Fourteenth)? The discussions around this issue highlighted the different
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ways in which Puerto Ricans and other Latinos defied easy categorization under the U.S. BlackWhite racial paradigm. Some witnesses felt that the kind of voter discrimination encountered by
Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speakers was akin to the kinds of civil rights abuses confronted
by African-Americans. The shared experience with discrimination, according to some, would
make African-Americans and Latinos natural allies in the struggle for voting rights in the United
States. Other witnesses disagreed; testimony was offered making the argument that Puerto
Ricans and other Latinos were an ethnic group closer to Italian and Jewish-Americans in order to
put distance between Blacks and Puerto Ricans.
The chair of this subcommittee was Representative Don Edwards from California.
Edwards began his tenure in Congress in 1963 and was described as a politician of conscience, a
man who crusaded for civil rights for women and people of color. Other members of the
subcommittee included Herman Badillo from New York and Robert Drinan, a Roman Catholic
Jesuit Priest who served as a Congressman from Massachusetts. Drinan won his seat in 1971 by
campaigning on an anti-Vietnam War platform and continued to write about human rights issues
after he left Congress on 1981. The newest member of Subcommittee was Republican
Congressman Thomas Kindness who represented Ohio’s Eighth District. Kindness was regarded
as a very strong writer of legislation by his peers but he was not a very strong supporter of civil
rights. Kindness, for example, argued against the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) for women in
1973.370 The purpose of these hearings was to deliberate on various bills designed to extend and
expand the protections of the VRA. The subcommittee noted that while much progress in
African-American political power was made since the signing of the VRA in 1965, “the
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continuing disparity between black and white rates of registration as well as the increasing
number of Justice Department objections to proposed voting changes in the covered jurisdiction,
still attest to what appears to be significant and continuing need for the act’s provisions to remain
in full force and effect.”371
On February 25th, the very first witness to offer testimony in these hearings was Peter W.
Rodino, Congressman from New Jersey’s Tenth District. Described as, “a small and unassuming
man with a high, raspy voice …” Rodino was the chairman of the House Committee of the
Judiciary and played a prominent role in the Watergate hearings.372 In his testimony, Rodino
highlighted the importance of the US Commission on Civil Rights and its recent report in the
formulation of his views on the VRA. He, like many of his colleagues in Congress, recognized
that a degree of progress had been made in securing the voting rights of African-Americans and
other racial minorities but was appalled that significant barriers still existed. Of concern for
Rodino was the hostility that many citizens endured while attempting to register. This obstacle
affected not only African-Americans in the South, but Mexican-Americans and Native
Americans in the Southwest, as well as Puerto Ricans on the Northeast and the Midwest.373
Rodino, by associating the racial discrimination faced by African-Americans with that of groups
like Puerto Ricans, made the case for non-English speakers to be treated as if they were a “race”.
His conceptualization of language-as-racial marker would be adopted by other members of the
House.
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The next morning, Barbara Jordan, Congresswoman from the 18th Congressional District
of Texas, offered testimony during these hearings to argue on behalf of H.R. 3247. Jordan began
her political career in 1966 in the Texas State Senate. In addition to Shirley Chisholm, Jordan
was among the first African-American women to serve in Congress when she was elected in
1972. Her work with the Judiciary Committee pushed forward impeachment hearings for
Richard Nixon and she was referred to as “the Jackie Robinson of Texas politics.”374 Jordan
(through H.R. 3247) sought to amend the VRA to change, “the definition of the phrase ‘test or
device’ to make explicit the rulings of federal courts that the failure to provide bilingual
registration forms and ballots constitutes the use of a literacy test.”375 The court decisions in
cases like Arroyo, Torres, and PROPA, she argued, should be extended to protect non-English
speaking voters in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and parts of California. “Just as the Congress
seized upon literacy tests as characteristic of the voting problems facing blacks in the South, so
too are English-only ballots among a substantial Spanish speaking population.”376 For Jordan, the
type of language discrimination that Spanish-speakers like Mexican-Americans in her district
and Puerto Ricans in the Midwest and East Coast were subject to was equivalent to Jim Crow.
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Badillo and the other members of the subcommittee honed in on her proposed coverage
formula asking if other language minorities in addition to Spanish-speakers would be included.
While Badillo preferred language that explicitly protected Spanish-speaking voters, Jordan’s
proposal was more expansive in reach and sought to include other groups whose language was
something other than English like Native Americans and Asian-Americans. Kindness and
Edwards were especially interested in Jordan’s plan and how it would include other language
groups in addition to Spanish-speakers. Kindness spoke of “a lonely little place out in the
Midwest …” called Holmes County in Ohio. Kindness was concerned that German-speaking
Amish in Holmes County would now fall under this new version of the VRA even though this
community did not participate in elections. Jordan reassured Kindness that in a situation like this,
the Amish of Holmes County did not meet the 5 percent threshold established in the Torres case
and, therefore, would not fall under the VRA’s coverage formula. Edwards had similar concern
about French-speaking communities in New England.377 For Jordan, picking up a few extra
jurisdictions that would now require translations here or there was a compromise needed to
protect the clear majority of language-minorities like her Mexican-American constituents who
needed bilingual ballots.
There was also discussion on the topic of how to classify Latinos (Puerto Ricans, Cubans,
South Americans, and Mexican-Americans) racially since this would impact whether they would
fall under the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.378 Jordan favored
protecting language-minorities under the Fifteenth Amendment and relied on an argument
established by the Attorney General’s office. Per the Attorney General, the precedent of treating
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foreign language speakers as a race stretched back to the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873 in which
Mexicans and Chinese were referred to as a race.379 In addition to these nineteenth century legal
decisions, more recent court decisions supported the idea of Puerto Ricans and other non-English
speakers being classified as a race under the Fifteenth Amendment. The various lawyers who
worked on behalf of Puerto Rican voting rights in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia all
argued that Puerto Rican voting rights were protected by, among other legal precedents, the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The victories gained by Puerto Rican activists were cited
during these hearings and signify their importance in the reconceptualization of voting rights.
The struggle for equal voting rights for Spanish-speakers was not limited to Puerto Rican activist
organizations like PRLDEF of elected officials such as Badillo. Indeed, many of the supporters
for bilingual ballots came from the Mexican-American community which included individual
voting rights activists, Mexican-American civil rights organizations in the Southwest, and
elected officials from the West Coast such as Edward Roybal.
Elected to the House of Representatives in 1972, Roybal was the first Hispanic to
represent California in Congress since Romualdo Pacheco in 1879.380 Roybal made an explicit
connection between the kinds of discrimination faced by Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans
and the imperial ambitions of United States foreign policy in the nineteenth century. Roybal
pointed out that, “this country has seriously failed to protect the voting rights of our second
largest minority of over 12 million Spanish speaking citizens. This oversight, this neglect, comes
as no surprise. Ever since the acquisition of the Southwest and of Puerto Rico, Mexican
Americans and Puerto Ricans have suffered every aspect of discrimination and abuse imaginable
- in housing, health, education, economic opportunity, political representation and the
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administration of justice.”381 By taking this approach, he sought to highlight the contradictions
between the way in which the United States perceived itself as a defender of democratic values
and the sordid political realities of the nation. For Roybal, the “acquisition” of the Southwest
after the Mexican-American War and of the island of Puerto Rico after the Spanish-American
War implied that the conquered peoples of these territories would be incorporated into a new
body politic. Roybal sought to shatter this illusion by drawing a relationship between voting
discrimination and the other forms of oppression that Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans
faced in the areas of housing, employment, and education. In doing so, Roybal made the point
that Spanish-speaking U.S. citizens held a second-class citizenship.
Roybal made an impassioned defense of the need for legislative protections for Spanishspeaking American citizens by connecting the struggles of his constituents with the courtroom
victories of Puerto Ricans in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia. He recounted numerous
incidents of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in his district. At one point during his
testimony, Roybal recalled many of his constituents upset with their experience registering to
vote. “There have been many instances in which people asking for assistance have been told that,
‘This is America, if you don't know English you have no right to vote’. This kind of attitude on
the part of election officials has to be changed.”382 When later asked by Kenneth N. Klee, an
attorney that served on both the Subcommittee and the Committee on the Judiciary, what basis
Roybal had for selecting the 5 percent cutoff figure, the Congressman from California
responded, “Well, I suppose one could go either below, or go above it. But the 5 percent base
was arrived at by a recent court decision and one used by the Bureau of the Census to determine
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whether people participate in the overall election process.”383 The recent court decision Roybal
referred to was the standard established in Torres v Sachs.
In addition to these elected officials, several other civil servants and civil rights activists
offered testimony during these hearings. As chairman of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, Flemming was brought in to discuss the findings from the report recently published by
his office The Voting Rights Act 10 Years Later. Flemming sought to convince the members of
the Subcommittee that allowing the VRA to expire would negatively impact African-American
and language minorities alike. He drew special attention to the efforts of the Puerto Rican
community to press the courts for bilingual ballots. He argued that the court decisions in New
York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia, “have required the development of bilingual election
systems to ensure the voting rights of Spanish-speaking citizens.”384 He also highlighted that
other regions of the nation, like California, voluntarily adopted bilingual voting. While praising
the limited availability of bilingual ballots, Flemming took the position that language minorities
across the entire nation should have these protections. He also criticized the way bilingual
elections were administered and felt that legislative measures were needed to guarantee that
bilingual voting was conducted fairly.
Badillo sought to get Flemming’s take on whether language-minorities should fall under
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. While Flemming avoided committing to either, Badillo
had the opportunity to voice his concerns over Puerto Ricans falling under the Fifteenth. “If we
want to cover these specific groups, we have the problem of the ‘race or color’ as opposed to the
question of national origin or the specific itemization of Spanish-speaking people … the present
Voting Rights Act is addressed to the Fifteenth Amendment except with respect to Puerto Ricans

383
384

Ibid, 934
Ibid, 29

161

in subsection 4(e). And the reason we put that in originally was because we wanted to avoid the
question of race or color although there are Puerto Ricans who are black … so we put it in under
the 14th amendment basis.”385 This distinction between these two amendments was of
importance to Badillo but it raises some questions about his reluctance to place his faith in the
Fifteenth Amendment. Clearly, he had no qualms about supporting equal language access for
other groups, even though his proposal bill would limit bilingual ballots to Spanish-speakers. In a
speech given to the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages in 1971, Badillo
clearly placed the interests of Spanish-speakers alongside Chinese and Native Americans.386 By
writing his proposed legislation solely focusing upon voting protections for Spanish-speakers
under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, Badillo was articulating a vision of “Hispanicity”
that was distinct from “blackness”. This invocation of a Hispanic identity signified a shift away
from a shared political space with African-American community leaders that Puerto Ricans had
during the 1960s.387 Sonia Lee refers to this process as “bifurcated racialization” (a process
where two distinct racial minorities imagine their respective cultures as being opposed to one
another rather than see themselves as both victims of the same oppression) and Badillo sought to
institutionalize the differences between Puerto Ricans and African-Americans in voting rights
law. According to Lee, “Puerto Rican elites from the 1970s had to assert it all the more
aggressively at this time since Puerto Ricans’ political identity had become considerably
entangled with that of African-Americans …”388 While Badillo did not express antipathy for
African-Americans, his actions demonstrated that he wanted Puerto Ricans to have a modicum of
political power on their own and he was in a position to wield influence over this process. He not
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only served on this Subcommittee, but he testified during the 1965 hearing for the VRA and
during the hearings held by the Commission during 1974 as well as having served on the Board
of Directors of PRLDEF.
Among those called to testify were representatives of organizations on the forefront of
the campaign for bilingual ballots and these activists made the connection between the work
PRLDEF conducted in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York City and the need to extend
bilingual ballots across the nation. Vilma Martinez, the executive director of MALDEF, called
attention to cases that her organization had taken on in Texas and California to secure bilingual
elections for Mexican-Americans and cited the importance of the litigation undertaken by Puerto
Rican activists to bolster her legal logic in defense of bilingual voting. “In Arroyo, Torres, and
Kusper, courts agreed that English-only elections were ‘devices’ which discriminated against
Puerto Rican voters in violation of Section 4(e) of the Act. For the same reasons, English-only
elections should be considered ‘devices’ … An English-only election has the same effect as a
literacy test and should therefore have the same statutory consequences.” 389 By citing the
importance of the PRLDEF cases, Martinez not only acknowledged the contribution of Puerto
Ricans in expanding the scope of the Civil Rights Movement but also hoped that these hearings
would result in getting similar protections extended to the Mexican-American community. While
bilingual ballots were available in California, that practice was not enshrined in law and could be
changed at a moment’s notice. In addition, many Mexican-American communities outside of
California had no access to bilingual ballots.
Other civil rights activists also cited the precedent established by Puerto Rican activists to
draw attention to the need for expanded legislative protections for language minorities. Howard
Glickstein, director of the Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights, made the argument that the VRA
389
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needed to be modified to protect all language minorities. “This barrier of a requirement to be
able to read and speak English is as significant an impairment of the right to vote as any literacy
test that was used to deny the franchise to blacks.”390 Glickstein, like Barbara Jordan, made
explicit the connection between voter discrimination against both African-Americans and
Latinos which hinged upon both groups being racially different from Caucasians. In addition,
Glickstein, like many of the other witnesses called in to testify during these hearings, cited the
importance of Puerto Rican activism and the judicial decisions that came as a result of this
activism as a significant step which could extend bilingual ballots nationally. 391 Charles Morgan
Jr., director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), also focused upon the work of
PRLDEF in Philadelphia, New York, as well as the PROPA decision in Chicago to draw
attention to the voting discrimination faced by Mexican-Americans in the Southwest.392 Morgan
began his work with the ACLU in Atlanta in 1964. In 1972, he became director of the ALCU's
Washington office where he could gain a greater sense of the impact voting discrimination had
outside of the African-American community in the South. Morgan warned the Subcommittee
that, “until Mexican-Americans are able to fully participate in the electoral process as candidates
and voters, their efforts to curtail wide-spread isolation and segregation … will be cast into
courtrooms rather than polling places.”393 By making the connection between the struggles of
Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and the legal decisions secured in Chicago, New York, and
Philadelphia to secure bilingual voting, Morgan made the argument that PRLDEF’s national
campaign had implications beyond Puerto Ricans alone.
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The acknowledgement of so many politicians, bureaucrats, and civil rights activists aside,
the PROPA, Torres, and Arroyo decisions brought to the fore the tensions between race and
language. Were Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speakers more similar to European immigrants
who eventually assimilated or would they retain their cultural and racial distinctiveness and be
more akin to African-Americans? The lived reality of Puerto Ricans in places like Chicago, New
York and Philadelphia was similar to other immigrants like Italians, Poles, Jews and Russians of
the early twentieth century in the sense of the place each of these groups upon arrival tended to
occupy a subordinate position in the low-wage labor market. In addition, many Puerto Ricans
experienced return-migration to the island as did some Italians before WWII. There were,
therefore, some similarities between Puerto Ricans and the earlier waves of European migrants.
More important, however, were the critical differences in the migration experience of Spanishspeakers like Puerto Ricans. Even though Puerto Ricans established state-side communities in
cities like New York and Philadelphia since the early twentieth century, they (like their AfricanAmerican neighbors) were never able to climb the racial hierarchy in the same ways that other
European immigrants did over the course of the twentieth century. The same kinds of housing,
economic, and educational disparities afflicted both African-Americans and Puerto Ricans alike.
In addition, the colonial status of the island, while helping to facilitate the movement of Puerto
Ricans to the mainland United States, reinforced a notion of the Puerto Ricans as not only
racially inferior but foreign as well. The end result of this was that, in effect, their language was
racialized.394 It became a marker, regardless of a Puerto Ricans phenotypical appearance, that
Puerto Ricans were racially distinct.
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These factors were not the only elements that contributed to the racialization of Spanish.
There was a purposeful conflation of language and race by Mexican-American civil rights
advocates and political operators. Al Perez, head of MALDEF’s Washington, D.C. office, was a
key contributor in this process. Perez, who was aware of the impact that the VRA had for the
African-American community in the South, wanted to get the same kind of legal protection for
Mexican-American voters in Texas. Working with David Tatel and Tom Reston, lawyers from
the Washington, D.C based law firm Hogan and Hartson, Perez began preparing a strategy in
1974 to get Mexican-Americans in the Southwest included in the 1975 VRA. Perez looked to the
1970 Census to provide the rationalization for developing the “language minority” category.
“because the group Mexican Americans was not a distinct Census category, but Spanish
language was, it was decided that Spanish language could be used to generate Census data that
could be used in drafting the legislation … Using ‘Spanish language’ as a proxy for Mexican
Americans was consistent with the effort’s overall goals.”395 Perez, in addition to
conceptualizing this new category of language minority, connected the legal research of Reston
and Tatel with elected officials and civil rights advocates like Vilma Martinez of MALDEF and
Rep. Barbara Jordan. While Perez and his team never had any direct contact with the attorneys at
PRLDEF, the cases in Chicago, New York City, and Philadelphia provided the legal support for
their arguments alongside other evidence of voter and language discrimination levied against the
Mexican-American community in Texas.
To accumulate sufficient evidence to present a case for voter and language discrimination
against Mexican-Americans, Perez relied on local civil rights organizations like the American G.
Dame Institute for Latino Studies (January 2005), 11.
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I. Forum, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), and most importantly
MALDEF. As was the case in other civil rights litigation, organizations like MALDEF needed to
get local community members to share their stories of voter discrimination and convince them to
support this campaign. Witnesses offered testimony that demonstrated how similar tactics used
against African-Americans were employed against Mexican-Americans in Texas, such as
election officials invalidating votes, gerrymandering, excessive filing fees for voting, refusal to
print Mexican-American candidates on ballots, and economic reprisals.396 MALDEF, after
interviewing a number of potential candidates, decided upon Modesto Rodriguez to serve as the
face of the Mexican-American community during the VRA hearings in 1975.

Modesto

Rodriguez was a farmer and political activist from Frio County, Texas who suffered both
economic repercussions and physical violence for his activism and shared the harrowing details
of his efforts to register Mexican-Americans to vote and the kinds of resistance and outright
threats of violence leveled against him and his family.397 This kind of evidence, in addition to the
behind the scenes work of Al Perez, and the strong legal precedent established in the PRLDEF
cases helped secure equal voting rights for Latinos and other language minorities. While Al
Perez, Vilma Martinez and other Latino activists willingly embraced the contributions of Puerto
Ricans towards the expansion of bilingual ballots, not everyone was as enthusiastic. Some
questioned the need for bilingual ballots while others feared that the gains of one racial minority
might come at the expense of another.
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Opposition
Not all the witnesses called in to testify offered support for the idea of protecting the
voting rights of language minorities. Some opposed bilingual ballots outright while others
favored only a very limited extension of bilingual ballots. Still others hoped to use the issue of
bilingual ballots as a wedge-issue to create tension between Spanish-speakers and AfricanAmericans. At the heart of this discussion was the issue of “separability”. By adding voting
rights protections for all Spanish-speakers into the VRA, African-American civil rights activists
worried that a potential legal challenge to bilingual voting would overturn the entire VRA. These
same activists journeyed to the nation’s capital to not only offer testimony about the continued
need for the VRA, but also to request that any additions to the VRA regarding bilingual ballots
include language that would separate bilingual ballots from the rest of the VRA so that a legal
challenge to one section did not endanger any other sections of the law. This discussion of legal
esoterica aside, the issue of separability reveals the tensions inherent in intersectionality. While
the struggle for voting rights of both African-Americans and Puerto Ricans were pursued
together in the 1960s, this fragile alliance collapsed in the 1970s. During the 1975 VRA
reauthorizations hearings, African-American and Latino elected officials and activists turned
suspicious eyes towards one another in an effort to ascertain whether or not each was being
threatened by the other.
The degree of opposition to bilingual voting varied from witness to witness. Some, like
Robert McClory, a Congressman for Illinois’ 13th District, opposed the idea because the idea of
eliminating a minimum standard of intelligence for the electorate was an anathema. When asked
by fellow Congressman Herman Badillo about the need to protect and expand bilingual voting,
McClory remarked, “I haven't given a great deal of thought to that. I have supported special
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language programs for the Spanish or the youngsters that come from Spanish-speaking families,
and I think again our goal should be to encourage education of the Spanish surname or Spanish
language groups in order that they can more fully participate and comply with whatever
minimum requirements might be imposed.”398 When Badillo challenged McClory about the need
to dismantle English-only elections since they represented a form of literacy test, McClory
responded, “I think that a literacy test, when it is used as a test or device for discrimination, takes
on a different character from a literacy test which is nondiscriminatory but is an across-the-board
determination as to a minimum intelligence factor with regard to the voter. I am not certain that
we want to bar for all time all States from applying literacy tests.”399 McClory was among the
many who questioned the need for cultural accommodation of Spanish-speaking voters and
advocated instead for linguistic assimilation of Latinos. While McClory was unsuccessful in his
advocacy, these very arguments would be resurrected during the 1980s in order to dismantle
bilingual accommodations in both education and election law.
Others opposed the VRA because they hoped to get their states out from under the weight
of federal oversight. Albioun F. Summer, Attorney General of Mississippi, called attention to the
way in which the VRA targeted the Old South and left many Latinos unprotected since, “its full
effect is leveled at five Southern states with heavy black population and gives immunity to the
larger states to discriminate, through literacy tests and other ways, against great numbers of
Spanish-speaking minorities.” Summer made a special point to call attention to the selective way
that African-Americans supported civil rights. He made the argument that African-Americans
were no friends of the Spanish-speaking community since they wanted to hoard voting rights
protections for themselves:
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I hope Mr. Mitchell will not be stingy toward the other minorities and cut them out as he
is reported to be doing — the Spanish-speaking minorities of the Northeast, the West and
the Southwest —the American Indians and the inner-city blacks of the North. I say put
them all in and let's devise a system in which all Americans can participate ... If a
member of Congress would vote to include one minority group why would he or she not
vote to include others more deprived? Are the Chicanos in Texas, California and New
York to be summarily dismissed?400

By shifting the conversation away from discriminatory voting practices in the South to Latino
voter discrimination in the North, Sumner sought to undermine the VRA by claiming the law
was discriminatory against Spanish-speakers and Southern states.
McClory and Summer utilized different tactics to sap the strength of the VRA and the
proposed inclusion of protections for language minorities. McClory made the point that he was
an ally of his Spanish-speaking constituents, but that they should endeavor to learn English to be
able to participate in the democratic process. By supporting a “minimum intelligence factor with
regard to the voter”, McClory was evoking arguments from an earlier era in American history
when the intelligence and basic humanity of African-Americans and foreign immigrants was
called into question. Summer’s argument was perhaps even more insidious. Summer’s first point
was that the VRA unfairly targeted a few select States while allowing the clear majority to
impose discriminatory voting requirements upon language minorities. In effect, it was Southern
states that were unfairly being discriminated against by the selective application of the VRA. In
addition, by pitting the interests of African-Americans against language minorities like Puerto
Ricans, Chicanos, and Native Americans, Summer employed a divide-and-conquer strategy to
weaken support for reauthorization.
There were those who expressed concern about how writing bilingual voting protections
would impact the entire VRA. Clarence Mitchell, head of the NAACP’s Washington Bureau,
400
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supported the principle of bilingual elections but did not want those protections written into the
VRA in such a way that the gains made by African-Americans could be imperiled. He remarked
that, “I just think that we can avoid unnecessary problems and divisions by making this a
separate title. I honestly think that the bill is so sacred that whether doing it a different way
would be harmful or not, there are people in the black community who would feel that it would
be an effort to sabotage the bill, and I don't say that lightly.” 401 Responding to Albioun
Summer’s characterization of his concerns being stingy, Mitchell commented that “a lot of socalled friends of the Spanish-speaking have come forward championing their cause. I think a
gentleman from Mississippi who was here the other day said I was pretty greedy because, as he
put it, I was talking about blacks only and not including Spanish-speaking. I hope he is a friend
of the Spanish-speaking people, but my experience is that many of these people, like him, are
trying to open the door for real damage to the other part of the bill.”402 Not every AfricanAmerican activist felt as strongly as Mitchell did. Joseph L. Rauh, the Vice President of
Americans for Democratic Action and a close friend of Mitchell, offered a slightly different
viewpoint. “I think it's gotten to the point where we should be more trusting of each other. I
guess I don't feel as strongly as Mr. Mitchell or some of his advisers do that there is a
separability danger here.”403 The question of separability was an important one despite Rauh’s
comments. If bilingual voting protections were added into the existing form of the VRA, then a
challenge to bilingual voting would not only imperil the protections gained by language
minorities, but those gains made by African-American activists who struggled for many years to
secure their own right to vote. By separating the bilingual voting provisions into a new section,
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these activists argued, both African-Americans and language minorities would enjoy the
protections of the VRA without endangering the other.
While separability was the technical justification for resistance by some AfricanAmerican leaders like Mitchell, there were other factors that led to this resistance. AfricanAmericans had reasons to distrust the Nixon Administration. Nixon actively courted the support
of Dixiecrats (Southern Democrats who supported segregation) and sought Latino votes through
his support for bilingual education in an effort to court the growing numbers of Latino voters.404
The lack of trust that Ruah referred to was very real. In 1965, Puerto Ricans, like Badillo,
supported the issue of voting rights alongside his African-American counterparts. By the mid1970s, the relationship between African-Americans and Puerto Ricans in the realm of voting
rights witnessed became more challenging in an increasingly hostile political environment.

Conclusion
On April 7, 1975, Herman Badillo along with Jordan, Roybal, Drinnan and Rodino
cosponsored H.R. 6219. This resolution would extend the duration of the VRA for another seven
years, extend a permanent ban on the use of all forms of literacy tests across the nation, officially
defined the term “language minority” in American law, and prohibited English-only elections.405
This version of the proposed resolution sought protection for language minorities under both the
14th and 15th Amendments and it contained the separability clause desired by African-American
civil rights leaders. Badillo testified before the Senate on April 22nd to articulate his support for
H.R. 6219 where he characterized it as representing “further improvements” to the bill that both
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he and Roybal’s proposed earlier that year.406 It passed the House on June 4th with a vote of 34170. It was passed by the Senate on July 24th with a vote of 77-12. On August 6th it officially
became Public Law 94-73 when it was signed by President Gerald Ford.407
The issue of race manifested in different ways during the course of the 1975 VRA
reauthorization. The initial reluctance of Badillo to bind the fate of Puerto Ricans with that of
African-Americans was shared by prominent African-American civil rights leaders. Badillo
made it clear by conceptualizing bilingual ballots as a civil rights issue under the 14th
Amendment that he saw Puerto Ricans as an ethnicity and not as a race. While this view did not
preclude him from working alongside African-Americans (having had a productive working
relationship with Barbara Jordan and mobilizing African-American voters in his district to
support his campaign), he was purposefully working to create a political space that Puerto Ricans
and other Spanish-speakers could call their own. African-Americans were also hesitant about the
expansion of the VRA to include language minorities. After the many years of organizing across
the South and enduring violence at the hands of the supporters of Jim Crow, community leaders
like Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP were very vocal about preserving their hard-won gains.
Opponents of the VRA in the South attempted to capitalize on this mistrust, but both AfricanAmericans and Puerto Rican civil rights advocates recognized this tactic for what it was. They
might not have trusted each other completely, but Blacks and Puerto Ricans recognized in the
end that they had to work with one another in order to protect and expand voting rights in the
United States.
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While the shadow of distrust may have cast a pall over some of individuals involved in
these deliberations, it was apparent that the litigation campaign by Puerto Ricans in the Northeast
and Midwest also left their mark upon these proceedings. Despite the lack of direct contact
between PRLDEF and MALDEF during these hearings, time and again witnesses drew upon the
courtroom victories of PRLDEF and its local allies as an example of why bilingual elections
should be offered across the United States. The attorneys who moved these lawsuits forward did
not make the same sort of distinctions about race that Badillo articulated. For Herbert Teitelbaum
and George Pontikes, the 15th Amendment was just as important as the 14th in creating a legal
logic that would ensure Puerto Ricans could vote in their native language. The struggle waged by
African-Americans during the nineteenth century helped pave the way for both of those
Amendments, and their twentieth century efforts resulted in the civil rights legislation of the
1960s. In addition, the efforts of Chicanos in Texas and California, as well as litigation by an
earlier generation of Puerto Rican activists made the road a bit easier for bilingual election
advocates. PRLDEF did not take a position that demanded a separate political space for Puerto
Ricans but argued instead on behalf of the intersectionality of struggle for all minorities – racial
or language alike.
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Chapter 6: Backlash
Puerto Rican activists who fought for bilingual ballots did not cease their community
organizing with their victory in 1975. Indeed, many of the activists and organizers who operated
in the 1970s continued their efforts into the 1980s. When Herbert Teitelbaum left PRLDEF to
create his own law firm, other attorneys from PRLDEF continued the organizations’ efforts to
protect Puerto Rican voting rights. These activist-lawyers became involved in a new phase of
Puerto Rican civil rights activism in the United States - the larger effort to protect the gains they
made in the 1970s. PRLDEF was not alone in this effort. After the collapse of the Young Lords
Party by the mid-1970s, former members of the Young Lords Party joined forces with other
Puerto Rican community activists to form the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights
(NCPRR). In fact, attorneys at PRLDEF like Juan Cartagena were also members of the NCPRR.
NCPRR members in Philadelphia and New York City maintained a commitment to direct-action
protest as a tactic available to the NCPRR but their rhetoric was more firmly planted in ideas of
American democratic Liberalism rather than in Puerto Rican Nationalism. The NCPRR, with
membership ranging in location from Boston to Florida, brought together a vast network of
Puerto Rican civil rights activists from across the country. The creation of the NCPRR was
timely since a new threat to the civil rights victories of Puerto Ricans in the 1970s grew out west.
In the aftermath of the 1975 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), an
organized movement against bilingual voting was born. This movement, beginning in California,
quickly spread by finding supporters across much of the United States during the 1980s and
1990s. Sometimes called English-Only, Official English, or English-First, the movement was
comprised of a number of different lobbying organizations, but perhaps the most important of
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these was U.S. English. This group formed in 1983 due to the efforts of S.I. Hayakawa, a
Republican Senator representing California from 1977 to 1983 and author of the book Language
in Thought and Action. Hayakawa entered electoral politics after his retirement from academic
pursuits. He was the President of San Francisco State College during the student protests of
1968. Coming into the public eye just as Governor Reagan was waging his own battles against
higher education, Hayakawa’s leadership style during the student protests demonstrated his
authoritarian style. During his time as a Senator, he sponsored the unsuccessful English
Language Amendment in 1981. According to Hayakawa, language was the most important
element that connected the citizens of the United States. “It is with a common language that we
have dissolved distrust and fear. It is with language that we have drawn up the understandings
and agreements and social contracts that make a society possible.”408 Among the explicit goals of
groups like U.S. English was the elimination of bilingual ballots.
Proponents of state and federal English-Only legislation asserted a belief that federal
legislation privileging English as the official language of the nation could provide a vehicle for
cultural unification for the diverse citizens of the country. To this end, they supported an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution declaring English the official language of the United States,
the modification of bilingual education programs, and the abolition of bilingual elections in order
to remedy the cultural separatism that bilingual programs supposedly promoted. According to
supporters of English-Only, the English language was said to be under attack, and elected
officials needed to take steps to guarantee the protection of the language. The discourse
employed in this campaign would oftentimes appropriate the language of the Civil Rights
Movement in order to bolster its claims. U.S. English often invoked the notion of “color408
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blindness” to target voting rights protections that explicitly covered language minorities in a time
when tensions around Latin American immigration were taking a turn for the worse and a
broader assault on voting rights was taking shape. While the English-Only movement achieved
some victories, these victories did not go uncontested.
Despite the challenges of operating within a hostile political climate during the Reagan
administration, Puerto Rican activists continued to use organized protest methods of the 1960s
and 1970s to achieve their ends and defend their civil rights at the dawn of the Culture Wars. The
literature on the Culture Wars is understandably recent with some of the earliest works taking
active positions within the various intellectual, cultural, and policy battlefields of this period.409
Another group of scholars argues that the various public discussions of American identity during
the Culture Wars were superficial or entirely irrelevant. 410 The first major work, however, within
this literature was James Davison Hunter’s Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America,
where he outlines the sharp divides within American society into “orthodox” and “progressive”
camps that will inevitably come to blows.411 According to Hunter, the cultural and ethical
questions that divided Americans in the 1980s came to replace earlier forms of social divides
such as religious affiliation. While Hunter successfully brings together various debates of the
period into a single framework, he perhaps overemphasizes the role of abortion in the Culture
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Wars of the 1970s and 1980s. Hunter is not the only scholar who overemphasizes one particular
issue within the Culture Wars. Robert Self, in his book All in the Family: The Realignment of the
American Democracy since the 1960s, also takes this approach but emphasizes the nation’s
preoccupation with family values rather than abortion.412 While both scholars focused upon the
role of sexuality in American life, Self’s interpretation differs from Hunter because he pays
closer attention to the role of the New Left activists during the Culture Wars. What Self does not
account for, however, is the broader participation of Latinos within these national dialogues
about American culture during this period.
By examining the role of Puerto Rican activists who mobilized against English-Only
policies during the 1980s, this chapter will enhance our understanding of how the issues that
galvanized Puerto Rican community leadership during the 1970s continued to play an important
role during the Culture Wars of the 1980s as well as how that mobilization changed. During the
1970s, Puerto Ricans living in the United States had very little representation in formal electoral
politics (Herman Badillo, of course, being a notable exception). This began to change in the
1980s as a result of their civil rights activism during the previous decade as well as their efforts
to be involved in the process of redistricting at the local level in the early 1980s. The increased
numbers of Puerto Ricans serving in Congress, in various state and municipal legislatures
represented some measure of progress and these activists had the explicit goal of preserving the
voting rights protections for language minorities in the face of a conservative backlash with an
openly racist agenda. The opposition to English-Only was comprised of a generation of activists
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operating in the previous decade in the militant-Left alongside more reform-minded community
activists. The overlapping networks of activists that existed in the 1970s continued to be utilized
in the 1980s and 1990s as young activists matured together. These activists continued to
mobilize the Puerto Rican community towards a Reformist agenda using both direct-action
protest and legislative advocacy as it had in previous decades. In order to better understand the
ways in which Puerto Rican civil rights activism experienced continuity and change, we must
first explore the nature of the English-Only movement in the United States during the 1980s.

English-Only Groups and their Actions
Before Hayakawa formed U.S. English, he attempted to deal with the issue of language in
the legislative arena. Hayakawa introduced legislation that would, through a Constitutional
amendment, make English the official language of the nation. His 1981 bill, however, did not
receive support from other members of Congress and the bill quickly died.413 In the wake of this
unsuccessful endeavor, Hayakawa left electoral politics and decided to pursue his political
interests though advocacy work with the formation of U.S English. Many across the country
shared Hayakawa’s anxieties about the English language and the preservation of American
culture. Hayakawa co-founded U.S. English along with James Tanton in 1982. Tanton, an
ophthalmologist from the small town of Petoskey, Michigan, began his advocacy work as a part
of the local environmentalist movement. His focus then shifted to the issues of resource
conservation and population control. To that end, he worked with Planned Parenthood and Zero
Population Growth (ZPG) that he headed for two years during the 1970s. After parting ways with
413
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ZPG over the direction of the organization over its refusal to take on immigration reform, Tanton
formed a new organization called FAIR (Federation for American Immigration Reform) in order
to lobby for tougher immigration laws and lower quotas. A former employee of ZPG said that
Tanton spoke, “in very legitimate terms, about protecting our borders and saving the nation’s
resources and so on, but the trouble is, after you’ve heard them, you want to go home and take a
shower.”414 Others more directly criticized Tanton and FAIR for its anti-immigrant and racially
motivated policy recommendations. Jerry Tinker, an aide to Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass),
remarked that “Long before they took the garb of U.S. English, this was an anti-immigrant outfit
and their newsletters contained barely disguised racism.”415
According to the organization’s mission statement, U.S. English is "committed to
promoting the use of English in the political, economic, and intellectual life of the nation."416
The organization's guiding principal was to "maintain the blessings of a common language —
English — for the people of the United States."417 It attempted to "reverse the spread of foreign
language usage" by calling for a number of federal reforms to return the English language to the
prominence that it deserved in American life. This amendment to make English the official
language of the country was a means to an end; a Constitutional amendment would only serve to
help abolish both bilingual ballots and restrict bilingual education. 418 The need for a
Constitutional amendment was premised upon the fact that federal-level court decisions and law
mandated these policies. In order to overturn them, Hayakawa would likewise need a federal-
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level policy. In order to rally support for his cause, Hayakawa targeted the group that best
symbolized language politics in the 1970s – the nation’s Latino population.
Hayakawa’s ire was often directed at what he called “the Hispanic lobby” (Hispanic
elected officials and community activists). In his view, these individuals were “professional
Hispanics” meaning that their job was to BE Hispanic rather than merely being Hispanic. “It is
not without significance that pressure against English language legislation does not come from
any immigrant group other than … the Hispanic politicians and ‘bilingual’ teachers and lobbying
organizations. One wonders about the Hispanic rank and file. Are they in agreement with their
leadership?”419 The implication here was a leadership cadre that emerged from the roots of
identity politics in an effort to secure power for itself rather than actually serving the needs of
their presumed constituents. Hayakawa identified two major legislative initiatives sponsored by
“the Hispanic lobby” during the decade of the 1970s that he felt threatened the unity of the
nation: bilingual education and bilingual ballots. “The aggressive movement on the part of
Hispanics to reject assimilation and to seek to maintain – and give official status to – a foreign
language within our borders is an unhealthy development.”420 By framing the discussion of
Hispanic leadership as grasping and opportunistic, Hayakawa sought to delegitimize Hispanic
political leaders in the eyes of his membership and the public. U.S. English endeavored to
characterize itself as pro-American and anti-racist by characterizing itself as an organization that
supported the silent mass of Hispanics in the United States that wanted nothing more than to
assimilate into American society by driving a wedge between Hispanic leaders and their
constituents.
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Hayakawa’s rhetorical method for combating bilingual elections appropriated the
concerns and ideas of the Civil Rights Movement to argue against the legislative and judicial
victories that granted bilingual ballots. “Sensitive as Americans have been to racism, especially
since the days of the civil rights movement, no one seems to have noticed the profound racism
expressed in the amendment that created the bilingual ballot. Brown people, like Mexicans and
Puerto Ricans, presumed not to be smart enough to learn English. No provision is made,
however, for the non-English speaking French-Canadians in Maine or Vermont, or for the
Hebrew-speaking Hasidic Jews in Brooklyn, who are white and are presumed to be able to learn
English without difficulty.”421 Hayakawa failed to note, however, that other language minority
groups aside from Asian-Americans and Latin Americans also benefitted from bilingual ballots,
like the Polish in Chicago. The concern of many advocates of English-Only policies with
language was connected to deeper anxieties around the shifting demographic portrait of the
nation. States like California, in particular, saw dramatic increases in its Asian and Latin
American migration after 1965 with the passage of the Hart-Celler Act. As Mae Ngai has pointed
out, discrimination against Asian and Latin American immigrants was prevalent in the political
and social fabric of California since the nineteenth century.422 Passage of the Hart-Celler Act in
1965, however, reflected a shift in policy towards immigrants from Latin America and Asia and
has often been viewed as an extension of the legislation enacted during the height of the Civil
Rights Movement.423 Congressmen Philip Burton (D-CA) noted that, “Just as we sought to
eliminate discrimination in our lands through the Civil Rights Act, today we seek by phasing out
the national origins quota system to eliminate discrimination in immigration to this nation
421
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composed of the descendants of immigrants.”424 With noticeable increases in community growth
and with a number of civil rights protections in place, it appeared to Hayakawa that Asian and
Hispanic groups sought to use bilingual ballots as a means to artificially inflate its own electoral
potential by including undocumented migrants into the voter pool.
In a fundraising letter to the membership of U.S. English, Hayakawa described the kind
of voter fraud that resulted from bilingual ballots. “A very strange voter registration drive was
conducted in San Francisco a few years ago … it was so strange that it aroused the suspicion of
the United States Attorney … he uncovered that 27 percent of the requests for bilingual ballots
came from noncitizens.”425 Hayakawa went on to explain to his membership how Asian and
Hispanic groups banded together and used the judicial system to successfully expand and defend
their voting rights even in the face of opposition by English-Only groups. He argued that the
activism of language minority groups and their legal victories revealed that “they have rights
beyond those of ordinary citizens like you and me.”426 The articulation of “rights beyond
ordinary citizens” was used to subtly accentuate the perceived differences in immigration and
Americanization that earlier European immigrants experienced at the turn of the twentieth
century against the more recent waves of immigrants from Asia and Latin America.
In order to galvanize support for the Official English movement, U.S. English during the
1980s appropriated the language of the Civil Rights Movement, such as the opposition to
“separate but equal” policies, to suggest that the Hispanic leadership threatened the political and
social fabric of the nation. Hayakawa in his writing made the case that civil rights groups like
MALDEF and PRLDEF represented, “an unhealthy trend in present-day America.” He also
noted that Hispanic leaders desired political and social separation from the rest of U.S. citizens.
424
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“the present day politically ambitious ‘Hispanic Caucus’ looks forward to a destiny for Spanishspeaking Americans separate from … all the rest of us who rejoice in our ethnic diversity, which
gives us a richness of culture, and the English language, which keeps us in communication with
each other …”427 In addition, Hayakawa argued in his organization’s fundraising literature that
civil rights policies for language minorities such as bilingual education and bilingual ballots
"lead to institutionalized language segregation and a gradual loss of national unity." 428 By
invoking the idea of language segregation, Hayakawa equated language-rights activists with
supporters of Jim Crow in the American South. For Hayakawa, bilingual ballots and bilingual
education were two key cogs in the Hispanic Caucus machine that needed to be toppled in order
to preserve the linguistic integrity of the nation.
US English grew rather quickly since its creation in 1982. By 1986, it attracted more than
200,000 dues-paying members about half of whom resided in California. U.S. English also
bound together Americans of various political ideologies and interests. While many supporters of
U.S. English identified as political conservatives, others were people who were interested in
increasing the literacy rate in the United States, while others (like Tanton) came to U.S. English
from the conservationist and environmentalist movement. According to Tanton, U.S. English in
1985 raised 2.4 million dollars and additional money was raised for a legislative task force that
conducted political lobbying at both the state and federal levels. Campaign finance records show
that the California English Campaign received $385,000 loan from the US English Legislative
Task Force to help pay for the signature gathering drive to make English the official language of
California.429 The support that U.S. English received in terms of membership and funds attracted
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some rather high profile members to the organization’s board. Foremost among these was
broadcast journalist Walter Cronkite and author Saul Bellow. With the broad base of popular
support, U.S. English became an important force in the national campaign to push for both
federal and state level legislation to make English the official language and to undermine the
civil rights victories of Puerto Rican activists.

Legislative Efforts of English-Only
The creation of a national lobbying group with access to both financial resources and
political capital led to a flurry of proposals in Congress to support English-Only policies. Using
his professional networks from his time as a Senator, Hayakawa was able to identify like-minded
officials who were willing to sponsor and develop English-Only legislation. From 1983 to 1985,
two Constitutional amendments were proposed in Congress that would make English the official
language of the nation. If approved, then local enforcement of bilingual ballots could be
overturned. These proposed amendments came at a time when a broader assault on the civil
rights gains made during the 1960s and 1970s were under attack by the Reagan Administration.
In 1981, the Reagan Administration began to replace the leadership of the Civil Rights
Commission with more like-minded individuals who would not challenge the Administration.430
Similarly, the Department of Justice (DOJ) was saturated with neo-conservative ideologues. Ari
Berman, in his book Give Us the Ballot, described the DOJ of the 1980s as, “the nerve center of
the Reagan revolution, the most intellectually vibrant and ideologically conservative agency in
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the federal government.”431 With growing support in all branches of government, English-Only
supporters once again made the push to grant the English language primacy.
In March 1983, Norman Shumway (R-Ca) introduced House Joint Resolution 169 for
consideration in the House. This resolution would add a constitutional amendment making
English the official language of the nation and would prohibit state governments from requiring
the use of any language other than English. If successful, an English Language Amendment
(ELA) would trigger Section VI of the U.S. Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, which would
override any state-level laws that supported policies like bilingual ballots. The ELA, as proposed
by Shumway, would provide only one exception in the case of bilingual education programs
designed to make foreign-language students proficient in English.432 While the bill had sixteen
other Republican cosponsors, including Congressman Thomas Kindness, Shumway’s proposed
legislation was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and died there without serious
consideration.433 Although Shumway was himself bilingual (he was fluent in Japanese and a
great student of Japanese culture), he represented constituents who were anxious over increased
Latin American immigration and he sincerely believed that an ELA would put the country back
onto the path of social unity.
Shumway sponsored multiple English-Only bills during his tenure in Congress. Like his
1983 ELA, his bills in 1985, 1987, and 1988 were also turned aside. When speaking in support
of this kind of legislation, Shumway observed that “it [English] is the primary language in which

431

Ari Berman, Give Us the Ballot: the Modern Struggle for Voting Rights in America (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2015), 149
432
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hjres169/summary accessed on December 8, 2015. One the many
issues that English-Only advocates had with bilingual education was the belief that these kinds of educational
programs were not teaching English to foreign-language students. A common criticism of bilingual education was
that these programs were designed merely to provide jobs to Hispanic teachers.
433
https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-joint-resolution/169/all-actions accessed on December 8,
2015

186

our government should continue to function. However, without that missing legal protection, I
believe that the primacy of English is being threatened, and that we are moving toward the status
of a bilingual society.”434 Supporters of English-Only laws often voiced this kind of an argument.
The example of Quebec and the political conflicts in Canada over language were often brought
up to suggest that the Canadian path was one best avoided.435 Shumway also argued, much like
Hayakawa did in U.S. English’s fundraising letters, that bilingualism was not only dangerous to
national unity, but inherently contradictory. “We are fostering policies which discourage
language minorities from learning English, and we are sending conflicting and confusing signals
to those language minorities. For example, we expect all those under the age of fifty seeking
naturalization to demonstrate competence in English as a condition of citizenship. However, in
375 jurisdictions in 21 states, the federal government still requires that ballots be printed in
languages other than English.”436 Despite these contradictions, Shumway was unable to rally
support for his ELA bills in the House of Representatives.
Similar efforts to create an English Language Amendment transpired in the U.S. Senate.
While the efforts in the House were led and supported by Republicans alone, the ELA bills in the
Senate drew support from both Democrats and Republicans. The sponsor of one such bill was
Senator Walter Huddleston of Kentucky. Entering the world of Kentucky state politics in 1964,
Huddleston won his Senate seat in 1972. During the 1980s, Huddleston proposed numerous bills
on the floor of the Senate to limit immigration and was a member of the Board of Advisors of
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FAIR.437 Speaking in support of a constitutional amendment he proposed (Senate Joint
Resolution 167) to make English the official language of the United States, Huddleston remarked
in 1983 that: “our great strength has been drawn from our ability to assimilate vast numbers of
people from many different cultures and ethnic groups into a nation of people that can work
together with cooperation and understanding … for the last fifteen years, we have experienced a
growing resistance to the acceptance of our historic language, an antagonistic questioning of the
melting pot philosophy that has traditionally helped speed newcomers into the American
mainstream.”438 Huddleston’s invocation of the melting-pot (a model of immigration whereby
the immigrant gives up his/her original cultural practices in favor of those from the receiving
nation) was contrasted against what he, Tanton, and Hayakawa, perceived was the growing
intransigence of Hispanic leaders and activists since the 1970s.
Huddleston framed the discussion of English language in American politics as a conflict
between traditional modes of immigrant assimilation and the more recent trends towards
multiculturalism.439 A key element of Huddleston’s support for an ELA was the removal of
bilingual ballots. “The wisdom of this policy is clearly lacking when you consider that the vast
bulk of political debate … is conducted in English. By failing to provide a positive incentive for
voting citizens to learn English, we are actually denying them full participation in the political
process … Although this helps to preserve minority voting blocs, it seriously undercuts the
democratic concept that every voting individual should be as fully informed as possible about the
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issues and the candidates.”440 Like Hayakawa, Huddleston sought to associate bilingual ballots
with Jim Crow era voting policies when describing how bilingual ballots limited full
participation of language minorities in the political process. He also contrasted the democratic
concept of individualism with the threat represented by ethnic voting blocs and collective
political action. By positing the conflict in this way, Huddleston made subtle associations
between the United States’ primary adversary in the Cold War, the Soviet Union, and Hispanic
leaders who supported bilingual education and bilingual ballots. Despite these appeals, the
efforts to create an ELA in the Senate met with the same fate as the proposed bills in the House
of Representatives.
From 1983 to 1999, numerous bills were introduced that would result in repealing
bilingual ballots. Some of these proposed laws did not even bother with the pretense of making
English the official language in order to do away with bilingual ballots. In 1995, a bill named
Bilingual Voting Requirement Repeal Act was proposed and had 51 cosponsors (48 of whom
were Republican). According to research presented in a report on this bill, there was no evidence
of discrimination in voting to justify continued federal intervention, that bilingual voting did not
demonstrate any significant increase in electoral participation by non-English speakers, and
finally, the process of translating voting materials was expensive.441 Within the scope of the
report was included a memo of dissent from Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois. He
identified other negative ramifications for language-minority voters aside from not being able to
read ballot questions.
H.R. 351 appears to eliminate entirely the nationwide ban on discriminatory election practices
against members of language minority groups. This could prevent members of language minority
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groups from being able to challenge vote dilution … More fundamentally, H.R. 351 would call
into question the legal right of members of language minorities, such as Hispanic-Americans and
Asian-Americans, to challenge such blatantly harmful election practices as limiting the voter
registration of only language minority citizens.442

Table 6:1: Proposed Federal English-Only Resolutions 1983-1999
Proposed

Name

Congress

Year

A resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of
the United States with respect to
the English language
Bilingual Voting Requirements
Repeal Act of 1995
Declaration of Official Language
Act of 1995
National Language Act of 1995

98th Cong

1983

104th Cong.

1995

104th Cong

1995

104th Cong.

1995

English Language Empowerment
Act of 1996
National Language Act of 1997

104th Cong

1996

105th Cong

1997

Declaration of Official Language
Act of 1997
National Language Act of 1999

105th Cong

1997

106th Cong

1999

Declaration of Official Language
Act of 1999

106th Cong

1999

Law
S.J. Res. 167

H.R. 351
H.R. 739
H.R. 1005
H.R. 3898
H.R. 1005
H.R. 622
H.R. 1005
H.R. 50

Source: Mexican American Legal Defense & Education Fund, “Redressing Impediments to Voting Language
Minorities: the Need to Reauthorize and Expand Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act”, 46, reprinted in S. 2236
Hearings: Voting Rights Act Language Assistance Amendments of 1992, 454; James Thomas Tucker, “Enfranchising
Language Minority Citizens: the Bilingual Election Provision of the Voting Rights Act”, New York University
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy vol.10, 230

Other members of Congress banded together to write an official dissent and included it in the
report – among them were Barney Frank (D-Mass) and Xavier Becerra (D-CA). They
characterized this bill as a modern day poll tax and refuted the claim that bilingual ballots were
442
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costly. “According to the Government Accounting Office, the average cost of providing written
assistance is minuscule, costing an average of 2.9 percent of election expenses or less. Recent
studies confirm that nearly three-fourths of Spanish speaking American citizens would be less
likely to vote if minority language assistance were not available.” 443 This bill, like so many
others, did not generate sufficient support to make it to the President’s desk.
While U.S. English was not successful in getting its platform instituted at the federal
level, it did gain victories at the state-level during the mid-1980s. As an organized response
against the civil rights victories of language minorities, voters in California approved Proposition
38 in 1984 with 71 percent of the vote.444 Proposition 38 called for the Governor to deliver a
message to the President and Congress expressing their opposition to bilingual ballots. Through
its organizing efforts, U.S. English was able to get a ballot question on the 1986 California statewide election. This ballot question, Proposition 63, would amend the State Constitution of
California to make English the official language of the state. The law would require the state
government to take steps to ensure the prominence of English and allow private citizens the
ability to file litigation against the State for not enforcing the measure. 445 Proposition 63 was
sponsored by State Assemblyman Frank Hill with the support of Hayakawa and Stanley
Diamond, head of the California English Campaign (CEC), which served as a state-level
equivalent of Hayakawa’s U.S. English organization.
Leading up to the vote on Prop 63, the issue was hotly debated across the country. Some
observers identified the fear of growing Hispanic political power as the inspiration behind Prop
63. Commenting on Proposition 63, Geoffrey Nunberg, a writer for the Philadelphia Daily News,
stated “What frightens them most is the large Hispanic communities, which they see as
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Ibid, 23
Ballot ’86: Analysis of Proposition 63, Diana Caballero Papers, Box 31, Folder 2, Series VII
445
Ibid
444

191

threatening not only because of their size and concentration but because they are perceived as
being subject to contagion by foreign political interests.”446 Nunberg was not alone in this
sentiment. An editorial in the Los Angeles Times referenced recent measures taken in San
Francisco to limit the use of languages other than English in official government business.
“Voters in San Francisco, long regarded as the most tolerant city in California, approved a ballot
proposition that urged the federal government to stop requiring the city to print voter information
material in languages other than English. The vote stemmed from a controversy over ballots
printed in Cantonese, Mandarin and other languages by elderly Chinese residents of the city.”447
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) gathered together a number of civil rights
organizations in order to oppose Prop 63. The group, Californians United: Committee Against
Proposition 63, drew support from such groups as MALDEF, the Asian-American Bar
Association, the Japanese American Citizens League, the American Jewish Congress, the League
of Women Voters, the National Conference of Black Lawyers, and many others.448 The central
argument of this consortium of civil rights organizations against Prop 63 was that it encouraged
discrimination against language minorities. “This proposition exacerbates tensions that exist in
society by legitimizing nativism and xenophobia.”449 Francisco Garcia of MALDEF, a member
of this consortium, argued that the links between the leadership of US English and other antiimmigration groups like FAIR revealed its true purpose. “These interlocking directorates make
clear the xenophobic threat and general anti-immigrant and racist contours of the ‘English-Only’
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movement.”450 Californians United was able to marshal its collective resources and convince the
City Council of San Jose to oppose Prop 63 before the referendum even took place. Drawing
support from labor unions and the clergy, Californians United rallied several hundred protesters
outside of San Jose’s City Hall while inside the City Council heard arguments from both
supporters and opponents of Prop 63. In the end, San Jose’s City Council voted 8-1 to oppose
Prop 63.451 This opposition, however, ran counter to what pundits and political observers
expected in a statewide vote on the controversial proposition.
Despite organized opposition, there were many others who supported Prop 63. Joan
Beck, a columnist for the New York Daily News, saw this proposed California law as a means to
preserve the country. “The melting pot ideology that served us well historically is being pushed
aside by sentimental insistence on preserving … other languages and cultures. But if this nation
is to survive the diverse new waves of immigration, it is essential that the process of assimilation
go on … and the key to being a united nation is a common tongue.”452 Beck also identified
sympathy for immigrants and concern for civil rights as obstacles to national unity. Similarly,
many American citizens wrote to various newspapers to express their support for Prop 63 and
other English-Only laws. Writing in opposition to an editorial in the Los Angeles Times which
condemned Prop 63, many citizens echoed the arguments expressed by U.S. English. “’Do you
think if English-speaking people were to go to the countries these foreigners came from that they
would print ballots in English … I think not.’” Another California resident wrote, “’They
[immigrants] have always had an opportunity to learn English in this country, and those that have
failed, did not want to exert themselves’” while another argued that, “’I do not see any reason
why people who have spoken English all these years should have to give it up because of
450
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immigration.’”453 By galvanizing the anxiety that many Americans living in California felt about
increased levels of immigration, U.S. English and its local allies like Stanley Diamond were able
to successfully rally support for their agenda. The petitions circulated by Diamond’s organization
were able to secure over three times the number of signatures needed.454
Although U.S. English’s organizing efforts produced a groundswell of support for Prop
63 in California, there was dissention within the ranks about the value of this legislative measure.
Norman Cousins, author and editor of the Saturday Review for 35 years, was a member of the
Advisory Board of U.S. English. Due to his opposition of Prop 63, he resigned his position
within the organization. He argued that the passage of this measure would pose a threat to
Latinos. “I fear a momentum may have been created that is carrying us in an unwise and
unhealthy direction.”455 While he still agreed with the goals of privileging English, he favored
providing more opportunities for immigrants to learn English by expanding the ESL (English as
a Second Language) courses available to adults. In Los Angeles alone, officials estimated that
40,000 adults were turned away from ESL courses due to lack of space. 456 Author and public
intellectual Gore Vidal, a member of U.S. English’s Advisory Board, also disagreed with Prop
63. “They didn’t ask my advice about the language of this proposition – if they had, I would’ve
advised against it. Obviously, this amendment is out to get the Hispanic – that’s clear …”457
An overwhelming majority of the California electorate voted in favor of Proposition 63.
73.2 percent in favor (5,138,577), 26.8 percent voted no (1,876,639). The measure was approved
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by voters in every county in California.458 Proposition 63 declared that English is the official
language of the State of California. It directed the California State Legislature to enact legislation
to "preserve the role of English as the state's common language." It also prohibits the Legislature
from "passing laws which diminish or ignore the role of English as the state's common
language."

More than half of the dues-paying members of U.S. English were located in

California.459 U.S. English tapped into the fears of many Californians of Hispanics’ growing
demographic strength and the civil rights protections they had achieved. Using this fear, it was
able to attract a large membership, organize a statewide campaign to mobilize voters in favor of
this measure, and the media campaign to have their message in the forefront of the public eye
were all key factors in passage of Prop 63.
English-Only campaigns were not only successful in California, but in other regions of
the nation with large Spanish-speaking populations such as South Florida. Miami is known for
its large population of Cubans (after the ascendency of Fidel Castro) and Haitians. The political
leadership of Miami-Dade County decided in 1973 to declare that Miami-Dade was officially
bilingual. In 1980, a grassroots effort was organized by two local women – Marion Plunske and
Emmy Shafer – who created Citizens of Dade United, a group whose sole purpose was to make
English the official language of Miami and prevent other languages from entering into public
discourse. Citizens of Dade United launched a very successful petition campaign to get an
English-Only measure placed on the 1980 ballot and with 59.2 percent of the vote, Ordinance
80-128 passed. An analysis of the vote by the Miami Herald concluded that 71 percent of Whites
voted in favor of the ballot measure while 56 percent of the African-American community and
85% of Latino voters opposed the ordinance. “Little else besides ethnic group – not age, not sex,
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nor education, nor choice of presidential candidate made much difference in how people voted
on the ordinance.”460 While this ordinance could be enforced in Miami-Dade, it had no power
beyond South Florida since other English-Only initiatives in the State Legislature did not receive
sufficient support to be enacted into law. Interest in creating English-Only legislation for Florida
continued throughout the decade of the 1980s and culminated with a ballot measure
(Amendment 11 which would make English the official language of Florida) in November of
1988. Amendment 11 was sponsored by Florida English, a local branch of U.S. English. While
there was some pushback against this proposed legislation, the Spanish-speaking community of
South Florida was noticeably less mobilized against English-Only when compared with similar
efforts in California and in the Northeast. Organizers who came into South Florida in an effort to
mobilize the Cuban-American community against Amendment 11 were struck by the degree of
apathy they encountered. “It was like talking about the diminution of the ozone layer. It was just
something that didn’t seem real to them.”461 Other members of the media in South Florida
observed, “There was practically no reaction. There’s an I-don’t-give-a-damn attitude.”462 This
attitude might be explained by the support the Cuban-American community received in the form
of bilingual education assistance and easier access to small business loans as a result of the larger
Cold War politics of the 1960s. While Cuban-Americans in Miami built a dynamic community
during the 1960s and 1970s, negative attention over the integration of successive waves of
Cuban immigration in the 1980s, los Marielitos, and the rapid transformation of Miami into a
Spanish-speaking city might explain this perceived apathy on the part of some Cubans and the
lack of grassroots mobilization against the English-Only ballot measure.
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Local activism against English-Only
In the wake of the vote on Prop 63, English-Only supporters began to gear up to expand
this kind of statewide strategy to other regions of the country. According to Tanton, “Things that
happen there [in California] tend to sweep across the country.”463 While the federal initiatives to
make English the official language of the country were unsuccessful, U.S. English hoped that by
getting the majority of states to approve English-Only measures, it could pave the way for a
federal legislation on this issue. In order to achieve its goal of scuttling bilingual ballots, US
English needed to find a way to overcome the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution (Article 6, Clause 2). The Supremacy Clause bound individual states to federal law
and although voters in California endorsed the repeal of bilingual ballots, federal law protected
these voting rights for language minorities. By convincing individual state legislatures to adopt
English-Only legislation, it could pressure Congress to take this issue more seriously rather than
allow these kinds of proposals to die in committee. Hoping to repeat the recent victory in
California, proponents on English-only policies were refocusing their efforts on the Northeast.
New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania were among the states that considered
bills in their respective state legislatures to make English the official state language. 464
As U.S. English geared up for a push to the east coast, it needed to identify state
legislators who would be sympathetic to its agenda. In New York, William Paxon, who
represented the 147th district in the New York State Assembly, cosponsored a measure along
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with 13 other Assemblymen to make English the official language of New York State. 465 Along
with Paxon, U.S. English encouraged New York State Senator John Marchi (R-Staten Island) to
pose similar legislation (S-901) in the Senate in order to demonstrate that there was support for
English-Only laws in both houses of New York’s state government. 466 These proposed measures
were introduced while Puerto Rican elected officials and community based groups organized
their allies to counter this kind of legislation.
The Puerto Rican community in the Northeast during the 1980s was well aware of U.S.
English and its agenda. An editorial in El Diario – La Prensa, a New York-based Spanish
language newspaper founded in 1913, identified U.S. English and its agenda as a threat to the
civil rights achievements of Puerto Ricans in the United States. “The real targets of the EnglishOnly program are the very things that members of our Hispanic community have fought many
years to obtain. These are Bilingual Education programs, Spanish language ballots, and election
materials … Before this happens, we must unite and begin to educate New Yorkers on the real
objectives of this movement. We must emphasize the importance of a multilingual and
multicultural society. We do not need an English-Only movement here.”467 El Diario – La
Prensa, like the Spanish-language newspapers in New York’s Puerto Rican community before
WWII, saw its function within the Puerto Rican community as a defender of the Spanish
language and the people who used it. El Diario – La Prensa sought to rally its own community
leadership to action in order to protect hard-won civil rights protections.
Puerto Rican community-based organizations and elected officials were well aware of
U.S. English and its successful California campaign. As U.S. English prepared its campaign in
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the Northeast, Puerto Rican activists articulated their position about English-Only laws. Juan
Rosario, executive director of Aspira, made the position of his organization clear. “Aspira joins
with representatives of Hispanic, Asian, and other civil rights organizations today to publicly
denounce the efforts of groups that are working to establish English as the official language of
the United States.” Rosario acknowledged that proficiency in English was one way in which
immigrants could advance in U.S. society and that immigrants wanted to learn the language. He
disagreed, however, with US English’s position that bilingualism promoted separatism.
“Bilingualism … promotes intercultural understanding – an asset in an increasingly
interdependent world. Bilingualism does not promote separatism, it is the intolerance of other
languages and cultures that can lead to racism and bigotry.”468 In addition to organizations like
Aspira, Puerto Rican elected officials voiced their dismay at the growing English-Only
movement and urged their constituencies to prepare accordingly.
New York State Assemblyman Jose Serrano thought it was, “important that we involve as
many bilingual communities as possible in this fight. We need to reach out to the general
population of New York State and educate them as to the great advantages of being bilingual or
multilingual. It is up to us to explain how the diversity of languages enriches our culture.”
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Serrano, in preparation for this eastward push for English-Only policies towards New York,
organized a meeting of community leaders from various racial and ethnic communities that
would be impacted by this kind of legislation.470 A committee formed out of this initial meeting
consisting of Joseph Monserrat, Celia Chong from the Chinese-American Progressive
Association (CAPA), and Joseph Scelsa from the Italian American Institute of New York
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University. “We have concluded that the US English movement is an attempt to undermine due
process of the law and the civil rights already granted to United States citizens whose native
language is not English.”471 Chong argued that language minorities in the United States desired
social and political integration. This integration, according to Chong, should not come at the
expense of civil rights protections that language minorities fought for. “We absolutely accept that
English is a first language here, but people should not be denied the right to maintain their
languages or to have access to ballots in their language.” 472 Serrano and his allies (Bronx
Assemblyman Jose Rivera and the other members of the Black and Puerto Rican Legislative
Caucus) devised a strategy whereby they would propose legislation to officially declare New
York a multilingual state.

473

This proposed bill, while having very little likelihood of being

approved, would serve to raise awareness among the general public about the danger the U.S.
English’s agenda posed to Puerto Ricans and other language minorities in New York.
One of the key organizational partners in this effort was the National Congress for Puerto
Rican Rights (NCPRR). The NCPRR was created in 1981 by a diverse group of Puerto Rican
activists from many different existing organizations such as the Young Lords, the Puerto Rican
Socialist Party (PSP), and the Puerto Rican Alliance (PRA). While early meetings took place in
Philadelphia, its first large convention was in the Bronx. Former members of the Young Lords
like Juan Ramos (from Philadelphia) and Juan Gonzalez (from New York) wanted to create a
larger civil rights organization which could mobilize Puerto Rican communities across the nation
on a variety of issues. The structure of the organization was designed to be decentralized; while
the NCPRR did have a central executive committee, much of its organizing energy came from
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the local chapters around key issues such as organizing to protest the United States Navy’s
presence in Vieques among many other others. The NCPRR was meant to be flexible enough to
mobilize quickly around a variety of local and national issues and share information across this
network of activists. By the time that English-Only bills were proposed in New York, the
NCPRR had the capacity to move quickly on any political issue that could affect the Puerto
Rican community. Among the attendees of these early meetings was a young Puerto Rican
activist named Hiram Carmona. Carmona, raised on American military bases for much of his
childhood, migrated to Philadelphia from Puerto Rico in the late 1970s after spending time as a
community activist working with local fisherman to organize against the Bacardi Rum company.
After moving to the Hunting Park section of the Philadelphia, he became involved with PRA on
police misconduct issues.474 Carmona, already interested in issues of social justice through his
work with the PRA, became involved in the fight against English-Only policies through the
NCPRR.
Along with a campaign of resistance to English-Only bills in the state legislature, a
committee formed within the NCPRR to organize a street demonstration to bring attention to this
issue. Representatives from Puerto Rican activists from other civil rights groups like PRLDEF,
the Puerto Rican/Latino Education Roundtable (the Roundtable), and the Philadelphia-based
PRA met on February 5, 1987 at the Center for Puerto Rican Studies in Hunter College. Among
those present were Diana Caballero of the Roundtable, Juan Cartagena from PRLDEF, Hiram
Carmona and Elaine Ruiz. Both Ruiz and Caballero were active in the Puerto Rican community
struggle since the 1970s and were both drawn to fight English-Only legislation in order to protect
bilingual education programs in New York City. At this meeting, the participants discussed
Rivera’s resolution and English literacy bill, Serrano’s coalition efforts, and the contents of
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Marchi’s proposed English-Only bill and decided that this committee needed to organize a public
demonstration in front of Marchi’s downtown office.475
In order to generate support, the committee reached out to key allies and to the general
public to join the NCPRR in their protest against English-Only proposals. Elaine Ruiz, Bilingual
Education Coordinator for the NCPRR, argued: “While English Only proponents maintain they
are protecting the English language, this is only a pretext for an anti-immigrant, anti-Puerto
Rican/Latino sentiment that threatens our collective survival.”476 She urged that anyone who
wanted to support their campaign against Marchi’s English-Only bill could attend a protest they
planned to hold or could write State Senator Warren M. Anderson to voice their disagreement. In
addition, members of this organizing committee reached out to their contacts among the labor
unions, as well as allies within the Asian-American and African-American community. This
coalition called itself the Committee for a Multilingual New York.
On February 19th, approximately 100 individuals converged upon Assemblyman
Marchi’s office in Manhattan to publicly denounce the proposed English-Only bill in the New
York State Assembly. Present at this demonstration were representatives from Aspira, Latinos
United for Political Action (LUPA), the Chinese American Progressive Association, and the
Local 1199 (a labor union representing hospital workers). Support within the African-American
community came from Sheila Diana Evans, President of the New York Alliance of Black School
Educators (NYABSE).477 While some observers of this protest characterized it as lacking
organization, Caballero, who was recognized by her peers as the central organizer of this
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campaign, made the intentions of the Committee for a Multilingual New York clear.478 “We want
Marchi to retract his proposed law, to apologize for trying to legalize racial discrimination, and
to promise never to submit this kind of legislative proposal ever again.”479 Caballero was joined
by Assemblyman Jose Rivera, whose district included the Tremont, Fordham, and Grand
Concourse sections of the Bronx, commented that “Franklin and Jefferson didn’t write an official
language into the Constitution because they knew that the whole world would come to our shores
looking for freedom and a better life ….” Juan Cartagena, an attorney with PRLDEF, argued
that the “proposed law creates an environment in which if one speaks, appears, or acts
differently, then that person in a sense ‘un-American’.”480 Cartagena and Rivera were both
framing the discussion of this bill as an anathema to American identity. In so doing, they marked
themselves and other opponents of English-Only legislation as adhering to the spirit of
democratic Liberal virtue. Other demonstrators drew focus to the institutionalized racism that
language and racial minorities in the United States were subjected to. “We know the racial
purists that are in elected office believe that this country is one race, one language, and one color.
This bill is going to be another weapon in the arsenal of racists to exclude people of the
Caribbean, Asians and Latinos,” stated Richie Perez, a former member of the Young Lords and
an active member of the NCPRR, at the protest.481 Due to the combined efforts from both elected
officials and community activists, the proposed bill was stopped before they could become law.
What is perhaps even more significant is how this campaign revealed the growth of Puerto Rican
activists from the 1970s into the 1980s. While the rhetoric of these activists in an earlier time
would have used identity politics as means to gain recognition of distinctiveness from
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mainstream American identity, these activists invoked documents such as the Constitution and
ideas like pluralism to make a case for their inclusion in American politics and to protect their
ability to participate intelligibly.
As the civil rights campaign against English-Only was underway in New York, Puerto
Ricans in different parts of the nation became involved in the fight against language
restrictionism. An important factor to remember is that, demographically, Puerto Ricans were
only a small segment of the population in U.S. cities like New York and Philadelphia. In order to
compensate for this, Puerto Rican activists actively sought out political allies in other racial and
ethnic communities. When Pennsylvania State Representative John Perzal sponsored H.R. 249 to
make English the official language of Pennsylvania in 1986, State Rep. Babette Josephs wrote to
Perzal urging him to withdraw the resolution. Josephs represented sections of South Philadelphia
and Center City after getting elected in 1984. A progressive Jewish-American, Josephs served on
the board of the local branch of the ACLU, and worked in collaboration with Latino elected
officials like Ralph Acosta (the only Puerto Rican in the Pennsylvania State Legislature at that
time) as well as Latino and Asian community-based organizations in Philadelphia like the
League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the Chinese Benevolent Association, the Spring
Garden United Neighbors, and Congreso de Latinos Unidos to mount an organized resistance to
Perzal’s bill in a similar fashion to Puerto Rican elected officials in New York.482
The following year, thirty-seven State Representatives from across Pennsylvania
sponsored H.B. 1031, a law that would demolish bilingual education and make the use of
bilingual ballots illegal. Section 3 of the proposed law stated that all state government
“proceedings, records and publications shall be in English. Primary and secondary education
shall be taught in English. There is no obligation to utilize a language other than English in
482
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official proceedings, records, and publications. There is no obligation to teach the standard
curriculum in a language other than English.”483 Only a month after H.B. 1031 was drafted, U.S.
English held its national convention in Philadelphia. The convergence of these events presented
Puerto Rican activists in Philadelphia with a prime opportunity to draw attention to how their
civil rights were being targeted by English-Only laws.
Over two hundred protesters converged at 4th and Arch in front of the Center City
Holiday Inn to picket outside of U.S. English’s convention on the morning of Saturday May 2 nd,
1987. The protesters were mostly Puerto Ricans from New York City and Philadelphia. The
protest was directed against the effort by US English to amend the Constitution to make English
the official language of the country and the recently proposed English-Only bills in the State
Legislature of Pennsylvania. According to Carmona, one of the key organizers of the
Philadelphia protest was Joaquin Rivera. Rivera served as a guidance counselor in Olney High
School working mostly with foreign language students like Puerto Ricans but also with a sizable
number of Korean and Vietnamese students. Rivera’s contacts within these various communities
allowed him to introduce the NCPRR, and its efforts against English-Only, to a much wider
audience. Carmona noted that, “He [Rivera] was always bringing in new people to each meeting
we held. One week it would be someone from a Korean group, the next week a Muslim group,
etc.”484 Due to Rivera’s efforts to create solidarity with other language minorities, and the
NCPRR bringing into Philadelphia bus-loads of its members from New York, the Philadelphia
protest was much larger and better organized than its New York protest. By the end of the protest
that morning, Rivera, playing his signature cuatro (a small stringed instrument used in Puerto
Rican folk-music), marched with the other protest organizers from the Holiday Inn to the Painted
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Bride for a rally. The various speakers at this rally, which included State Rep. Ralph Acosta,
State Rep. Babette Josephs, City Councilman Angel Ortiz, Dr. Vuong Thuy and Elaine Ruiz
from the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights argued that knowing more than one
language was crucial to understanding cultural differences and favored a policy of encouraging
both English and foreign language proficiency.485
Hayakawa was nonplussed about English Plus and its protest. When asked about the
demonstration outside of his convention Hayakawa responded, “They haven’t got that much
rational thought behind it. They haven’t had anything to oppose for a long time since the
Vietnam War.”486 His cavalier attitude might have been prompted by the success that US English
was having. By 1987, resolutions to make English the official language were introduced in 31
states legislatures. When asked by a reporter about his racial heritage, Hayakawa took pains to
distinguish Asian immigrants from Puerto Ricans and Latin American immigrants. “We [the
Japanese] learned English without any help. They [the Oriental population] contributed their own
money, not the taxpayers’, to their children learning Japanese or Chinese.” Firmly planted in
Reagan-era ideas about the virtues of limited government, he went further and argued that the
Hispanic lobby took advantage of the 1974 Supreme Court ruling in the Lau v Nichols case to
secure funding for Hispanic teachers through the creation of bilingual education programs. “Why
is it … that no Koreans, no Philipinos have done so [oppose the U.S. English amendment]? It’s
only Hispanics.”487 Despite his dismissive attitude, the numerous bills in the Pennsylvania State
legislature were all turned aside.
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Conclusion
The activism of Puerto Ricans in places like New York and Philadelphia during the 1980s
against English-Only demonstrated the political maturation of the individuals and organizations
involved in this movement. While former militant-Leftists like Diana Caballero did not drop
some of the tactics utilized during the 1970s such as public protests, they incorporated a new set
of strategies in order to accomplish their goals. By utilizing new organizations such as the
NCPRR and combining the resources of various civil rights activist organizations across the
Puerto Rican diaspora in the United States, activists like Caballero, Ruiz, Cartagena, and
Carmona were able to continue the kinds of national strategies utilized by PRLDEF in the 1970s.
Puerto Ricans engaged in civil rights activism locally while they simultaneously coordinated
regionally.
Not only were the times different, but the activists themselves had evolved. In their
campaign against the spread of English-Only policies to New York City and Philadelphia, Puerto
Rican activists used discourse that highlighted their American citizenship and service to the
nation while supporting policies that protected language minorities. In an era where the neoConservative agenda of President Reagan exerted influence in all levels of government, Puerto
Rican civil rights organizations like the NCPRR waged their battle against U.S. English both in
the street as well as in the state legislature. This kind of “inside-outside” strategy, where pressure
is applied on the “outside” using protest in public spaces while negotiations occur “inside” with
public officials, was not new nor did it originate within the Puerto Rican community in the
United States. African-Americans used these kinds of tactics with great affect during the 1960s
to secure federal legislation protecting civil rights.
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Puerto Rican civil rights activists during the 1970s and 1980s were architects of
expanding and preserving the protections of the VRA for their own community and for other
language minorities. The 1970s has often been viewed as the era of Black Power, and yet
reformist Puerto Rican organizations like PRLDEF used the same kind of methods that the
NAACP used to integrate public schools. Examining the legal battles waged by the Puerto Rican
community in the New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia during the 1970s and the continued
activism of these communities in the 1980s highlights their role in broadening the scope of the
movement for Puerto Rican civil rights.

Conclusion
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In 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) handed down a decision in
the Shelby v Holder case that effectively neutralized Section 4(b) of the VRA. Under Section
4(b) voting districts with a history of discriminatory voting practices were required to submit any
proposed changes to their voting laws to the Attorney General of the United States for approval.
This clause was an important element of the VRA as it allowed the Attorney General’s office an
opportunity to overrule proposed policies which could do harm to the ability of racial minorities
to participate in the electoral process. The Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision found that Section 4(b)
exceeded Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Justice John
Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, reasoned that the coverage
formula treated the subject districts unfairly since it was "based on 40 year-old facts having no
logical relationship to the present day" and thus was not responsive to current needs of the voters
in these districts.488 Justice Roberts argued that Congress could not subject a state to preclearance
based solely upon a past history of discrimination. According to Roberts, since the coverage
formula was last modified in 1975, the country "has changed, and while any racial discrimination
in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem
speaks to current conditions."489 While the Court struck down Section 4(b), it left Section 4(e)
intact, which provided protection for Puerto Ricans, as well as Section 203, which provided
protection for all language minorities. This decision, although it preserved the right to bilingual
ballots, opened up a window in which States could enact other forms of discriminatory voting
policies.
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In the wake of Shelby v Holder, a number of states began to impose voter ID
requirements on eligible voters and made other changes in election policy ostensibly designed to
reduce voter fraud. In many of the areas where voter ID laws were passed, these policies had the
effect of simply reducing the number of eligible voters. In Alabama, Republicans drew a new
legislative districts within the state in order to pack African-American voters into fewer voting
districts which would stymie the power of this largely Democratic voting bloc.490 Arizona, along
with one of the most stringent anti-immigrant laws in the form of H.B. 1070, enacted policy that
mandated potential voters to prove their citizenship.491 North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory
signed H.B. 589, which reduced opportunities to register to vote.492 Similar changes in election
law were made in Texas, Wisconsin, and Ohio.493 The assault on voting rights since Shelby v
Holder reminds us of the continued need for vigilance by civil rights organizations, such as
PRLDEF, to preserve the most fundamental civil right - the ability to vote. Looking at
PRLDEF’s national campaign for bilingual ballots, it is clear that this battle was fought on
multiple fronts, the most important of these fronts arguably was the litigation that occurred in
U.S. cities with sizable Puerto Rican populations like Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York City.
The favorable decisions in these lawsuits provided the legal framework to expand access to
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bilingual ballots for other language minorities in 1975. When these civil rights victories were
challenged in the 1980s, Puerto Rican organized resistance in local state legislatures and used
public protest to preserve their right to vote in Spanish.
The story of bilingual ballots is often misunderstood by scholars. Some focus solely upon
the federal level and the 1975 reauthorization of the VRA while others look to various sections
of the 1965 version of the VRA to find the legal rationale that resulted in bilingual voting. These
approaches, while important, miss the critical role that PRLDEF had in establishing the legal
logic for bilingual voting and, therefore, obfuscate the role of Puerto Rican civil rights
organizations and activists in this larger story of voting rights and language policy in the United
States. These activists represented one facet of Puerto Rican movement for civil rights which
contained within its ranks a diverse group of individuals, organizations, political ideologies and
strategies for achieving their goals. Other scholars have examined the contributions of Puerto
Ricans in the areas of education rights (especially in the realm of bilingual education), housing,
employment, and police brutality. Curiously, voting rights have either been ignored or deemed
less important in the larger discussion of Puerto Rican civil rights by historians. This dissertation
makes critical interventions in the literature of civil rights in the United States by highlighting
how middle class reformers utilized their professional and organizational skills to seek judicial
and legislative means to allow Puerto Ricans equal access to the vote.

The Racial Dynamics of Language
The lawyers who worked on this campaign intentionally conceptualized language as a
racial, rather than a cultural, characteristic. During the course of the lawsuits in Philadelphia,
Chicago, and New York City, as well as during the 1975 VRA reauthorization hearings, lawyers,
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civil rights activists and elected officials repeatedly invoked the 14th and 15th Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution (in addition to the 1965 VRA) as the legal foundation for their claims. The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment created the legal foundation that
supported many civil rights reforms during the 1950s and 1960s such as the Brown decision, the
Loving decision, and paved the way for the creation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 while
Section One of the Fifteenth Amendment set the stage for the VRA in 1965. Puerto Rican
activists, working with elected officials, ensured the inclusion of legal protections for Puerto
Rican voters through Section 4(e) of the VRA. Taken together, these policies created a precedent
for PRLDEF attorneys to argue that language was a component of race for the purposes of civil
rights protections and, due the history of voter discrimination against Puerto Ricans in the United
States, this community had an affirmative right to have access to translated ballots and other
voting materials. This racial construction of language was very different from the ethnic
construction of Puerto Ricans articulated by scholars and elected officials. By viewing Puerto
Ricans as an ethnic group, intellectual and political leaders of the 1950s and 1960s hoped that
this group of Spanish-speaking American citizens would traverse a similar path of assimilation
as earlier waves of European immigrants, such as the Italians, the Jewish immigrants of Eastern
Europe and the Irish. Contrary to this conceptualization of Puerto Ricans, lawyers like Pontikes,
Bertucci, Teitelbaum, Diaz, and others argued that the quality of Puerto Rican citizenship bore
closer resemblance to that of African-Americans and, therefore, language merited affirmative
protections under civil rights law.

Intersectionality within the Puerto Rican Civil Rights Movement

212

This campaign also demonstrates the need to see the movement for Puerto Rican civil
rights in the United States as a movement connected with the political fortunes of other language
minorities in the nation. PRLDEF received substantial assistance early in its existence from other
civil rights organizations such as MALDEF and drew inspiration from the NAACP. It built upon
the work of earlier civil rights campaigns for equitable voting practices by expanding the scope
of voting rights and language rights with favorable court decisions in Chicago, New York City
and Philadelphia. The success in this litigation campaign created an important legal precedent
which was later utilized as a framework to apply bilingual ballots nationally during the 1975
reauthorization of the VRA. As a result of PRLDEF’s courtroom advocacy, elections are now
conducted in a variety of languages. While PRLDEF’s efforts met with success in this campaign,
election law was not the only issue this organization was concerned with. Sonia Lee argued that
PRLDEF’s foray into bilingual education rights did not achieve the kind of success that the
organization hoped for.494 Lee is correct in arguing that access to bilingual education services
was not a cure for many of the systemic ills that Puerto Rican and other Spanish-speaking
students endured in the New York City public school (as well as in Philadelphia, Chicago, and
other cities with substantial numbers of Spanish-speaking students from low-income families).
The acquisition of a consent decree between the Board of Education and Aspira was, however, a
binding legal agreement that did not exist before PRLDEF’s legal advocacy and this decision did
open up pathways for some students to begin their path to academic success. During the 1970s
and 1980s, PRLDEF also made interventions in the realm of housing and employment rights for
Puerto Ricans as well. Within the context of a single civil rights advocacy organization existed
multiple smaller Puerto Rican civil rights campaigns. The interconnectedness of these multiple
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civil rights campaigns within one group helps us to appreciate the complexity of the many civil
rights movements that transpired across the United States during the 1960s through the 1980s.
The term Civil Rights Movement is something of a misnomer. It implies a singular focus
and a coherent organizational apparatus. This idea is betrayed, however, even within the confines
of traditional geographic and chronological spaces of the Civil Rights Movement. Within the
American South during the 1950s and 1960s, there were many distinct civil rights organizations
and campaigns which converged at some points and diverged at others. The 1953 Baton Rouge
bus boycott, organized by Reverend T.J. Jemison and the United Defense League, was a distinct
movement from the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott, led by Martin Luther King Jr. and E.D.
Nixon, even though each movement shared similar goals of desegregating the public
transportation system in their respective cities. The Greensboro sit-ins of 1960, while inspired by
King, were a distinct civil rights campaign from those occurring in the Deep South. The March
on Selma was aimed at ending Black voter disenfranchisement and not at segregation in public
transportation and public spaces. While historians have often conceptualized these events as
seminal within the framework of the Civil Rights Movement due to shared leadership and tactics,
these endeavors were smaller campaigns in a larger struggle for equality which extended well
beyond the chronology of the “classic” Civil Rights Movement, the American South, and the
African-American community.
The danger of having too narrow a gaze upon history is that we potentially miss and,
therefore, exclude voices that would enrich our sense of connection with other players in the
narrative of American history. How can we possibly demarcate the beginnings of the Civil
Rights Movement chronology back to 1954 when the story of Brown begins in late 1930s? How
can we ignore the importance of Latinos and their role in the Brown decision with the landmark
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Mendez v. Westminster decision in 1946? Do we ignore the role that Asian-Americans and
Cuban refugees had upon the development of bilingual education (an issue that is often
conceptualized as a Mexican-American or Puerto Rican issue)? If we accept that other racialized
groups in the United States, like Puerto Ricans, had an effect upon some of the seminal events in
what we have constructed as the “classic” Civil Rights Movement, then can we not also extend
this idea forward to examine how Latinos influenced the struggle for civil rights during the
1970s? This dissertation demonstrates that PRLDEF’s goals and the method by which its
attorneys sought to achieve these goals were linked to an earlier generation of civil rights
activists rooted in the idea of democratic liberalism and reform. Not only did PRLDEF build
upon the work of other civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and MALDEF, but it
continued the work of earlier Puerto Rican activism around the issue of voting rights. By
securing language access rights for Puerto Ricans, PRLDEF created the foundation to extend
these rights to other language minorities and open up the democratic process even further.

Internal Tensions within the Movement
One of the important internal dynamics of this campaign was the suppression of class
difference between upwardly mobile cause-lawyers who represented Puerto Rican plaintiffs and
the working-class plaintiffs themselves. The very terrain of much of this civil rights campaign,
the federal court system, limited who could speak on behalf of the Puerto Rican community. Due
to the nature of this civil rights campaign, many of the key figures like Herbert Teitelbaum,
Nelson Diaz, George Pontikes, and Herman Badillo, by virtue of their education and their social
capital, proved to be critical in establishing the parameters of this movement. Even though
individual attorneys, like Diaz, had working-class origins, the way in which he described the two

215

female plaintiffs he recruited reveals that he was more interested in how they could service his
agenda as opposed to integrating their voices into the litigation in Philadelphia. The affidavits of
the plaintiffs in the New York City lawsuits clearly sublimated their right to articulate their needs
to needs of PRLDEF lawyers. Even in Chicago, where the energy for the PROPA lawsuit came
from grassroots activists, the plaintiffs who testified were trained so that their testimony would
fulfill the needs of the case. The cause-lawyers who took part in this litigation were committed to
legal and legislative reform and the charitable foundations behind these cause-lawyers preferred
to support reformist organizations that challenged the institutions of the nation-state without
seeking to destabilize the American political system. It was no accident that when Juan
Cartagena participated in the English-Only protests during the 1980s, he did so with the National
Congress of Puerto Rican Rights (NCPRR) rather than PRLDEF. The organizational framework
of PRLDEF would not allow for that kind of direct-action tactic but within the NCPRR, which
actively incorporated the agenda of working-class Puerto Ricans such as a stand against police
brutality and economic equality, Cartagena was free to do so.
In addition to the class dimensions of this campaign, it also contained a gendered
dimension. These cases were largely planned and executed by men. Women, when involved,
typically served as plaintiffs whose voices were subsumed to the needs of the case. Peggy
Arroyo and Petra Gonzales in Philadelphia were recruited solely to represent Puerto Rican voters
without consideration of their needs or desires as women. Diaz even remarked that the maternal
qualities of these two women made them attractive recruits for his litigation. While PRLDEF’s
office in New York had female employees in leadership positions, they were, for the most part,
not involved in this litigation campaign for bilingual ballots. Those women who were involved in
this litigation typically served as assistants to Herbert Teitelbaum or adjuncts to serve in his
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place when he could not personally attend to it himself. This style of gendered involvement in
civil rights campaigns conforms to what Belinda Robnett calls “bridge-leadership”. While
Teitelbaum argued the merits of the case in court, Judy Medina was on the ground verifying that
bilingual ballots were distributed to Puerto Rican voters in Spanish Harlem and the South Bronx.
This form of gendered participation was not exclusive to New York City. In Chicago,
community leader Hilda Frontany, who was certainly a force to be reckoned with on her own
with the Lakeview Latin American Coalition, also served as a bridge-leader in this campaign.
Hector Franco held the title of President of PROPA, but it was Frontany that was organizing
support for this campaign. She found the prospective recruits to lend their names to the lawsuit.
She traveled with these plaintiffs to voter registration sites knowing full-well that each of the
Puerto Rican recruits would encounter problems when attempting to register. She prepared them
for the kinds of questions they would encounter when they testified in court. Finally, she testified
in court about what she observed without revealing her deeper role in the planning and execution
of this lawsuit. Despite her critical role in the success of this endeavor, Frontany was never
recognized for her efforts.
Despite these internal tensions, PRLDEF’s campaign for bilingual ballots created an
important legal precedent that would go on to become institutionalized in federal law in the span
of only three years. This was arguably the most significant and enduring contribution of Puerto
Rican civil rights movement during the 1970s. We can more fully appreciate the longevity of this
policy when compared to the other areas of civil rights activism within the Puerto Rican
community. While bilingual education has endured as a policy, support for this policy has
fluctuated based upon changes in political administration and educational funding. In addition,
discrimination in acquiring affordable housing and disparities within the criminal justice
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continue to plague Puerto Ricans, African-Americans, and other racialized communities living
within the confines of urban America despite the best efforts of activists groups like PRLDEF
and many others.

Epilogue
Since the 1970s, the demographic concentration of Puerto Ricans in the United States has
shifted. By 2000, Puerto Ricans were still a large portion of the overall Latino community in
New York City, but shared this space with Mexicans, Dominicans, and other recent arrivals from
across Latin America.495 While the Puerto Rican presence in New York City dwindled, their
population in Central Florida grew very quickly between 1990 and 2000.496 These demographic
shifts among the Puerto Ricans and other Latinos were an important factor in PRLDEF’s
reassessment of itself and its mission. Over time, PRLDEF transformed from a Puerto Rican-led
civil rights organization in New York City into a national pan-Latino civil rights organization. In
2008, the leadership of the organization agreed that the name “Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund” no longer reflected the core constituency of the group and decided to change
the name to LatinoJustice PRLDEF. The new name reflected the evolving nature of the Latino
community in the United States, but still paid homage to the organization’s historic roots in New
York City’s Puerto Rican community.497
The struggle for voting rights has evolved since the 1970s. During that period, the central
focus was on gaining equal access. This issue shifted during the 1980s and the focus was upon
495

Laird Bergad, “The Latino Population of New York City, 1990-2010” Latino Date Project, Report 44 (November
2011), 4. http://clacls.gc.cuny.edu/files/2013/10/The-Latino-Population-of-New-York-City-1990-2010.pdf accessed
on December 7, 2016
496
Monivette Cordeiro, “Puerto Ricans will surpass Cubans in Florida by 2020, report says” Orlando Weekly
September 12, 2016 http://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2016/09/12/puerto-ricans-will-surpasscubans-in-florida-by-2020-new-report-says# accessed on December 7, 2016
497
http://latinojustice.org/about/history_2000s/ accessed December 2, 2016

218

preserving the gains made in the previous decade in reaction to a large and widespread EnglishOnly movement. Early In the twenty-first century, the question of voting rights has shifted again
to enforcement. The tactics of voter identification legislation and racialized gerrymandering
work hand-in-hand with selective enforcement of bilingual ballots to limit the effect of increased
voter registration and turn-out among Puerto Ricans and other Latinos. Juan Cartagena observed
that “While the descendants of early Puerto Ricans migrants have acquired mastery of English,
increased migration away from the island and other parts of Latin America necessitate the
continued existence of section 203 of the VRA.”498 Since the election process is determined at
the state-level by the Board of Elections, and these Boards are often controlled by the Republican
Party in many states, we see an intermingling of a thinly-disguised racist agenda and machine
politics in an effort to maintain Republican control over state legislatures and the judiciary.
To this end Juan Cartagena, now the President and Lead Counsel of LatinoJustice
PRLDEF, has continued to use litigation as a tool to press for enforcement of bilingual ballots. In
Osceola County, Florida LatinoJustice PRLDEF used the threat of litigation to compel
compliance with section 203 of the VRA.499 While much of the organization’s emphasis in recent
years has been on Central Florida and the growing Puerto Rican community in Orlando,
PRLDEF has kept it eyes and ears open across the country to gather information about continued
voting rights abuses. PRLDEF, in conjunction with NALEO and the Nation Lawyers Guild,
created a smartphone application in 2016 by which individuals could report acts of voter

498

Juan Cartagena, interview. December 2, 2016
Susn Jacobson, “Osceola Vows to Help Spanish Voter” Sun Sentinal, June 26, 2002. http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2002-06-26/news/0206260167_1_spanish-speaking-voters-poll-workers-bilingual-voters Accessed
on December 19, 2017
499

219

suppression in real time.500 While the tools to suppress the right to vote have evolved since the
1970s, the tools to combat this kind of civil rights abuse has evolved alongside them.
This dissertation aims to blend the threads of both social and political history to tell the
story of PRLDEF’s litigation campaign for bilingual ballots. Using oral history and archival
sources, I have explored how language was racialized in United States law, the tensions over
class and gender that existed within this particular Puerto Rican civil rights campaign and the
intersectionality of activism within the movement. There is still room, however, for further
exploration of this topic. A more quantitative approach, for example, could inform future studies
of this issue by examining the pool of eligible language-minority voters and assess the impact of
bilingual ballots in a given community. At the end of the day, elections are about the number of
registered voters who show up to the polls on Election Day. Registration is affected by how easy
or difficult it is to register. It is no coincidence that there has been a rebirth of policies designed
to limit the electoral power of racially marginalized communities such as “packing” and
“cracking”, defunding the Department of State and local elections commissions so that the
availability of services are negatively impacted, as well as the aforementioned voter ID laws all
represent. Despite these challenges, organizations like PRLDEF and others continue to remain
active in preserving the gains made by earlier voting rights activists.
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